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THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON
THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PRINCIPLES TO MENTAL HEALTH*
LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN**
LANCE GABLE***
It is not necessary to recount the numerous charters and declarations
... to understand human rights .... All persons are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. Everyone ... is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth in the international human rights instru-
ments without discrimination, such as the rights to life, liberty, secur-
ity of person, privacy, health, education, work, social security, and to
marry and found a family. Yet, violations of human rights.., are
a reality to be found in every corner of the globe.'
International human rights law provides a powerful, but often ne-
glected, tool to advance the rights and freedoms of persons with
mental disabilities. International law may seem marginal or unimpor-
tant in developed countries with democratic and constitutional sys-
tems of their own. Yet, even democracies often resist making reforms
to mental health law and policy, and domestic courts do not always
compel the changes necessary to improve the rights and welfare of
persons with mental disabilities.2 While many democracies have taken
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Persons with Mental Disabilities: The European Convention of Human Rights, 23 INT'L J. LAW &
PSYCHIATRY 125 (2000). The authors wish to thank Marcia Carpentier, Illisa Lazar, Lauren
Marks, Steven Fadeyi, Gabe Eber, Steven Fairchild, and Stephen Barbour for their
assistance in researching and preparing this Article.
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1. Peter Piot & Jos6 Ayala-Lasso, Foreword to LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC, at vii (1997).
2. See, e.g., David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, Social Policy Toward Intellectual Disabil-
ities in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTEL-
LECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 83, 97-99 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL] (explaining that legislation protecting the rights of
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significant steps to enshrine in their national laws protections for the
rights and freedoms of persons with mental disabilities, many of these
same countries have failed to respect the human rights of persons
with mental disabilities due to popular or political pressure.3 Addi-
tionally, international human rights law is obviously important for
countries without democratic and constitutional systems because it
may provide the only genuine safeguard against the abuse of persons
with mental disabilities-abuse that may be based on political, social,
or cultural grounds.4
International human rights law is important in the context of
mental health because of two fundamental ideas unique to global pro-
tection of rights and freedoms. First, human rights law is the only
source of law that legitimizes international scrutiny of mental health
policies and practices within a sovereign country.5 Second, interna-
tional human rights law provides fundamental protections that cannot
be taken away by the ordinary political process.6
Prior to World War II, the international system consisted almost
exclusively of interactions between sovereign states.7 The interna-
tional community operated on the assumption that human rights vio-
lations within a country's borders were internal matters, and rarely
were these violations subjected to serious external scrutiny.8 As the
world came to terms with the unspeakable atrocities of the war, it be-
came evident that the existing system at both the national and interna-
tional levels had completely failed to adequately protect the rights and
freedoms of individuals.9 The international community and the na-
scent human rights movement resolved to change fundamentally the
perspective of international law to ensure that such wanton disregard
people with disabilities was not enacted until the late Twentieth Century in the United
States or Britain).
3. See id. at 98 (discussing the United Kingdom's Disability Discrimination Act, which
disappointed disability advocates by not going far enough to protect the rights of people
with disabilities).
4. See SIDNEY BLOCH & PETER REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: How SOVIET PSYCHIATRY
IS USED TO SuPPREss DISSENT 280-330 (1977) (detailing international opposition and ac-
tions taken against the Soviet Union's misuse of psychiatry to advance political purposes).
5. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 234 (2d ed.
1979) (explaining that the United States has been reluctant to enter into international
agreements because it does not want to subject itself to scrutiny from other countries).
6. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 20-21 (1990) (discussing the fundamental
nature of many human rights laws, which has made the laws binding either through cus-
tom or through international agreements).
7. GoSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also HENKIN, supra note 5, at 319-20 (explaining that nations agreed to enact
laws to prevent war).
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of peace and human dignity would not recur.' ° The human rights
movement solidified the inherent rights and freedoms of individuals
by recognizing these rights under international law and piercing the
veil of national sovereignty to hold states accountable for violations."
Human rights, therefore, are not a matter simply between citizens and
their government-even a democratically elected government. 12
Rather, human rights are a matter of international law enforceable
against the state on behalf of persons living within or under the con-
trol of the state.'" This renders each country's mental health policies
and practices subject to international human rights standards and sus-
ceptible to international monitoring and control.' 4
The second related idea is that human rights do not rely on gov-
ernment beneficence. Governments do not possess the power to
grant or deny human rights and freedoms.' 5 Persons possess rights
simply because of their humanity.16 Thus, persons with mental disa-
bilities need not prove that they deserve certain rights or that they can
be trusted to exercise them in socially and culturally acceptable ways.
The fundamental nature of human rights can, therefore, serve as a
basis to challenge unjust treatment of people with mental disabilities,
even in the face of popular or political objections.
Human rights, then, afford all persons fundamental rights and
freedoms and place duties on government to respect them. Rather
than focusing on personal obligations, classic understandings of
human rights center around a government's duty to respect rights and
freedoms.1 7 Human rights law, strictly speaking, does not protect one
individual against the harmful actions of another individual."8 How-
ever, a government can conceive its human rights duties broadly to
include: (1) respect-the state's obligation not to infringe upon human
rights, e.g., no arbitrary confinement; (2) protection-the state's obliga-
tion to prevent private violations, e.g., anti-discrimination laws; and
(3) fulfillment-the state's obligation to promote human rights, e.g.,
10. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 2.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 40 (discussing the need for governments to adhere to minimum standards
on the treatment of individuals within their specific jurisdictions).
13. Id. at 8-9.
14. See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 21 (explaining that a member of an international
agreement may report the violations of another member).
15. GosTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at xiv.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 43.
18. See, e.g., Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Doti v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, para. 20
(noting that a directive cannot be used to impose obligations on one individual against
another individual).
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education and services.' 9 Thus, international human rights law places
the onus on the state to safeguard the human rights of all people,
including individuals with mental disabilities.
This Article examines the human rights of persons with mental
disabilities and the application and development of these rights by the
various international and regional systems that have been established
to protect human rights. An international system of human rights
with universal application has been developed under the auspices of
the United Nations.2 ° Regional human rights systems have applied
additional human rights protections to their respective geographic re-
gions.2" Both the international and regional systems have addressed
the human rights of persons with mental disabilities through treaties,
declarations, and thematic resolutions.22 Moreover, regional institu-
tions have incrementally formulated a body of law that protects the
human rights of persons with mental disabilities.2" These interna-
tional systems, documents, institutions, and legal rulings have collec-
tively spurred the development of tangible and recognizable human
rights standards at the international and regional levels; they have also
brought to light, and in some cases put an end to, ongoing human
rights violations targeting persons with mental disabilities.24 Further,
the legal precedent and public pressure created by this body of inter-
national law has encouraged domestic governments to apply human
rights principles to their policies affecting mentally disabled individu-
als at the national and sub-national level. 25 This Article devotes partic-
ular attention to the well-developed jurisprudence within the
European system for the protection of human rights. This regional
human rights system has advanced a rich and nuanced body of law
protecting the human rights of persons with mental disabilities.
19. See generally HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS, MoRALs 361-66 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the liberal political
tradition of Western civilization and its emphasis on state obligations to individuals).
20. GoSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 2.
21. Id. at 10-12.
22. See generally Stanley S. Herr, From Wrongs to Rights: International Human Rights and
Legal Protection, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 2, at 115, 118-37 (detailing several
international and regional human rights initiatives).
23. See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 11 (contending that regional systems are
often more accessible and responsive to individual complaints than the broader interna-
tional human rights system).
24. See id. at 11-12 (discussing the purpose behind several regional human rights
systems).
25. See, e.g., Braddock & Parrish, supra note 2, at 97-98 (describing laws enacted by the
U.S. and Great Britain regarding persons with disabilities).
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First, this Article briefly examines three important relationships
between mental health and human rights: (1) how coercive mental
health policies can infringe on human rights; (2) how invasions of
human rights can harm mental health; and (3) how the positive pro-
motion of mental health and human rights can have mutually rein-
forcing and synergistic results.
Second, this Article reviews sources of law within the United Na-
tions system of human rights protection. The principal source of law
within the United Nations system is the International Bill of Human
Rights, which includes two treaty-based covenants that are binding on
states that have ratified the agreements. 26 These covenants, and the
General Comments interpreting them, as well as the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, serve as the foundation of international
human rights law. 27 The Article also examines the United Nations
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for
the Improvement of Mental Health Care (MI Principles). 2' These
principles, while not formally binding, serve as influential aids in the
interpretation of treaty obligations. 29  The Article additionally dis-
cusses other nonbinding statements, resolutions, and principles for-
mulated at the international level that have furthered the
development of human rights as applied to persons with mental disa-
bilities. Two ongoing international initiatives are also considered: a
proposal for a specialized international treaty on disability rights
30
and the forthcoming Mental Health Legislation Manual that the
World Health Organization is developing.3'
26. See Herr, supra note 22, at 121-22 (noting that these two covenants are the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights).
27. See id. at 118-23 (discussing the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and international treaties on the establishment of international human rights law).
28. G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 3d Comm., 75th plen. mtg., reprinted in
[1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. 620, U.N. Sales No. E.92.I.1 [hereinafter MI Principles].
29. Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under
the "Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257,
268 (1993).
30. For an excellent discussion of the rights of persons with mental disabilities under
existing human rights instruments and the debate over a new binding treaty specifically
addressing the rights of persons with mental and intellectual disabilities, see Eric Rosenthal
& Clarence J. Sundram, Recognizing Existing Rights and Crafting New Ones: Tools for Drafting
Human Rights Instruments for People with Mental Disabilities, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra
note 2, at 467.
31. The World Health Organization is currently in the process of developing a Mental
Health Legislation Manual that national governments may use as a guide to modernize
their mental health laws and incorporate human rights concepts into national mental
health practice. The Manual is part of a larger effort by the WHO Department of Mental
Health and Substance Dependence "to protect and promote the human rights of people
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Third, this Article discusses regional human rights systems in Eu-
rope, Africa, and the Americas. These regional systems operate under
human rights instruments distinct from the United Nations system,
but often contain similar human rights norms to those found in
United Nations sources.3 2 These institutions have achieved substan-
tial progress in the development of human rights law relevant to per-
sons with mental disabilities.33
Fourth, this Article examines the application of civil and political
rights to mental health by international and regional systems of
human rights protection. The corpus of international human rights
law has focused predominantly on civil and political rights that pre-
vent governments from taking or permitting actions that will reduce
human rights among persons with mental disabilities.34 The analysis
will focus in depth on the most highly developed regional system of
human rights protection-the European Convention of Human
Rights3 5 (ECHR) within the Council of Europe-but will also explore
the intersection of human rights and mental health under the African
and Inter-American regional systems. This part of the Article demon-
strates the vast potential of human rights law in three important areas
of mental health policy: (1) the right to fundamental fairness in com-
pulsory admission and subsequent detention in mental institutions,
e.g., legal representation, a hearing, and use of independent experts;
(2) the right to humane and dignified conditions of confinement,
e.g., avoidance of neglectful or abusive conditions in mental hospitals
and harmful or intrusive forms of medical treatment; and (3) protec-
tion of the rights of citizenship, e.g., privacy, marriage, franchise, and
association.
Finally, the Article discusses the application of social, economic,
and cultural rights to mental health, particularly with respect to af-
firmative entitlements to mental health services. While the basis for
recognizing economic, social, and cultural mental health rights exists
with mental disorders." See World Health Organization, WHO Project on Mental Health and
Human Rights, at http://www.who.int/hhr/mentalhealth/en/ [hereinafter WMO Project]
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (explaining the purpose, history, and future of the Manual).
32. See GoSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 10-12 (describing several regional systems).
33. See generally David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American
Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUmAN RIGHTS (DavidJ. Harris & Stephen
Livingstone eds., 1998) [hereinafter INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM] (describing the achieve-
ments made by the Inter-American human rights system).
34. See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 10-12 (discussing the rights targeted by
each regional human rights system).
35. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Conven-
tion/WebCovenENG.pdf [hereinafter ECHR].
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in international and regional instruments, institutions at the interna-
tional, regional, and domestic levels have been reluctant to pursue,
define, or enforce such positive rights. 36 The right to health, how-
ever, has undergone a significant evolution in recent years through
the adoption of several notable instruments and reports at the inter-
national and regional levels, most importantly General Comment 14
to the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.3 Additionally, the United Nations has appointed a Special
Rapporteur on the right to health, whose mandate includes the right
to mental health. 8 Concurrently, an expanding body of scholarly
writing has examined the scope and application of the right to
health.39 The idea of affirmative mental health rights can fundamen-
tally advance the dignity and welfare of persons with mental
disabilities.
International human rights law, of course, leaves domestic gov-
ernments with a wide range of discretion in relation to each of these
rights and freedoms.40 Nevertheless, this body of international law
opens each of these areas to serious external scrutiny and may pro-
voke domestic governments to recognize and respect these rights and
freedoms.
36. See generally BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 3-26 (1999) (offering an extensive account of the development of the right
to health). But see GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 6-7 (explaining the lack of precise
standards and definitions for the right to health); TOEBES, supra, at 259-72 (delineating
complications with defining the content of the right to health).
37. The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, CESCR General Comment 14, U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22d Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14].
38. The Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, has released his first report. See The Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health: Report
of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, 59th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2003/58 (2003).
39. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean
for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457, 1467-74 (2001) (discussing the right to
health under international treaties and institutions); Aart Hendriks, The Right to Health:
Promotion and Protection of Women's Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health Under International
Law: The Economic Covenant and the Women's Convention, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1123, 1128-31
(1995) (explaining the scope of a woman's right to sexual and reproductive health);
Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REv. 1, 8-17 (1994)
(exploring differing definitions for an international right to health); Mary Ann Torres, The
Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: A Case Study from
Venezuela, 3 CHI.J. INT'L L. 105, 111-14 (2002) (setting forth the importance of the interna-
tional right to health by evaluating a Venezuelan Supreme Court case).
40. See Kinney, supra note 39, at 1464-67 (discussing the problems and promise of using
customary international law to promote a human right to health).
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I. THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Mental health and human rights, with notable exceptions, are
rarely connected in thoughtful, systematic ways. 4 Different philoso-
phies, vocabularies, and social roles may explain the rarity of cross-
disciplinary work.42 Yet, mental health and human rights are both
powerful, modern approaches to advancing human well-being; by
viewing these two fields together, rather than each in isolation, they
become mutually reinforcing.4" There are three relationships be-
tween mental health and human rights: (1) mental health policy af-
fects human rights; (2) human rights violations affect mental health;
and (3) positive promotion of both mental health and human rights
are mutually reinforcing.44
The first relationship is that mental health policies, programs,
and practices can violate human rights.45 Despite its rhetoric of "vol-
untarism" and noncoercion, mental health policy quintessentially in-
volves the exercise of governmental power-the power to restrain, to
treat, and to deprive individuals of basic rights of citizenship, e.g., vot-
ing, access to the courts, and controlling personal and financial af-
fairs.46 Mental health powers may be exercised beneficently for the
welfare of the individual as well as family and society. However, gov-
ernmental authority, by its very nature, affects a variety of personal
interests such as autonomy, bodily integrity, privacy, property, and lib-
erty.47 These interests can, and do, give rise to human rights claims
when mental health powers are exercised arbitrarily, in a discrimina-
tory manner, or in the absence of a fair process.
41. Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
7, 7 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. at 11-14.
46. See Larry Gostin, Human Rights in Mental Health: A Proposal for Five International Stan-
dards Based Upon the Japanese Experience, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 353, 358-60 (1987) (dis-
cussing the importance of voluntary admission to mental hospitals and noting the
prevalence of compulsory admission in Japan); see also Michael Allen & Vicki Fox Smith,
Opening Pandora's Box: The Practical and Legal Dangers of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 342, 343-45 (2001) (describing how involuntary outpatient com-
mitment violates various constitutional rights, including the right to privacy and the right
to travel).
47. See Keith Graham, Freedom, Liberalism and Subversion, in LIBERTY AND LEGISLATION
205, 213-14 (Richard Hoggart ed., 1989) (asserting that the state has a decisive and pervad-
ing influence over every area of an individual's life).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The second relationship between the two approaches is that
human rights violations adversely affect mental health.48 The mental
health effects of severe human rights violations, such as torture, rape,
genocide, and inhuman and degrading treatment, are obvious and
inherent.49 Yet, the duration and extent of mental health problems
remain under-appreciated.5 ° Severe abuses of human rights result in
serious, life-long mental suffering-not only by the individual, but
often the family, community, and even future generations.5' Serious
human rights violations usually are designed, not so much to inflict
physical pain, but to break the human spirit-torture may be politi-
cally motivated to discourage resistance to government; rape and ge-
nocide may be employed to destroy ethnic and cultural identity.5
2
Even less drastic human rights violations, such as discrimination and
invasion of privacy, can have adverse effects on mental well-being by
undermining dignity and self-worth.5"
The third relationship between the two approaches is that mental
health and human rights are inextricably linked.54 Mental health and
human rights are complementary approaches to the betterment of
human beings. Some measure of mental health is indispensable for
human rights because only those who possess some reasonable level of
functioning can engage in political and social life.55 Similarly, human
48. Mann et al., supra note 41, at 14-16.
49. Anne E. Goldfield et al., The Physical and Psychological Sequelae of Torture:
Symptomology and Diagnosis, 259 JAMA 2725, 2727 (1988).
50. Id. at 2727-28.
51. See id. (describing the long-term effects that torture victims experience); see also
KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 264-67 (1997) (discussing how rape of women during times of war af-
fects not only the victim, but also the community group to which she belongs).
52. SeeAHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ENFORCEMENT 18-19, 36-37 (1999) (asserting that the infliction of mental suffering is a
form of torture); see also ASKIN, supra note 51, at 264-67 (stating that the purpose of rape
during war time is for one group to assert superiority and domination over another).
53. See, e.g., Aart Hendriks, Disabled Persons and Their Right to Equal Treatment: Allowing
Differentiation While Ending Discrimination, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 153, 153-55 (1995) (dis-
cussing how disability-based discrimination perpetuates human rights violations where
those who hold power seek to reinforce their superiority); Aldred H. Neufeldt & Ruth
Mathieson, Empirical Dimensions of Discrimination Against Disabled People, 1 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. 174, 178-81 (1995) (reviewing the disadvantages suffered by disabled people as a re-
sult of discrimination in education and employment opportunities).
54. Mann et al., supra note 41, at 16-18.
55. See NoRMAN DANIELSJusT HEALTH CARE 32-35 (1985) (stating that disease and disa-
bility can impair an individual's ability to function in society); see also Dan W. Brock &
Norman Daniels, Ethical Foundations of the Clinton Administration's Proposed Health Care Sys-
tem, 271 JAMA 1189, 1189-90 (1994) (arguing that treatment for mental illness is an essen-
tial part of a comprehensive health plan, because mental health is necessary for individuals
to pursue nearly all of their life goals).
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rights are indispensable for mental health because they provide secur-
ity from harm or restraint and the freedom to form and express be-
liefs that are essential to mental well-being.56
Consider the importance of mental health and human rights to
women in society. Without good mental health, women cannot func-
tion within the family, community, and workplace or participate in the
political process.57 Furthermore, women's mental health will suffer if
they are subjected to discrimination, enforced conditions, violence in
sexual relationships or marriage, limits on their possession or use of
property, or restrictions on their social status or means of livelihood.58
Seen in this way, a woman's mental health may improve by safeguard-
ing her human rights-for example, by reforming laws relating to di-
vorce, property distribution, labor, and rape. 59 A woman's power to
secure her rights may improve if the government provides services
and other conditions necessary for mental health.6 °
II. SOURCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION SYSTEM
The body of law that has developed around international human
rights is complex and evolving. The continuing development of
human rights law and practice within the United Nations system has
strengthened human rights protection for persons with mental disa-
bilities.6" Nevertheless, a patchwork of sources created these protec-
tions and they have been enforced only sporadically in securing and
promoting mental health.6 2 The International Bill of Human Rights,
which contains the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and the two International Covenants of Human
Rights, comprises the main source of law within the United Nations
56. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 262-67 (discussing the rights outlined
in the MI Principles and their emphasis on protecting the dignity and freedom of mentally
ill persons and preventing discrimination against them).
57. See Pamela Goldberg, Women, Health and Human Rights, 9 PACE INT'L L. REv. 271,
275-77 (1997) (discussing the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and its focus on
women's mental health in both societal and political contexts).
58. See id. at 279-80.
59. See id. at 283-85 (describing human rights problems and the need for legislation to
enforce the human rights of women).
60. See id.
61. SeeJamar, supra note 39, at 19-28 (setting forth and explaining several international
documentary sources that provide substance for a right to health); see also Rosenthal &
Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 257-77 (outlining the rights embodied in the United Nations
MI Principles that serve as guidelines for protecting the rights of mentally ill people).
62. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 284-85 (asserting that international
scrutiny is needed to ensure that states enforce international agreements).
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system.6 3 While the International Bill of Human Rights forms the
foundation for international human rights law, its provisions do not
explicitly focus on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.6 4
Consequently, the United Nations has adopted additional declara-
tions, resolutions, and guidance documents specifically addressing the
rights of persons with mental illness 65 and developmental disabili-
ties.6 6 Also, Special Rapporteurs appointed by the United Nations to
investigate specific human rights areas have added guidance on the
interface of human rights and mental disability.6 7 The regional
human rights systems in the Americas, Europe, and Africa further pro-
tect the human rights of persons with mental disabilities.6 8 Part III of
this Article discusses these systems in detail. The following part exam-
ines the application of human rights to persons with mental disabili-
ties under the United Nations system, tracing the development of
international human rights law through the prism of mental health.
This part also discusses several international initiatives underway to
clarify and advance these rights.
63. G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
IBHR]. The International Bill of Human Rights also includes the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR. Id. The Optional Protocol empowers private persons to seek redress for Covenant
violations from the Human Rights Committee, but is only available against states that have
ratified it. See Dinah L. Shelton, Individual Complaint Machinery under the United Nations
1503 Procedure and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 59, 67 (Hurst Hannum ed.,
1984). The Optional Protocol binds a majority of the states that are parties to the Cove-
nant. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (July 7, 2003), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
64. See IBHR, supra note 63 (describing rights applicable to every person).
65. MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 620.
66. See Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856, U.N. GAOR,
26th Sess., at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); see also Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Per-
sons, G.A. Res. 3447, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Standard
Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 96, 48th Sess., at
202, U.N. Doc. A/48/627 (1993) [hereinafter Standard Rules]. See generally Stanley S. Herr,
Rights of Disabled Persons: International Principles and American Experiences, 12 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 1 (1980) (exploring the application of human rights to persons with disabili-
ties); DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 2 (containing many articles about international
human rights instruments).
67. See supra note 38 and infra notes 156-159 (discussing the reports of several Special
Rapporteurs).
68. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 35; American Convention on Human Rights, opened for
signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter American Convention]; African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
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A. The United Nations Charter
In its preamble, the United Nations Charter articulates the deter-
mination of the international community "to reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, [and] in the dignity and worth of the human
person."69 One of the central purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o
achieve international co-operation in... promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction. "70 Similarly, the United Nations "shall promote
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development"7 and "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all."72 The Charter, adopted as a binding treaty in 1945, requires
member states to advocate and to observe the human rights of all indi-
viduals, regardless of their racial, gender, ethnic, or religious
differences.73
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) built upon
the ideals of the United Nations Charter by identifying specific rights
and freedoms that deserve promotion and protection. 4 With the
adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the organized international commu-
nity first attempted to establish "a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations" to promote human rights. 75 The Dec-
laration's thirty articles are based upon the principle that "[a]ll
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."76 The
rights set forth in the UDHR are to be respected without discrimina-
tion, and include: the right to life, liberty, and security of person; the
prohibition of slavery, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment; the right to an effective judicial remedy; the prohibition of
arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; freedom from arbitrary interfer-
69. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (Oct. 24, 1945), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/UN
charter.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
70. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
71. Id. art. 55(a).
72. Id art. 55(c).
73. Id arts. 55-56. Similarly, the Constitution of the World Health Organization states:
"The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic
or social condition." CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, reprinted in 14
U.N.T.S. 185, 186.
74. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/311 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
75. Id, pmbl.
76. Id. art. 1.
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ence with privacy, family, or home; freedom of movement; freedom of
conscience, religion, expression, and association; and the right to par-
ticipate in government. 7 Notably, the UDHR does not separate or
make distinctions among civil and political rights and economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights.7"
The UDHR characterizes economic, social, and cultural rights as
"indispensable for [a person's] dignity and the free development of
his personality." 9 Among the economic, social, and cultural rights
included under the UDHR are several that are especially applicable to
vulnerable populations, such as persons with mental disabilities: social
security, work, equal pay for equal work, remuneration ensuring "an
existence worthy of human dignity," education, and the right to share
in the cultural life of the community and "to share in scientific ad-
vancement and its benefits."8 Article 25 of the UDHR expressly rec-
ognizes an interest in health:8
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, includ-
ing food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unem-
ployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.8 2
The UDHR has largely fulfilled the promise of its preamble, be-
coming the "common standard" for evaluating human rights condi-
tions.8 3 Although the United Nations did not promulgate the UDHR
to legally bind member states, countries have so often applied and
accepted its key provisions that the principles have attained the status
of customary international law.84 The UDHR embodies the interna-
tional community's understanding of "human rights" and has inspired
77. Id. arts. 3-28.
78. See id. arts. 1-28.
79. Id. art. 22.
80. Id. arts. 22-27.
81. During the drafting of the UDHR, the emphasis shifted from a direct focus on the
right to health to its current focus on the economic necessities to achieve human health.
See TOEBES, supra note 36, at 36-40 (tracing the progression of the text of the UDHR).
During its second session, the Commission on Human Rights produced a draft declaration
stating that "[e]veryone, without distinction as to economic and social conditions, has the
right to the preservation of his health by means of adequate food, clothing, housing, and
medical care." Id. at 38.
82. UDHR, supra note 74, art. 25.
83. Id. pmbl.
84. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 317-52 (1995) (discussing the accept-
ance of the UDHR as customary international law).
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successive generations of legally binding human rights instruments,
including the international covenants on human rights and regional
documents such as the European Convention of Human Rights.85
The "common standard" established by the UDHR does not, however,
specify the enumerated human rights beyond their most general con-
text, and, as a result, has minimal direct application to the rights of
persons with mental disabilities.8 6
C. Mental Health Rights Under International Human Rights Treaties
1. The International Covenants on Human Rights.-The adoption
of the UDHR set the stage for the International Covenants on Human
Rights, a binding, treaty-based scheme to promote and protect human
rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were adopted in 1966, and entered into
force in 1976.87 Similarly to the UDHR, the international covenants
do not focus explicitly on the rights of persons with mental disabili-
ties; rather, they adopt broad principles for safeguarding and promot-
ing these rights.88 Unlike the UDHR, the drafters of the international
covenants separated the rights into two groups-civil and political
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights-creating distinct in-
struments for each group of rights. The covenants address many of
the same rights found in the UDHR and, in some instances, expand
significantly upon the UDHR's treatment of these rights.8" The two
85. See id at 290 (noting that nearly every international human rights agreement
makes a reference to the UDHR).
86. See UDHR, supra note 74 (failing to articulate specific rights for individuals with
mental disabilities).
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
88. See ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74 (mandating remedies for
violations of recognized rights and freedoms); see also ICESCR, supra note 87, art. 2, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5 (detailing rights under the agreement that states must enforce).
89. The ICCPR includes most, but not all, of the civil and political rights addressed in
the UDHR. Compare ICCPR, supra note 87, arts. 1-27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-79 (covering
rights of self-determination, freedom from discrimination, marriage and fair trial, among
others, but not covering the right to own property alone), with UDHR, supra note 74, art.
17 (enumerating the right to own property alone). The ICESCR, by contrast, addresses
economic, social, and cultural rights more extensively than the UDHR. See Marc-Andr6
Eissen, The European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Problems of Coexistence, 22 Buow. L. REv. 181, 182-83 (1973) (discussing the
United Nations' conception and enactment of the two covenants and the UDHR).
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international covenants, however, diverge in their treatment of per-
missible limitations on the rights they enumerate. 90
The civil and political rights contained in the ICCPR protect indi-
viduals from government actions that infringe on their liberty, privacy,
and freedom of expression and association." Persons with mental dis-
abilities have frequently invoked these rights and benefited from the
protection they provide. For example, the prohibition of cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment has empowered mentally disabled per-
sons subject to civil commitment to argue for more humane
conditions of confinement and treatment. 92 Likewise, the right not to
be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention has bolstered efforts to re-
quire adequate procedural protections for persons with mental disa-
bilities subject to civil or criminal confinement.9 3
Sections of the ICESCR form the foundation for rights that im-
pose affirmative duties on the state to provide services.94 Such eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights include family protection, an
adequate standard of living, education, and the right to share in scien-
tific advancement and its benefits.95 Article 12 of the ICESCR re-
quires governments to recognize "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
90. The ICCPR recognizes that certain rights are so fundamental as to be absolute and
proscribes any derogation of them. ICCPR, supra note 87, art. 4.2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
Nonderogable rights include: the right to life; freedom from torture and from cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to recognition as a person before
the law; and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Id. arts. 6, 7, 16, 18, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174-75, 177-78. The ICCPR states that other rights may be justifiably limited
under certain conditions, such as "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation" but only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with other obligations under interna-
tional law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin." Id. art. 4.1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. Freedom of move-
ment may be justifiably limited where restrictions are "provided by law, are necessary to
protect national security, public order . . . .public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others." Id. art. 12.3, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176. The ICESCR, on the other hand,
permits "such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible
with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare
in a democratic society." ICESCR, supra note 87, art. 4., 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
91. ICCPR, supra note 87, arts. 9.1, 18.1, 19.2, 22, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175, 178.
92. See, e.g., Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1985)
(discussing the contention of a mentally disabled individual who claimed that his transfer
to a higher security hospital resulted in a deprivation of his liberty).
93. See, e.g., Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24-25 (1979)
(finding that the judicial proceedings in the Netherlands' Mentally Ill Persons Act were
inadequate procedural protections under section 4 of ECHR Article 5).
94. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 87, art. 2, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 (requiring signatory states
to guarantee the rights articulated in the ICESCR).
95. Id. arts. 10-15, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7-9.
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the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."96 Persons
with mental disabilities and their advocates have utilized many of
these economic, social, and cultural rights to advance access to treat-
ment in the community, develop more effective and humane treat-
ments for mental illness, and increase the availability of educational
and vocational training programs that target persons with mental
disabilities.9
7
2. Human Rights Treaties.--Persons with mental disabilities who
are also members of other vulnerable groups may receive additional
human rights protections under four other existing international trea-
ties. United Nations conventions on the rights of women,98 chil-
dren,99 and racial minorities 10 have established a more rigorous
exposition of human rights directly pertinent to these specific groups.
The United Nations also has promulgated a convention prohibiting
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.10 ' This convention,
while not explicitly addressing mental health, is notable because per-
sons with mental disabilities may be subjected to cruel treatment in
institutions, or even in the community." 2 The rights found in the
foregoing conventions are targeted more toward the concerns of the
protected groups and they may, in some cases, offer more substantial
protections than the more general principles found in the ICCPR and
ICESCR. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example,
provides that a "mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a
full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-
reliance, and facilitate the child's active participation in the commu-
nity."103 Moreover, each of these conventions creates distinct moni-
96. Id. art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Gerard Quinn et al., Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use and Future
Potential of United Nations Human Rights Instruments, in THE CONTEXT OF DISABILITY 59-73
(2002) (detailing the manner in which nations should implement and enforce the rights
outlined in the ICESCR).
98. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDEW].
99. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinaf-
ter CRC].
100. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter ICERD].
101. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. This
convention prohibits intentionally inflicting physical or mental pain for any reason, includ-
ing discrimination based on mental disability. Id. art. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14.
102. See Neufeldt & Mathieson, supra note 53, at 178-83 (describing discrimination
against disabled individuals in education and in the workforce).
103. CRC, supra note 99, art. 23, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 51.
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toring bodies to oversee the enactment of and adherence to
convention rights.' °4 The monitoring bodies, in turn, have inter-
preted the conventions to support the human rights of persons with
mental disabilities."0 5 These monitoring bodies may provide persons
with mental disabilities within the covered groups additional opportu-
nities for oversight. 10 6
The rights contained in the International Covenants and the four
specific conventions mentioned above have binding effect on all states
that have signed and ratified them.10 7 These instruments, therefore,
establish a base level of human rights protection and the expectation
that signatory states will respect these rights. The widespread interna-
tional acceptance of the ICCPR and ICESCR suggests that the rights
they contain may have attained the status of customary international
law, which, at least in time, would make them applicable even to non-
signatory states.'0 8 The other conventions, while less likely to be bind-
ing through customary international law, have nevertheless been
widely ratified and have, thus, added to a meaningful international
human rights framework.'0 9
D. Clarifying Human Rights Under the United Nations System: General
Comments, Declarations, Resolutions, Reports, and Principles
The binding treaties discussed above establish the underpinnings
of the United Nations system of human rights. The norms and princi-
ples they contain, however, do not specifically address the rights of
persons with mental disabilities." 0 Traditionally, monitoring bodies
104. See, e.g., id. art. 43, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 58-59 (establishing the Committee on the
Rights of the Child to oversee enactment of the convention).
105. See Theresia Degener, Disability as a Subject of International Human Rights Law and
Comparative Discrimination Law, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 2, at 157 (noting that
monitoring bodies have adopted interpretive documents to support the rights of people
with mental disabilities).
106. See id. at 157-59 (discussing the interpretations of several treaty-monitoring bodies
that have safeguarded the rights of individuals with disabilities).
107. E.g., CRC, supra note 99, art. 50.3, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 61 (declaring that the Conven-
tion's provisions and amendments are binding on signatory states).
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1986) (declaring that "customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation").
109. The conventions, as widely accepted international law, exert pressure on nations to
comply with their standards. See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 44-45 (describing the impact of
international norms on government behavior).
110. The ICCPR, for example, does not specifically address these rights. ICCPR, supra
note 87, 999 U.N.T.S. at 172-79.
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operating under the treaties have not adequately enforced them.'1 1
Consequently, further guidance, development, and explanation have
been necessary to ensure that member states can effectively apply the
rights contained in these instruments to protect and promote mental
health.
Beginning in the 1970s, the United Nations developed a number
of comments, declarations, resolutions, and guidance documents that
have elaborated on the application of general rights to persons with
mental disabilities. 12 This evolution has occurred gradually, incre-
mentally, and often inconsistently.1 " 3 General Comments to the Inter-
national Covenants, General Assembly resolutions, Special
Rapporteur reports on health and disability rights, and other related
initiatives, some of which are ongoing as of this writing, have clarified
the rights of persons with mental disabilities. 4 Most significantly, the
United Nations has approved principles that directly apply to the
rights of persons with mental disabilities. 15
1. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness. -The
United Nations designated the years 1983 to 1992 as the "Decade for
Disabled Persons."11 6 The Human Rights Commission appointed two
special rapporteurs, Erica-Irene Daes 17 and Leandro Despouy, s to
report on human rights abuses and to advance the welfare and rights
of persons with disabilities, including the mentally ill.1 9 Following an
111. See Degener, supra note 105, at 159 (describing the international human rights
regime as a "toothless tiger").
112. See id. at 155-57 (discussing the United Nations' movement in the 1970s to recog-
nize individuals with disabilities as subjects of human rights).
113. See, e.g., id. at 156 (noting that the U.N. Commission of Human Rights failed to
capitalize on an opportunity to create a binding international human rights instrument to
protect persons with disabilities in institutions).
114. See, e.g., Persons with Disabilities, CESCR General Comment 5, U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, l1th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1995/22 (1994); General
Comment 14, supra note 37.
115. MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 620.
116. Implementation of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons,
[1982] 36 U.N.Y.B. 983, U.N. Doc. A/37/632.
117. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Principles, Guidelines and Guarantees for the Protection of Persons
Detained on Grounds of Mental Ill-Health or Suffering from Mental Disorder, U.N. ESCOR, U.N.
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/17 (1986).
118. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES,
HUMAN RGHTS AND DISABILITY, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/31 (1991).
119. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 258 (discussing the findings of the
special rapporteurs).
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extensive drafting process beginning in the late 1970s,12' and consid-
erable debate among mental health professionals and civil libertari-
ans, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the MI Principles,
a detailed international statement of the rights of persons with mental
illness.1 2' The MI Principles are a useful interpretive guide to United
Nations and regional human rights conventions.
The MI Principles begin by enunciating fundamental freedoms
and rights to such things as the "best available" mental health care;
respect for inherent dignity; protection from exploitation, physical or
other abuse, and degrading treatment; nondiscrimination; naturaljus-
tice prior to a finding of incapacity; and, more generally, the right to
exercise all rights found in the International Bill of Human Rights
and other relevant instruments. 22 The MI Principles recognize the
inherent difficulties of protecting human rights in institutions by not-
ing that care should, when possible, be administered in the commu-
nity.1 23 The duty to treat patients in the least restrictive environment
and to maintain and improve their autonomy reinforces this prefer-
ence for community care. 24
The MI Principles adopt a set of legal standards and procedures
for involuntary admission to a hospital. 125 A mental health institution
may involuntarily admit a person only if: (1) she has a mental illness
diagnosed under internationally accepted medical standards; and (2)
there is a serious possibility that immediate harm will happen to her
or to others; or (3) if she is severely mentally ill, has impaired judg-
ment, and there will be a drastic deterioration of her illness if the
facility does not admit her.1 26 To ensure that an involuntary admis-
sion meets the preceding requirements, a patient will receive a fair
hearing by a judicial or other independent and impartial review
body.127 During this hearing, the patient has the right to representa-
120. Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Developments, G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR,
33d Sess., at 144, U.N. Doc. E/1978/33 (1978). The earliest draft was prepared by a com-
mittee under the auspices of the International Association of Penal Law and the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists. THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS SUFFERING FROM MENrAL
DISORDER: PROCEEDINGS OF Two MEETINGS OF EXPERTS HELD AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF HIGHER STUDIES IN CRIMINAL STUDIES IN SIRACUSA MAY 29-31, 1980 AND DECEMBER
1-4, 1980 (1980).
121. MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28; see also Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra
note 29, at 260-99 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the MI Principles).
122. MIPinciples, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, principle 1, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 621.
123. Id. principles 3, 7, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 621-22.
124. See id. principle 9, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 622 (prescribing the right to treatment in
the least restrictive environment).
125. Id. principle 16, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 624.
126. Id.
127. Id. principles 17, 18, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 624-25.
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tion, can call independent experts, and can review all evidence given
and the reasons for the review body's decision.' 2' The MI Principles
offer less robust protection against mandatory treatment. Principle
11, addressing consent to treatment, offers a complex and detailed
political compromise between autonomy and paternalism.
129
Persons with mental illness are entitled to a number of civil and
political rights including privacy and confidentiality, freedom of com-
munication, access to information, and freedom from forced labor.130
The MI Principles also enunciate a set of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights including the right to health and social services appropri-
ate to health needs, an individualized treatment plan, recreational
and educational services, and resources for mental health facilities
comparable to other health facilities.131
The MI Principles comprise the most direct expression of human
rights in the context of mental illness issued to date by the United
Nations. 3 2 The MI Principles, however, are not a panacea for mental
disability rights in all contexts. The civil and political rights found in
the MI Principles apply to all persons with mental disability, regardless
of whether they reside in a mental health facility. 13 3 The economic,
social, and cultural rights, by contrast, only apply to patients in mental
health facilities.' Notably, the MI Principles apply to all persons ad-
128. Id.
129. Id. principle 11, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 622-23; see Caroline Gendreau, The Rights of
Psychiatric Patients in the Light of the Principles Announced by the United Nations: A Recognition of
the Right to Consent to Treatment, 20 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 259, 267-76 (1997) (explaining
Principle 11 in detail). Some commentators have criticized this compromise, stating that
the MI Principles do not give patients sufficient autonomy. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein,
supra note 29, at 264 (discussing the tension between informed consent and physician
authority); Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 30, at 483 (asserting that the MI Principles
raise an expectation that cannot be met by mental health facilities). The United States
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether mentally ill defendants can be forced to
undergo treatment without their consent to render them competent to stand trial. See Sell
v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003). The Supreme Court established that it was consti-
tutional to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant so that he would be
competent to stand trial. Id. at 2178. The Court held that this practice is acceptable only if
the treatment is medically appropriate, it is unlikely that any drug side effects will under-
mine the fairness of the trial, and the treatment is necessary to further important govern-
mental interests in relation to the trial. Id. at 2184-85.
130. MIPrinciples, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, principles 6, 13, 19, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B.
at 622-23, 625.
131. Id. principles 8-10, 13, 14, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 622-24.
132. Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 259.
133. See MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, principle 1(5), [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at
621 ("Every person with a mental illness shall have the right to exercise all civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights.").
134. Id. principles 7, 13, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 622-23.
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mitted to a mental health facility, regardless of whether they are in
fact mentally ill.1" 5
2. General Disability Provisions Applied to Persons with Mental Disa-
bilities.-In addition to the MI Principles, the United Nations has
promulgated several other nonbinding disability-specific instruments,
including declarations outlining the rights of mentally-retarded 136
and disabled persons,13 7 and the Standard Rules on the Equalization
of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (the Standard Rules)."3 '
These instruments, while not specifically targeted at mental disabili-
ties, generally apply human rights to persons with any type of disabil-
ity. The Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons (the Disability
Declaration), adopted in 1975, broadly defines a person with disabili-
ties as "any person unable to ensure by himself or herself, wholly or
partly, the necessities of a normal individual and/or social life, as a
result of a deficiency, either congenital or not, in his or her physical
or mental capabilities."' The Disability Declaration asserts an exten-
sive set of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, includ-
ing rights to "medical, psychological and functional treatment" 4 ' and
economic and social security.14' Importantly, the Disability Declara-
tion also endorses community integration efforts for persons with dis-
abilities. 42 These rights clearly apply to persons with both physical
and mental disabilities.1 4 3
The Decade for Disabled Persons culminated with the World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993. The Vienna Declaration from
135. Id. principle 24, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 625; see Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sun-
dram, International Human Rights in Mental Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 469, 489 (2002) (noting the importance of this provision since the lack of other
resources and facilities means that many countries utilize mental health institutions to
house persons that are not mentally ill).
136. Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856, supra note
66, at 449; see Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 135, at 487-88 (explaining the significance
of the rights outlined in the Declaration).
137. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, supra note 66, at
528.
138. Standard Rules, G.A. Res. 96, supra note 66, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 977; see also Tal-
linn Guidelines for Action on Human Resources Development in the Field of Disability, G.A. Res. 70,
44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 101, [1989] 43 U.N.Y.B. 584, U.N. Doc. A/441/775
(1989).
139. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, supra note 66, art. 1.
140. Id. art. 6.
141. Id. art. 7.
142. Id. art. 9; see also id. art. 5 (providing that persons with disabilities are entitled to live
in environments that allow them to be "as self-reliant as possible").
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting the broad definition of "disabled
person" provided by article 1 of the Disability Declaration).
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that conference recognized that persons with disabilities were "unre-
servedly" due all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 144 The Vi-
enna Declaration also presented a call to action to increase awareness
of human rights in the context of disability.'45 The Standard Rules
were an outgrowth of that call to action adopted by the General
Assembly. 1
4 6
The Standard Rules adopt a broader approach to disability rights
than the MI Principles, focusing on the equalization of opportunities
and participation in all aspects of society.147 The Rules recognize that
"[p]ersons with disabilities are members of society and have the right
to remain within their local communities."' 48 In order to achieve
equalization of opportunities, the Standard Rules present a series of
affirmative rights for the state to implement while guaranteeing that
persons with disabilities have a meaningful voice in the development
of policies.' 49 The Rules encourage states to provide effective medical
care, including preventive care, given by adequately trained person-
nel. 5 ° Rehabilitation services should be available in the local commu-
nity. 5 ' The Standard Rules grant persons with disabilities affirmative
rights to accessible public facilities, integrated educational and voca-
tional settings, favorable employment conditions and hiring practices,
and social security and income maintenance. 52 The Standard Rules
further assert that the state should afford persons with disabilities
equal opportunities to fully participate in society through measures
that promote full participation in family life, as well as cultural, recrea-
tional, and religious activities. 5 3 States should also endeavor to raise
awareness about disability issues to reduce the stigma and misunder-
144. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human
Rights, Vienna, June 25, 1993, para. 63, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration]. The Vienna Declaration solidified the notion that persons with physical and
mental disabilities were subject to the protections from discrimination found in Article 26
of the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 87, Art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. Article 26 prohibits
discrimination and guarantees "to all persons equal and effective protection against dis-
crimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex.., or other status." Id. The Vienna
Declaration specifically included a physical or mental disability within the scope of "other
status." SeeVienna Declaration, supra, para. 63 (calling upon nations to adopt legislation to
prohibit discrimination against disabled persons).
145. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 144, paras. 63-65.
146. See Standard Rules, G.A. Res. 96, supra note 66, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 977.
147. Id. at Introduction, arts. 13-15, 24-27, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 978-80.
148. Id. at Introduction, art. 26, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 980.
149. Id. at Rules 2-12, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 982-85.
150. Id. at Rule 2, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 982.
151. Id. at Rule 3, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 982.
152. Id. at Rules 5-8, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 982-84.
153. Id. at Rules 9, 10, 11, 12, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 981-85.
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standing associated with disability and to ensure adequate training of
personnel. 
154
The United Nations encouraged legal and economic reforms to
achieve these goals. 15 5 The Standard Rules, unlike the MI Principles,
provide for a Special Rapporteur and enforcement committee to over-
see their implementation. 156 These oversight mechanisms have al-
lowed for further development of the provisions of the Standard Rules
and the collection of information regarding national efforts to
comply.
The developments of disability rights under the Standard Rules
and through the activities of the Special Rapporteur are highly rele-
vant to the rights of persons with mental disabilities. Bengt Lindqvist,
the Special Rapporteur on disability from 1994-2002, has stated that
the Standard Rules do not systematically address the needs and rights
of persons with developmental and psychiatric disabilities. 157 Yet, the
Standard Rules give guidance on active participation in society not
addressed in the MI Principles. 55 Lindqvist has commented that the
Standard Rules and MI Principles are complementary and that both
should apply to persons with mental disabilities. 159
Governments may argue that they are not obliged to conform
with international resolutions, rendering them virtually meaningless
as a force for influencing mental health policies. 6° A strong argu-
154. Id. at Rules 1, 19, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 981, 987.
155. Id. at Rules 15, 16, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 986.
156. The Special Rapporteur for Disability from 1994-2000, Bengt Lindqvist, authored
several reports on the implementation and interpretation of the Standard Rules. See infra
note 157. Lindqvist's term expired in December 2002. See United Nations Enable, Sheika
Hessa Appointed New Special Rapporteur for Disability (June 5, 2003), at http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/enable/rapporteur2003.htm. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
appointed Sheikha Hessa as Special Rapporteur for Disability for 2003-2005. Id.
157. Bengt Lindqvist, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission for Social Devel-
opment on Monitoring the Implementation of the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities
for Persons with Disabilities on His Second Mission, 1997-2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/2000/3, pa-
ras. 107-111, 118, 149, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/disecn003eO.
htm [hereinafter Second Mission]; Bengt Lindqvist, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission for Social Development on Monitoring the Implementation of the Standard Rules on the
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities on His Third Mandate, 2000-2002, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.5/2002/4, paras. 38-75, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dis
ecn520024e0.htm [hereinafter Third Mandate].
158. See Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 135, at 475-77 (noting the inherent shortcom-
ings of the MI Principles and the revolutionary nature of the Standard Rules).
159. Second Mission, supra note 157, paras. 113, 152.
160. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 268 ("U.N. General Assembly resolu-
tions, unlike treaties and customary international law, are not directly binding on states.")
(citations omitted); Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 135, at 479-80 (discussing the char-
acteristics of binding and nonbinding international law).
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ment, however, can be made that international principles such as the
MI Principles and Standard Rules do have significant practical
importance.
First, they help establish international human rights norms by
creating a baseline of fair and decent treatment of persons with
mental disabilities.' 61 The MI Principles in particular have been de-
scribed as creating "minimum United Nations standards for the pro-
tection of fundamental freedoms and human and legal rights of
persons with mental illness."' 62 The Pinciples formalize the rule that
international standards trump inconsistent local practices that do not
meet human rights standards.' 63 The guidance provided by interna-
tional principles similarly provides states with a standard to evaluate
their own level of compliance with international human rights norms
on mental disability.' 64
Second, the international principles enable fairer and more effec-
tive monitoring of psychiatric abuses because international and non-
profit organizations have a standard by which they judge extant
mental health policies. 65 The legitimization of international stan-
dards will compel states to participate and cooperate with interna-
tional investigations on mental disability rights.' 66 International
monitoring organizations can, in turn, use these principles to more
clearly and credibly identify rights violations and oblige states to take
steps to remedy them.'67
Finally, and most importantly, countries can use resolutions as in-
terpretive guides to international treaty obligations. International
161. See Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 135, at 492 (stating that U.N. human rights
standards should not be viewed as model laws, but rather as minimum standards that pro-
tect basic rights).
162. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, REPORT OF THE WORK-
ING GROUP ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AND
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/39 (1991). This
view was shared by the Despouy report to the U.N. Human Rights Commission. UNITED
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DISABILITY, U.N. Sales No. E.92.XIV.4 (prepared by Leandro Despouy), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dispaperdesO.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
163. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 269-70 (noting that the MI Principles
set international law standards and local custom does not excuse states' compliance with
these standards).
164. Id. at 270.
165. Id. at 269.
166. See id. (stating that international standards ensure that monitoring bodies will sub-
ject states to a single standard).
167. See id. (noting that the internationalization of detailed standards helps states iden-
tify and prosecute fundamental human rights violations).
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human rights principles, such as the MI Principles, may be invoked by
domestic courts or incorporated into domestic legislation.1 68 Re-
gional human rights systems have utilized international resolutions or
principles to construe the scope of human rights protection under
regional instruments.169 Over time, the increased acknowledgment of
and adherence to these international standards advance them toward
recognition as customary international law.17 °
E. New Initiatives: A Paradigm Shift at the International Level
The existing treaties and standards related to mental disability
form an inconsistent patchwork of legal protections for persons with
mental disabilities. Nonetheless, these existing instruments cede sub-
stantial authority to international bodies to enforce disability rights.
Historically, international treaty monitoring bodies have not made sig-
nificant efforts to protect and enforce mental health rights, even
though existing treaty rights amply cover the rights of persons with
mental disabilities.171 Recently, new efforts have been undertaken at
the international level to advance disability rights and supply supple-
mentary guidance to national governments seeking to understand and
enforce these rights. Two important initiatives are the historic effort
to draft a binding international convention on disabilities and the de-
velopment of a mental health legislation manual by the World Health
Organization (WHO).172
168. Id. at 288.
169. The Inter-American Commission, for example, has explicitly recognized the MI
Principles. Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99, para. 54
(1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Ecuador%2011427.htm.
170. In their introduction, the Standard Rules contemplate the possibility of becoming
customary international law: "Although the Rules are not compulsory, they can become
international customary rules when they are applied by a great number of States with the
intention of respecting a rule in international law." Standard Rules, G.A. Res. 96, supra note
66, at Introduction, para. 14, [1993] 47 U.N.Y.B. at 979.
171. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 97, at 1 (finding that "United Nations human rights
treaty bodies have considerable potential.., but have generally been underused in advanc-
ing the rights of persons with disabilities"); see also Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 30, at
468-70 (noting that reports from Special Rapporteurs and NGOs consistently demonstrate
a severe lack of enforcement of existing human rights laws on behalf of persons with
mental disabilities); Philip Alston, Disability and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS: ESSAYS AND RELEVANT HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 94 (Theresia Degener & Yolan Koster-Dreese eds., 1995) ("Interna-
tional human rights forums have been generally unresponsive to the situation and specific
needs of persons with disabilities.").
172. See Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 30, at 473-74 (describing attempts to draft a
disability convention); see WHO Project, supra note 31 (discussing the development of the
Manual on Mental Health Legislation).
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After years of inaction, in 2001, the United Nations General As-
sembly established an Ad Hoc Committee "to consider proposals for a
comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and
protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities."173 While
disability advocates championed the merits of a specific convention
addressing disability rights as far back as the Despouy report, the crea-
tion of the Ad Hoc Committee represents a potential paradigm shift
in the United Nations system.7174 The passage of a disability conven-
tion would create a binding treaty at the international level that would
support existing disability rights instruments without undermining
them.
175
The consideration of a thematic treaty on disability will likely
have a considerable effect on the protection of disability rights in the
United Nations system regardless of whether it is enacted. The pro-
ceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee will necessarily examine the cover-
age of disability rights under existing treaties and use these
precedents to construct the new convention. 176 However, new instru-
ments do not inherently advance human rights. Under some circum-
stances, a new instrument can actually reduce human rights
protections compared with existing international law if it includes lax
enforcement provisions or uses antiquated and disempowering
terminology. 
177
The World Health Organization is currently working on a Mental
Health Legislation Manual (the WHO Manual) and related materials
that will review and analyze legal provisions at the national level.
178
The WHO Manual represents an important approach by the interna-
tional community to seriously explore the application of human rights
to issues of mental health. Instead of establishing standards through
international treaties and commissions, the WHO Manual seeks to
173. Comprehensive and Integral Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 168, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 88th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/56/583/Add.2 (2001).
174. Quinn, supra note 97, at 29.
175. Id. at 182-83. The drafting process is ongoing as of this writing and will likely take
several years.
176. Id. at 181-82.
177. See Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 30, at 474-75 (noting that the drafters of the
Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination on the Basis
of Disability undermined its enforceability by requiring States to eliminate discrimination
"gradually" without defining this term).
178. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO MANUAL ON MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION,
available at http://www.cct-freiburg.de/who/humanrights/documents/legmanualfact
sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). The WHO Manual is currently under revision and
WHO likely will release it in 2004.
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provide guidance on national legislation without the imprimatur of an
international mandate." 9 While the WHO Manual will seek to incor-
porate many of the human rights provisions recognized in the MI
Principles and Standard Rules, the focus will be on incorporating
these concepts into domestic legislation.' 8 °
Given the disparate approaches to mental health practice around
the world and the varying capacity of mental health laws at the na-
tional level to govern these practices, the WHO Manual will serve as a
useful template for systematically addressing existing deficiencies in
national mental health laws."' 1 The WHO Manual will also help gov-
ernments update their respective national mental health laws to re-
flect modern mental health practice and respect human rights
norms.'8 2 The WHO Manual will address policy and implementation
issues as well as the contents of the legal framework, and will include
best practice suggestions from existing national laws.18 3
The framework for establishing the rights of persons with mental
disabilities within the United Nations system continues to progress.
Ongoing initiatives, such as the proposed disability convention and
the WHO Manual, represent a growing commitment to the further
development of clear and effective human rights for persons with
mental disabilities in the international system. Even if the new disabil-
ity convention does not come to fruition, the existing structure of in-
ternational instruments and standards provides a substantial
collection of rights and fundamental freedoms that can be invoked
for the protection and benefit of persons with mental disabilities. 84 It
is imperative that the development of these existing instruments con-
tinues concurrently with the new initiatives. Similarly, international
treaty monitoring bodies must recognize the importance of mental
disability rights, and be willing to enforce these rights when violations
occur.18 5 The renewed appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Disa-
179. See WHO Project, supra note 31 ("The Manual will serve as the basis for... provid-
ing step-by-step guidance on developing and implementing mental health legislation.").
180. See id.
181. See id. (noting that the objective of the Manual is to "inform and assist countries
wishing to formulate legislation").
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 30, at 491 (noting that although "a broad
array of international human rights protections do exist under existing international
human rights conventions, a new disability rights convention that spells out these rights in
detail would greatly aid compliance by clearly notifying governments as to their interna-
tional obligations").
185. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 283-84 (stating that international
human rights monitoring can help create customary international law).
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bility signals that there is continuing support for disability rights en-
forcement at the international level.'" 6 International institutions
should heed the call of Special Rapporteur Bengt Lindqvist to pay
special attention to developmental and psychiatric disabilities under
current treaty provisions in addition to developing new provisions.1
8 7
The next part of this Article discusses the development and evolu-
tion of important treaty obligations and institutions under regional
human rights systems.
III. REGIONAL SYSTEMS FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Regional human rights systems provide additional opportunities
for the protection and development of human rights at the suprana-
tional level. These regional systems have developed concurrently with
the international human rights institutions of the United Nations and
share many of the ideals and goals of the United Nations system.'
However, the regional nature of these systems has allowed for the cre-
ation and implementation of novel approaches and institutions to
protect and promote human rights."8 9 Europe, Africa, and the Ameri-
cas have all developed regional human rights systems.' 90 Other re-
gions of the world have considered regional human rights systems, but
have not yet finalized or implemented these arrangements. 1 '
While there is a general consensus that human rights are univer-
sal, regional systems have created additional fora for the protection
and promotion of human rights, often through more direct means.192
Courts and commissions established at the regional level have granted
individuals the ability to redress human rights grievances that have
186. See United Nations Enable, supra note 156.
187. See Second Mission, supra note 157, paras. 107-111, 118, 149; Third Mandate, supra
note 157, paras. 38-75.
188. See Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 SVRACUSEJ. INT'L L.
& COM. 241, 241-44 (2003) (describing the "confluence" of regional and international ef-
forts to protect human rights for those with disabilities).
189. See id. at 249-53 (discussing differences among nations' approaches, such as various
definitions of disability, different models with which to frame rights, and unique
remedies).
190. Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 135, at 473.
191. The Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted by the League of Arab States on
September 15, 1994, has not yet come into force and is essentially dormant at the time of
this writing. Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 HuM. RTs.
LJ. 151 (1997). There is no comparable human rights system in Asia, although an Asian
regional human rights system has been proposed. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 19, at
779-80.
192. Kanter, supra note 188, at 259-60.
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not been dealt with appropriately at the domestic level or to challenge
domestic policies and practices that violate human rights norms.1 93
A. European System for the Protection of Human Rights
On May 10, 1948, delegates to the Congress of Europe in the
Hague said: "We desire a Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing lib-
erty of thought, assembly and expression as well as the right to form a
political opposition." 19 4 The following year, Article 3 of the Statute of
the Council of Europe (which formed the Council) affirmed "the
principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons... of
human rights and fundamental freedoms." '195 This began a process
that culminated in the signing of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in
Rome on November 4, 1950.196 The United Kingdom was the first
country to ratify the Convention on March 8, 1951 and, by 1974, all
eighteen then existing States of the Council had ratified it.' 9 7 Today,
the Council has more than forty Members. 9 '
Until recently, member states of the Council of Europe were not
obliged to permit individual litigants access to the two institutions cre-
193. Id.
194. A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 6 (2d ed. 1977).
195. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, chap. 2, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 1.
196. ECHR, supra note 35. The ECHR was modeled on the UDHR. FRANCIS G. JACOBS,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1975).
197. JACOBS, supra note 196, at 2 n.1.
198. As of this writing, there are 45 members of the Council of Europe. Permanent
Representatives of the Council of Europe, at http://cm/coe.int/who.2.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2003). The European Union (which is a separate entity from the Council of Eu-
rope) is not a party to the Convention, and the Union does not accede to its authority. See
Case 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759. While European Union law does not provide a major vehi-
cle for human rights adjudication, Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union 1992 (the
Maastrict Treaty), does contain a nonjusticiable provision relevant to human rights: "The
Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms...." TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, art. F(2), July 29, 1992, oJ. (C 191) (1992). Additionally, after the Amsterdam
amendment in 1997, the Treaty Establishing the European Communities now contains
provisions on discrimination and public health. 2002 O.J. (C325) 33. Article 13 of the
Treaty enables the European Community (EC) to "take appropriate action to combat dis-
crimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual
orientation." Id. art. 13, 2002 O.J. at 43. Article 152 (formerly Article 129 of the Maastricht
Treaty) states that "a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the defini-
tion and implementation of all Community policies and activities." Id. art. 152, 2002 O.J. at
100. Consequently, European Union law, while certainly relevant, does not offer the kind
of adjudicative power on mental health and human rights as does the Council of Europe.
See generally Dinah Shelton, The Boundaies of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKEJ.
COMP. & INT'L L. 95 (2003) (examining questions and concerns presented by the overlap-
ping human rights jurisdictions of regional legal systems in Europe).
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ated by the ECHR-the Commission and Court-to redress violations
of rights and freedoms, although most chose to do so.1 99 The Elev-
enth Protocol to the ECHR, which entered into force on November 1,
1998, merged the functions of these two institutions into a single Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (European Court).200 The European
Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Protocol extends to all matters
concerning the interpretation and application of the ECHR.20 1 Fur-
ther, with the passage of the Protocol, the ability of individuals to ap-
ply directly to the European Court became a right upon which
contracting parties could no longer impede. 20 2 Therefore, in addi-
tion to its mandatory jurisdiction over inter-state cases, 20 3 the Euro-
pean Court hears individual applications by persons or
nongovernmental organizations who are "victim [s]" of a violation of
human rights by a contracting party.20 4
199. The United Kingdom, for example, granted the right of individual petition in
1966. The United Kingdom Home Department, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights
Bill, para. 1.2 (1997), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/
hoffice/rights/rights.htm. Many states, however, did incorporate the ECHR into domestic
law so that citizens could present human rights claims to their own courts. France, for
example, incorporated the ECHR into domestic law soon after the Convention was ratified,
but the United Kingdom took no action until the close of the Twentieth Century. Human
Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
200. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 19. Previously, the European Commission of Human
Rights (European Commission) received all applications, having the power to find them
"inadmissible" or "admissible." Kevin Boyle, Practice and Procedure on Individual Applications
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 135. If the Commission found an application "admissible" it
investigated and sought a "friendly settlement." Id. It also had power to report to the
Committee of Ministers and to refer cases to the European Court. Id. at 135-37. The
European Court had, and continues to have, the ultimate power to adjudicate violations of
the ECHR. Id. at 135; ECHR, supra note 35, art. 44.
201. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 32(1). The European Court considers cases by sitting on
committees of three judge panels, in seven judge Chambers, and in a seventeen judge
Grand Chamber. Id. art. 27(1). The Court can consider cases only after the plaintiff has
exhausted all domestic remedies and if less than six months has passed since the date on
which a domestic court made its final decision. Id. art. 35(1). The European Court can
hold an application "inadmissible" if it is "incompatible" with the Convention (e.g., the
Convention does not apply), "manifestly ill-founded" (e.g., the facts do not disclose a
prima facie violation), or an "abuse of the right of application" (e.g., politically motivated).
Id. art. 35(3). If the European Court finds the case "admissible," it will investigate the case
and try to negotiate an agreement between the parties or it will hold a hearing and render
a decision on the merits. Id. art. 38(1). If it finds a violation of the ECHR, the European
Court has the power to give the injured party 'ust satisfaction" (i.e., damages and reim-
bursement of legal costs). Id. art. 41. An injured party can appeal a Chamber's judgment
to the Grand Chamber if the decision raises a serious issue that affects the interpretation of
the ECHR or one that is of general importance. Id. art. 43(1)-(2).
202. Id. art. 34.
203. Id. art. 33.
204. Id. art. 34.
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The right of individuals to bring human rights violations directly
to the European Court has rendered the European System amenable
to the protection of human rights of persons with mental disabilities
by allowing these individuals access to an alternative legal venue when
domestic protections are inadequate. 20 5 Moreover, many of the mem-
ber countries of the Council of Europe have incorporated the ECHR
into their domestic law, providing domestic courts with the opportu-
nity to refine and expand the theory and practice of human rights.2 0 6
B. Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights
The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights
resides within the jurisdiction of the Organization of American States
(OAS).2 °7 Human rights in this system are protected under several
multilateral treaties. The American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man (American Declaration), adopted by the OAS in 1948,
contains comparable provisions to the UDHR and includes civil and
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.20" The OAS,
through a resolution, also established the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) to monitor and re-
port on compliance of member states with the rights protected in the
Declaration.20 9 Despite subsequent efforts to define the jurisdiction
205. See id.
206. For example, in the United Kingdom, state obligations under international law
were not part of domestic law or effectively justiciable by domestic courts prior to the
passage of the Human Rights Act of 1998. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). Other
commentators have detailed the role of human rights law in the United Kingdom prior to
the 1998 Act. See OLIVER THOROLD, MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND HUMAN RiGHTS ACT OF 1998
(2000); MURRAY HUNT, USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS (1997); RABINDER
SINGH, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RiGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1997). Since enactment
of the Human Rights Act, British courts have decided a number of cases on human rights
grounds relevant to persons with mental disabilities, and many more are expected. See, e.g.,
Regina v. London N. & E. Region Mental Health Review Tribunal, 3 W.L.R. 512, 522
(2001) (discussing section 10 of the Human Rights Act).
207. Christina Cerna, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Its Organization and
Examination of Petitions and Communications, in INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 65,
66.
208. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man (1948), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm (last
visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter American Declaration]. The American Declaration was
actually adopted three months before the UDHR, giving it the distinction of being the first
detailed exposition of human rights promulgated by an intergovernmental organization.
See Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not
Yet an Ox, in INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 31, 35 (noting that although the
UDHR is the most celebrated text of international human rights, the American Declara-
tion has the honor of being the "first broadly detailed enumeration of rights ... adopted
by an intergovernmental organization").
209. Farer, supra note 208, at 35-36.
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of the Inter-American Commission, 210 its role and power remained
vague until the drafting of the American Convention on Human
Rights (American Convention) in 1969.211
The American Convention expanded and clarified the rights de-
scribed in the American Declaration and authorized the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission and the newly formed Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (Inter-American Court) to enforce these rights. 2 12 The
American Convention emphasizes civil and political rights-it only
references economic, social, and cultural rights in a general manner,
stating that national governments should attempt to progressively
achieve this set of rights. 213 The more recently enacted Protocol on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains a more expansive treat-
ment of economic, social, and cultural rights, but the Inter-American
Commission has limited jurisdiction over rights under this
Protocol. 21
4
Pursuant to the American Convention, the Inter-American Com-
mission has jurisdiction to issue country reports and to examine indi-
vidual petitions alleging human rights violations.215 The Inter-
American Court has advisory and contentious jurisdiction. 216 Advi-
sory jurisdiction permits the Inter-American Court to issue advisory
opinions interpreting issues of human rights law at the request of OAS
states.217 Contentious jurisdiction allows the Court to adjudicate
210. See Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States,
opened for signature, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 112, O.A.S. T.S. No. 1-A (entered into force Mar. 12,
1970) (stating that the principal function of the Inter-American Commission is to promote
human rights and to serve as consultant to the OAS regarding human rights).
211. American Convention, supra note 68, 9 I.L.M. 673.
212. Id. arts. 41, 61-65, 9 I.L.M. at 686, 691-92.
213. Id. arts. 26, 42, 9 I.L.M. at 683, 686.
214. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Nov. 17, 1988, available at http://www.cidh.
oas.cas.org/Basicos/basic5.htm [hereinafter Additional Protocol]; see also Matthew Craven,
The Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Under the Inter-American System of Human
Rights, in INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 289, 307-11 (noting the expansion and
recognition of certain rights by the Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, such
as the right to food, the right to a healthy environment, the right to the formation and
protection of a family, the rights of children, the protection of the elderly, and the protec-
tion of the handicapped). The Inter-American Commission may only accept individual
petitions for certain rights violations, such as violations of the right to form trade unions
and the right to education. Additional Protocol, supra, art. 19(6). Instead, the Inter-Amer-
ican Economic and Social Council has oversight responsibilities. Id. art. 19.
215. American Convention, supra note 68, arts. 41(c), 44, 9 I.L.M. at 686-87.
216. Id. art. 64(2), 9 I.L.M. at 692.
217. Id.; see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights Law, 38 STAN. J. INT'rL L.
241, 242-43 (2002) (describing the Inter-American Court's advisory jurisdiction as a
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
claims of human rights violations by state parties, provided that the
state parties have explicitly recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court.218
More recently, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons
with Disabilities.219 This Convention aims to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against persons with disabilities, including those with
mental disabilities, and encourages states to make efforts toward com-
pletely integrating persons with disabilities into society.220 Notably,
the Convention explicitly links protection from discrimination and
community integration. 22  Nevertheless, some commentators have
been critical of the scope and language used in the Convention. 222
While this Convention has not yet gone into effect, it holds great
promise for promoting the human rights of persons with mental disa-
bilities in the Americas.
C. African System for the Protection of Human Rights
The development of a regional human rights system in Africa has
proceeded more gradually than development in other regional sys-
tems. The more protracted pace of regional human rights develop-
ment in Africa stems from the historical exploitation of Africans by
non-Africans during the colonial period, which resulted in a prefer-
ence for strong state sovereignty rights and a corresponding reluc-
tance to interfere with internal state affairs. 22' The Organization for
African Unity, formed in 1963, did not draft a human rights instru-
method of crystalizing the purpose and meaning of international human rights and provid-
ing judicial interpretation of the issues submitted by requesting parties).
218. American Convention, supra note 68, art. 62, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92; see also Ant6nio
Augusto Can4ado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 133, 135 (emphasizing that the contentious juris-
diction of the Inter-American Court is predicated on a state having recognized the Court's
jurisdiction either by a special declaration or agreement).
219. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Persons With Disabilities, adopted June 7, 1999, available at http://www.cidh.oas.
org/basicos/disability.htm.
220. Id art. II.
221. Id. art. IV.
222. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 30, at 474-75 (criticizing the drafters'
choice of language in Article 111 (1), which allows states to eliminate discrimination "gradu-
ally," because the term "gradually" could be used by states to avoid taking immediate action
in dealing with discrimination).
223. SeeVINCENT 0. ORLu NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 67-69 (2001)
(attributing Africa's late participation in the promotion and protection of international
human rights to its focus on eradicating colonialism within its borders and its belief that
human rights are internal issues that an outside body should not address).
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ment until nearly twenty years after its founding.224 That instrument,
the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African
Charter), forms the centerpiece of the African Human Rights Sys-
tem.2 25 Much like the organs of its European and Inter-American
counterparts, the Charter guarantees civil and political human rights
and provides for the establishment of an African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) to promote, pro-
tect, and interpret these rights. 226 The African Charter contains civil
and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, and "peo-
ples' rights"-an additional human rights concept that distinguishes
community rights as a separate and compelling regional concern.22 v
The African Charter differs from other regional instruments in
two other ways. First, in addition to the rights granted, it contains a
corresponding list of individual duties. 228 Second, the African Char-
ter appears to grant state parties more latitude in their compliance
with Charter rights. 229 The African Charter does not contain a spe-
cific derogation clause, and the African Commission has refused to
allow states to derogate rights, even in an emergency situation.230
However, the Charter includes general limitation clauses, internal lim-
itation clauses, and broadly worded "claw-backs"-provisions that a
state might interpret to allow it to claim any act as an exception to
rights found in the Charter if mandated by national or sub-national
law. 2 ' Nevertheless, the Commission has interpreted the claw-back
224. Gino J. Naldi, Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa: The Increased Role of the OAU?,
in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-
2000, at 1, 1 (Malcolm D. Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2002) [hereinafter AFRICAN CHAR-
TER IN PRACTICE].
225. African Charter, supra note 68, 21 I.L.M. at 58. All member states of the OAU have
ratified the African Charter. Naldi, supra note 224, at 5 n.28.
226. African Charter, supra note 68, arts. 1-24, 30, 21 I.L.M. at 60-64.
227. Id, arts. 1-24, 21 I.L.M. at 60-63; see NMEHIELLE, supra note 223, at 138-39 (explain-
ing the concept of "peoples' rights").
228. African Charter, supra note 68, arts. 27-29, 9 I.L.M. at 63. The duties include pres-
ervation of the family, refraining from discrimination, paying taxes, serving your country,
and promoting African unity. Id. The American Declaration also enumerates individual
duties, but the American Convention did not incorporate these duties. American Declara-
tion, supra note 208, arts. XXIX-XXXVIII.
229. See Christof Heyns, Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter, in AFRICAN CHAR-
TER IN PRACTICE, supra note 224, at 137, 139 (describing the African Charter's failure to
provide specific procedures for states to follow in times of war or natural disasters as a
weakness because the absence of any provision essentially allows a state to disregard the
African Charter during such times).
230. Id. (noting that the African Commission has made several rulings that states cannot
use emergency situations to justify derogating rights).
231. Id. at 142; see African Charter, supra note 68, art. 9(2), 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("Every indi-
vidual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.") (empha-
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provisions to apply to international law rather than municipal or na-
tional law, therefore reducing the chance that governments can use
these provisions to undermine the effectiveness and universality of the
rights in the African Charter.2 1
2
The African Charter created the African Commission.2 33 The Af-
rican Commission has the power to investigate violations of the rights
in the African Charter and to collect state reports detailing compli-
ance with the Charter.234 More importantly, the African Commission
has implemented a communications procedure whereby it receives
complaints or petitions from member states or other parties alleging
violations of human rights. 2 5 The African Commission has inter-
preted its communications jurisdiction quite liberally-individuals,
groups, and NGOs can file complaints, regardless of their geographi-
cal location and whether or not the petitioner is actually a victim of
the alleged violation. 23 16 By contrast, the Inter-American Commission
allows complaints from individuals and NGOs, but only NGOs that
have been legally recognized by the Inter-American Commission's
member states.2 37 The European System allows complaints only from
petitioners and NGOs who are actual victims of the alleged violation
and within the jurisdiction of the state.238 Despite this more accom-
modating approach in the African system, individuals and NGOs have
infrequently utilized this procedure. 2 9 The African Commission is-
sues recommendations in response to communications, but the en-
forcement of substantive remedies based upon the Commission's
determinations has been problematic. 4 °
sis added); see id. art. 10(1), 21 I.L.M. at 61 ("Every individual shall have the right to free
association provided that he abides by the law.") (emphasis added). As these examples show,
the claw-back provisions could allow a state to eviscerate the meaning of the rights based
upon their interpretation of "the law." See Heyns, supra note 229, at 142.
232. See Communication 101/93, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, Eighth Activity Re-
port 1994-1995, Annex VI (Documents of the African Commission, at 394) paras. 15-16 (inter-
preting Article 10 of the African Charter to prohibit governments from enacting laws that
interfere with an individual's right to free association or conflict with international human
right standards), http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/Africa/comcases/1O1-93.html; Heyns,
supra note 229, at 142.
233. African Charter, supra note 68, art. 30, 21 L.L.M. at 63-64.
234. Id. arts. 46, 62, 21 I.L.M. at 65, 68.
235. Id. arts. 47-59, 21 I.L.M. at 65-67.
236. Frans Viljoen, Admissibility Under the African Charter, in AFRICAN CHARTER IN PRAC-
TICE, supra note 224, at 61, 74-76.
237. American Convention, supra note 68, art. 44-47, 9 I.L.M. at 687-88.
238. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 34.
239. NMEHIELLE, supra note 223, at 197, 204-05.
240. Id. at 239.
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The relative successes of the Inter-American and European
human rights systems have demonstrated the effectiveness of judicial
courts in articulating international legal principles at the regional
level. In 1998, the OAU approved the African Court of Human Rights
(African Court), with the intention of strengthening human rights
protection and enforcement within the African System.2 4 ' The Afri-
can Court, when established,242 will have contentious and advisory ju-
risdiction over allegations of human rights violations under the
African Charter.243 The jurisdictional relationship between the Afri-
can Commission and Court is not completely clear, but the African
Court will likely become the predominant institution for protecting
human rights on the continent.244 In contrast to the African Commis-
sion, the African Court will possess adjudicatory powers and will have
the authority to issue legal decisions and mandate remedies. 245 How-
ever, individuals and NGOs will only be able to petition directly to the
Court if state parties assent to the African Court's jurisdiction.246
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES UNDER REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
The level of jurisprudential and interpretive development varies
greatly between the three regional human rights systems. There exists
an extensive body of case law on mental health from the European
Commission and Court of Human Rghts and an impressive body of
scholarship interpreting the application of its jurisprudence to per-
241. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establish-
ment of African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, adoptedJune 9, 1988, arts. 1-2,
available at http://www.acdhrs.org/African_Court.doc [hereinafter African Court
Protocol].
242. Five years after its adoption, the African Court Protocol establishing the Court has
yet to enter into force. Article 34 of the African Court Protocol states that it will come into
force after fifteen instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited with the
Secretary-General of the OAU. Id, art. 34. As of September 2002, only the following six
States have ratified the Protocol: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, and
Uganda. African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, Status of Ratification
of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establish-
ment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, available at http://www.acdhrs.
org/AfricanCourt.doc (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).
243. African Court Protocol, supra note 241, arts. 3-5.
244. See NMEHIELLE, supra note 223, at 261-63 (noting that, despite the African Court
Protocol's failure in Article 2 to state with specificity the relationship between the Court's
and the Commission's functions, the power conferred to the Court by Article 3 to interpret
and apply the African Charter, the Protocol, and other human rights agreements guaran-
tees that the Court will be highly influential).
245. African Court Protocol, supra note 241, arts. 26-30.
246. See NMEHIELLE, supra note 223, at 270 (discussing the ability of individuals and
NGOs to petition the African court).
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sons with mental disabilities.247 By contrast, the institutions of the In-
ter-American and African systems have historically exhibited far less
interest in addressing mental health issues. 24" This variation may be a
result of the different structural components of the respective systems
or an indication of the distinct regional political, economic, and cul-
tural complexities. 249 Legal developments within the European Sys-
tem have even been looked upon approvingly as precedent by the
other regional systems. 250 The European Human Rights System has
thus far dealt with human rights that are predominantly civil and po-
litical in character. That is, the courts have placed limits on govern-
mental interference with rights and freedoms, rather than
establishing a positive entitlement to government services. 251 The re-
247. See Phillip Fennell, The Third Way in Mental Health Policy: Negative Rights, Positive
Rights, and the Convention, 26 J.L. & Soc'v 103, 105-27 (1999) (discussing the European
Court of Human Rights' development of mentally disabled patients' right to receive a mini-
mum standard of service); Thorold, supra note 206, at 619 (assessing United Kingdom
mental health law in light of the requirements of the European Convention on Human
Rights); David Hewitt, Mental Health Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS ACr 1998: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 311 (Christopher Baker ed., 1998) (examining the application of the Human Rights
Act 1998 in various court cases); T.W. Harding, The Application of The European Convention of
Human Rights to the Field of Psychiatry, 12 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 245, 250-62 (1989) (analyz-
ing various complaints filed under the European Convention of Human Rights involving
individuals unlawfully detained and subjected to psychiatric examination and those who
are mentally ill).
248. See, e.g., NMEHIELLE, supra note 223, at 204-05 (stating that on the tenth anniversary
of the African Commission, it had received only 202 complaints and communications from
individuals).
249. The lack of mental health cases before the Inter-American and African Systems
may be attributable to political instability in many nations in these regions. See Nsongurua
J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples'Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 50-54 (2000) (describing the effect of unstable political
conditions on human rights in Africa). The regional institutions have, thus, concentrated
on the most serious human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings, violent political
repression, and subversion of the rule of law. Id.; see also Farer, supra note 208, at 42-46
(explaining how incessant coups, civil wars, and political instability over a 20-year period
undermined the development of a human rights system in the Americas).
250. See, e.g., Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99,
para. 66 (1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Ecuador%2011427.
htm (citing the European Commission's holding in Herczegfalvy v. Austria, in which the
Commission ruled that it may be considered inhumane to hold a mentally disabled person
in wretched conditions and without medical treatment); see also David Harris, Regional Pro-
tection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement, in INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note
33, at 5-6 (noting instances where the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human
Rights have cited to and followed precedent from the European System); Rosenthal &
Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 273 n.119 (stating that case law within the European System
is relevant to the Inter-American System because the Inter-American System is closely
modeled after the European System).
251. SeeJACoBs, supra note 196, at 4 (comparing economic, social, and cultural rights,
requiring action by the state with civil and political rights, and requiring protection against
state action).
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spective regional bodies within the Inter-American and African Sys-
tems, which have developed their human rights jurisprudence to a
lesser extent, have similarly focused on civil and political rights. 252
The case law can be categorized into three primary areas: compulsory
detention, conditions of confinement, and civil rights.
A. Involuntary Admission and Subsequent Detention
in Mental Institutions
The regional human rights systems guarantee the right to liberty
and security of the person.253 Under the European System, these
rights are found within Article 5.254 Article 5(1) of the ECHR lists the
circumstances in which governments may justifiably deprive persons
of their liberty and includes a provision referring to "persons of un-
sound mind. ' 255 The Inter-American and African instruments pro-
vide similarly strong liberty protections, but list only general
justifications for deprivation of liberty.256 Governments must inform
persons of the reasons for their arrest (including "psychiatric" arrest)
under the European 257 and American 25 1 Systems. The European and
American Systems also require governments to provide a "speedy" re-
view of the detention by an independent court or tribunal.259 Finally,
victims of arrest or detention in contravention of the ECHR or Ameri-
can Convention must have an enforceable remedy in damages. 26
1. The Meaning of "Detention" in the European System.-The entire
framework for protecting liberty and security of the person depends
on whether government is "detaining" a person with mental disability.
If government is not "detaining" a person, then the considerable safe-
252. NMEHIELLE, supra note 223, at 58.
253. American Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(1), 9 I.L.M. at 677; African Charter,
supra note 68, art. 6, 21 I.L.M. at 60; ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1).
254. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1).
255. Id. art. 5(1)(e).
256. American Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(2), 9 I.L.M. at 677 ("No one shall be
deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established
beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursu-
ant thereto."); African Charter, supra note 68, art. 6, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("No one may be
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law.").
257. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(2).
258. American Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(4), 9 I.L.M. at 677.
259. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(4) (the lawfulness of a detention shall be decided
speedily"); American Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(6), 9 I.L.M. at 677 (the court shall
decide on the lawfulness of a detention "without delay").
260. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(5); American Convention, supra note 68, art. 10, 9
I.L.M. at 679.
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guards of Article 5 of the ECHR do not apply.26' On its face, one
could read the language of Article 5 quite liberally: "Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person."2 62 Since personal security is a
concept broader than liberty, the language implies that Article 5 con-
cerns itself with all instances of the government constraining a per-
son's liberty.
263
Despite the possible differences in scope between liberty and se-
curity, the European Court construes Article 5 to apply only to cases
of formal detention and it appears to see detention mainly as a rela-
tively long period of confinement within an institution. 264 The Euro-
pean Court distinguishes detention,265 which triggers Article 5
safeguards, from a mere restriction of movement, which receives de-
cidedly less protection in other parts of the ECHR.26 6 In examining
detention determinations, the European Court considers all of the cir-
cumstances of the case, including the type, duration, effects, and man-
ner of the restraint.267 Detention is a matter of "degree or intensity"
(not "nature or substance"), with more severe restrictions rising to the
level of "detention. 268 In Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, for example,
the European Court held that a patient was detained "in the sense
that his liberty, and not just his freedom of movement, [had] been
circumscribed both in fact and in law .... even though he [had] been
permitted to leave the hospital on frequent occasions. "269
261. See Engel v. The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1976) (explaining
that Article 5(1) condemns the arbitrary deprivation of physical liberty by means of arrest
or detention).
262. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1).
263. See id.
264. See Amuur v. France, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 848 (warning that if the holding of
asylum-seekers is prolonged and excessive what would normally constitute a mere restric-
tion of liberty can transform into a violation of Article 5(1) or a deprivation of liberty).
265. Article 5 refers to arrests, detentions and deprivations of liberty: Article 5(1): "No
one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases . . . ."; Article 5(2): "Everyone
who is arrested shall be informed promptly... of the reasons.. . ."; Article 5(4): "Everyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings .
ECHR, supra note 35, arts. 5(1)-(4) (emphasis added).
266. Personal restraint that does not involve deprivation of liberty is governed by Article
2 of Protocol No. 4: "Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement...." Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Sept. 16,
1963, at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng [hereinafter Protocol No. 4].
267. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6, 19 (1985); Engel v.
The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1976); Guzzardi v. Italy, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep.
333, 362-63 (1980) (Court report).
268. Amuur, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 848.
269. Ashingdane, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20. Ashingdane's responsible medical of-
ficer recommended his transfer from Broadmoor (a psychiatric hospital) to a local hospital
and the Home Secretary accepted the recommendation. Id. at 9. However, the local au-
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This formalistic construction of "detention" may leave persons
without substantial human rights protection even when their auton-
omy and liberty are significantly constrained. Consider two important
problems in mental health that involve restraints that may fall outside
the scope of Article 5: confinement of nonprotesting patients and
compulsory supervision in the community.
a. The Problem of the Detention of "Nonprotesting" Patients.-
The problem of "nonprotesting" patients arises when persons are con-
fined in fact but not under the force of law. This may occur in several
different contexts. First, a person may succumb to a show of authority
because she does not realize that she is free to resist. For example, in
Guenat v. Switzerland,27 ° police officers "invited" an individual whom
they believed was acting abnormally to come to the police station.2 7'
His behavior, in fact, was caused by medication for a neurological con-
dition, but a psychiatrist, called in by the police, arranged for his com-
pulsory admission to a mental hospital.272 The European Commission
decided that his confinement in the police station was not a depriva-
tion of liberty because the police did not exert physical force, and he
remained free to leave. 27" This decision failed to consider the per-
son's true circumstances and whether, in reality, he reasonably felt
that his liberty was constrained.
Another illustration of this problem occurs when incompetent
patients are "voluntarily" admitted to a mental hospital. In the United
Kingdom, for example, persons with mental disabilities can be admit-
ted "informally. '274 Informal patients historically have not received
thority refused to admit him because the trade union of nursing staff had operated a total
ban on admission of restricted patients. Id. at 9-10. Since the nature and conditions in the
two hospitals were "fundamentally different," Ashingdane argued they were akin to choos-
ing between detention and liberty. Id. at 19. The Court rejected the claim, stating that,
although there are important differences between the regimes in a special hospital and a
local hospital, they are both forms of lawful detention. Id. at 19-22; see also L. v. Sweden,
App. No. 10801/84, 61 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 62, 73 (1988) ("[A] person de-
tained in a psychiatric hospital would clearly still be regarded as 'deprived of his liberty'
even if he was occasionally allowed to leave the hospital premises.").
270. App. No. 24722/94, 81-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 130 (1995).
271. Id. at 131.
272. Id. at 131-32.
273. Id. at 134. The European Commission did not hear his complaint that he had been
wrongfully admitted to a mental hospital because he failed to raise it before the lower
Federal Court of Geneva. Id. at 135.
274. Mental Health Act, 1983, c. 20, § 131 (Eng.). The United Kingdom has addressed
the issue of informal admission in a White Paper. Secretary of State for Health, REFORMING
THE MENTAL HEALTH AcT, 2000 Cm. 5016-I, available at http://www.doh.gov.uk/
mentalhealth/whitepaperl.pdf. In the White Paper, the UK sets out a new legal frame-
work that will provide safeguards of care for patients who do not have the capacity to
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any of the usual procedural and substantive safeguards to ensure they
have given legally effective consent and that admission is in their best
interests.275 Yet, in R_ v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS
Trust, ex parte L,276 the Judicial House of Lords upheld the practice of
informal admission.277 In Bournewood, a mental hospital informally
admitted an adult with severe learning disabilities after he had
harmed himself at a day center. 278 The House of Lords held unani-
mously that the common law doctrine of necessity justified his initial
sedation and movement to the hospital. 279 The informal admission to
the hospital, according to the majority, did not amount to a
detention.
280
There may be strong grounds for believing that, at least in some
circumstances, hospitals detain nonprotesting patients within the
meaning of Article 5. Recall that Ashingdane was "detained" because
his liberty was severely constrained "both in fact and in law."'281 The
incompetent informal patient's liberty may be severely constrained in
fact-he may not be aware of his right to leave the hospital.282 The
patient may also be genuinely constrained in law-if he tries to leave
the hospital he may be prevented from doing so.28 3 For example, in
the United Kingdom, doctors and nurses possess the power to hold
informal patients for a period of time necessary to accomplish an in-
voluntary admission to hospital. 284 The European Court should pay
consent to treatment. Id. at 49. It calls for new legislation to provide for quality care,
delivered in an appropriate setting, consistent with the patient's interests, and without un-
necessary deprivation of liberty. Id. The safeguards will apply to patients admitted to a
hospital, an assisted care facility, or a similar establishment. Id. Upon admission, a "social
care representative" will nominate an advocate who will act on behalf of the patient. Id. at
50. A clinical supervisor will assess the patient's needs and within 28 days develop a final
care plan in conjunction with two physicians. Id. At any time, either the patient or the
advocate may challenge the detention or the care plan and request a Tribunal review of
actions taken. Id.
275. See Mental Health Act, 1983, at § 131. But see REFORMING THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT,
supra note 274, at 49 (announcing the government's intention to introduce safeguards for
patients treated without the use of compulsory powers). The Department of Health esti-
mated that at any time there may be as many as 44,000 people informally admitted to a
hospital with serious, long-term mental incapacity. Id.
276. 3 All E.R. 289 (H.L. 1998).
277. Id. at 297-98.
278. Id. at 292.
279. Id. at 300.
280. Id at 301.
281. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1985).
282. See supra notes 276-280 and accompanying text (discussing Bournewood, in which an
adult with severe learning disabilities was informally admitted to a hospital).
283. See Ashingdane, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (finding that the petitioner was sub-
ject to a restriction order and thus restrained in law).
284. See Mental Health Act 1983, c. 20, §§ 5(2), 5(4) (Eng.).
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close attention to the factual and legal realities facing an individual. A
failure to exercise a theoretical right to leave an institution should not
be dispositive if the person lacks maturity, understanding of her situa-
tion, or competence.285 A determination of a "detention" under the
ECHR should depend on all the circumstances of the case including
the use of force or deception, the person's resistance to, or displea-
sure with, restraint and treatment, the person's mental capacity, and
the place, conditions, and duration of confinement. 28 6 In Bournewood,
the hospital prevented the patient's caregivers from visiting him.
2 7
Philip Fennell suggests that this "aggravating factor" might convince
the European Court of Human Rights that there had been a
deprivation.28 8
b. The Problem of Compulsory Supervision in the Community.-
Compulsory supervision of persons with mental disabilities in the
community has stimulated considerable interest in mental health pol-
icy circles. Pressure for community supervision arises from growing
public perceptions that de-institutionalization failed and that greater
numbers of mentally disabled persons in the community pose a public
risk.28 9 Various national schemes may require persons with mental
disabilities to live in specified residences, to attend specified places for
purposes of counseling, education, or training, to permit access by
mental health professionals to their homes, or to submit to compul-
285. See Guenat v. Switzerland, App. No. 24772/94, 81-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
130, 131 (1995) (failing to consider the effect that the detainee's medicine had on his
mental capacity).
286. SeeAmuurv. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 850-51 (noting that the court must
assess a number of criteria to determine if an appellant has been detained); see also Mental
Health Act 1983 Revised Code of Practice, HSC 1999/050 at § 18.27, available at http://
www.doh.gov.uk/pub/docs/doh/mhcop.pdf (recommending that an incompetent person
should be detained only if she "persistently and/or purposely" tries to leave the hospital).
287. R. v. Bournewood, 3 All E.R. 289, 292 (H.L. 1998).
288. Philip Fennell, Doctor Knows Best? Therapeutic Detention Under Common Law, the
Mental Health Act, and the European Convention, 6 MED. L. REv. 322, 325 (1998).
289. See Allen & Smith, supra note 46, at 343-45 (arguing that outpatient commitment
programs are not effective and are of questionable legal validity); Paul S. Appelbaum,
Thinking Carefully about Outpatient Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 347, 348-50 (2001)
(reviewing questions that policy makers should address in considering outpatient commit-
ment statutes); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Involuntary Out-patient Commitment and Reduction of
Violent Behaviour in Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 324, 327-28
(2000) (declaring that involuntary out-patient commitment has a significant effect on re-
ducing violent behavior in people who have severe mental illness); J.C. Phelan & B.G.
Link, The Growing Belief That People with Mental Illnesses Are Violent: The Role of the Dangerous-
ness Criterion for Civil Commitment, 33 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOCY S7
(1998) (studying the effect of the dangerousness criterion for involuntary admission on
the public's perception of mentally ill persons as violent).
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sory psychiatric treatment.2 0 These powers adversely affect several
important aspects of human dignity, including autonomy, association,
and privacy.
The European Court's jurisprudence is still insufficiently devel-
oped to predict whether, in the more extreme cases, community con-
trol would amount to a detention. There is certainly a "detention"
when a hospital actually admits, or re-admits, patients in the commu-
nity.29' At that moment, the full panoply of human rights under Arti-
cle 5 takes effect.29 2 However, only the most intrusive forms of
restraint in the community are likely to be of sufficient intensity and
degree to constitute a deprivation of liberty. The European Commis-
sion, for example, has found that provisional discharge conditioned
on the patient accepting medical treatment on an outpatient basis was
not a "deprivation of liberty. ' 29 Because of the serious effects on
human rights, the regional human rights systems should develop ef-
fective methods to ensure that governments justify the most intrusive
forms of community supervision.294
2. Justification for Detention Based on Mental Disability in the Euro-
pean System.-Article 5(1) of the ECHR lists the only circumstances in
290. Community treatment orders are used in the United Kingdom, United States, Can-
ada, and elsewhere. See Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995, c. 52, § 4
(Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1995/UKpga-I9950052-en-2.htm
(providing that a patient's responsible medical officer may make an application for a com-
munity care order which would improve conditions to ensure that the patient receives
medical treatment and after-care services); Mental Health Act, R.S.O., ch. M.7,
§ 33.1(3) (1990) (Ont.), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Statutes/Eng
lish/90m07_e.htm (providing for community treatment orders for certain individuals with
serious mental disorders); John Dawson et al., Ambivalence about Community Treatment Or-
ders, 26 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 243, 243 (2003) (describing the growing use of community
treatment orders around the world).
291. See Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9, 18 (1985)
(submitting that both petitioner and the state thought the hospital was detaining the peti-
tioner when it admitted him because of mental illness).
292. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1) ("No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.").
293. L. v. Sweden, App. No. 10801/84, 61 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 62, 73 (1988).
294. As suggested above, the European Court itself has said that restrictions of move-
ment should be considered under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4: "Everyone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement ...."
Protocol No. 4, supra note 266, art. 2; see Amuur v. France, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 848
("[m]ere restrictions upon liberty of movement.., are governed by Article 2 of Protocol
No. 4"). Community powers might also implicate, for example, Article 8 (respect for pri-
vate and family life), Article 1] (freedom of association), or Article 13 (an effective remedy
for violation of ECHR rights). See ECHR, supra note 35, arts. 8, 11, 13. Oliver Thorold,
however, concludes that "[c]ommunity controls.., appear to be treated as insufficiently
invasive or serious to engage any of the relevant Articles of the Convention." See Thorold,
supra note 206, at 632.
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which governments may justifiably deprive a person of liberty.295 Sub-
paragraph (e) addresses one such instance: "the lawful detention of
persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants. "296
The ECHR, therefore, groups together persons of unsound mind with
other individuals marginalized in society and subject to confinement
without a criminal conviction. The state interest in prevention of in-
fectious disease is certainly legitimate because the ECHR frames it in
terms of public protection.29 7 A similar state interest does not justify
the confinement of the remaining categories of individuals subject to
detention under this provision. Rather, they are persons character-
ized by a series of personal statuses based on health or socio-economic
status. 29 s The fact that an individual is in poor health from mental
illness, dependent on alcohol or drugs, or has no visible means of
support does not, in itself, warrant detention. Additional findings of
dangerousness and that the person will benefit from treatment are
necessary to justify detaining people who belong to these groups.299
Despite the ECHR's failure to state clearly and precisely a rigor-
ous justification for detention on grounds of mental disability, the Eu-
ropean Court has imposed reasonably strong standards under Article
5(1) (e). First, the detention must be "lawful," meaning that the gov-
ernment must follow a "procedure prescribed by law" and cannot act
arbitrarily. 00 Second, the person must be of "unsound mind.""°1
295. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1).
296. Id. art. 5(1) (e). It should also be noted that, in addition to Article 5(1) (e) of the
ECHR, governments can detain mentally disordered offenders admitted to a hospital using
either Article 5(1) (a) ("lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court") or Article 5(1) (b) ("lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law"). Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(b). See Nowicka v. Poland, App. No. 30218/96, para. 60
(Dec. 3, 2002) (Court report), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (authorizing detention of the
patient pursuant to Article 5(1) (b)).
297. See ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1) (e) (stating that the purpose of the detention is
to prevent the spread of infectious disease).
298. See id. (authorizing "the lawful detention of . . . alcoholics or drug addicts or
vagrants").
299. The European Court has attempted to justify the detention of these vulnerable
groups based upon protection from themselves and from the public. "The reason why the
Convention allows [persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, and drug addicts] to be deprived
of their liberty is not only that they have to be considered as occasionally dangerous for
public safety but also that their own interests may necessitate their detention." Guzzardi v.
Italy, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 333, 366 (1980) (Court report).
300. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1); Steel v. United Kingdom, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.
2719, 2735.
301. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1)(e).
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Third, she must currently be suffering from a mental illness that war-
rants confinement for care and treatment.30 2
a. "Lawful Detention ": Duty to Conform with Domestic Law and
Avoid Arbitrary Decisions. -Article 5(1) 's phrase "in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law" essentially refers back to domestic law; it
states the requirement that the detention must comply with the rele-
vant substantive and procedural rules under that law.30 3
The European Court has stated more generally that "lawful" de-
tention must also be consistent with the purposes for which a mental
health facility is confining a person.3 °4 Put another way, the govern-
ment must demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the objec-
tives (to provide care and treatment in the person's best interests) and
the means used to achieve those objectives (reasonable procedures,
criteria, and conditions of confinement) .305 Governmental action is
not reasonable if it is aimless: "[a] ny measure depriving a person of
his liberty should issue from and be executed by an appropriate au-
thority and should not be arbitrary. 3 0 6
The European Court asserts the power to examine whether a na-
tional authority has complied with the terms of its own legislation or
has otherwise acted arbitrarily, but the scope of review is limited. For
example, in Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, 7 the European Court
found a violation of Article 5(1) based on the arbitrary nature of the
302. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1979).
303. Steel, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2735 (noting that "given the importance of personal
liberty, it is essential that the applicable national law meet the standard of 'lawfulness' set
by the Convention, which requires that all law, whether written or unwritten, be sufficiently
precise to allow the citizen . . . to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circum-
stances, the consequences which a given action may entail"); see Hutchison Reid v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 50272/99, at 13 (Feb. 20, 2003) (Court report), at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int (holding that continued detention of the patient was not arbitrary al-
though "the grounds on which detention . . . [could] be ordered in domestic law [had]
altered over the period during which the applicant [had] been detained"). An interesting
human rights question was presented, but never resolved, in the Bournewood case where the
House of Lords in the United Kingdom held that the common law doctrine of necessity,
rather than mental health legislation, justified a patient's detention. R v. Bournewood
Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, 3 All E.R. 289, 298 (H.L. 1998).
Arguably, this is a violation of Article 5 (1) because mental health authorities did not fol-
low "a procedure prescribed by law." ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1). By relying solely on
the common law, they circumvented all the substantive and procedural safeguards in-
tended under mental health legislation. Bournewood, 3 All E.R. at 295 (noting that infor-
mal patients are admitted "without the formalities and procedures for admission necessary
for detention under the [Mental Health] Act").
304. See Aerts v. Belgium, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939, 1962.
305. See id.
306. Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20.
307. App. No. 11509/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567 (1990) (Court report).
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detention."38 The judge failed to hear from the patient or her repre-
sentative and did not give any reason why he did not hear from her. 0 9
Similarly, in D.S.E. v. The Netherlands,31 the European Commission
found that the government failed to comply with lawful procedures.31'
A mentally disordered offender's period of confinement in a hospital,
due to a procedural oversight, was not formally extended because
"there was a period of two months and twenty days ... during which
there existed no court decision as the basis of the applicant's
detention." '312
"Lawful" detention may also require a minimally therapeutic envi-
ronment.3"3 This follows from the relationship between the need for
detention and the treatment for mental illness.31 4 Detention for the
purposes of care and treatment of mentally ill persons cannot be ac-
complished in punitive or nontherapeutic environments. The idea
that the ECHR may impose an affirmative obligation to provide a min-
imally therapeutic environment is discussed below.
b. Persons of "Unsound Mind. "-The entire foundation of
mental health law rests on a reliable diagnosis of mental disability.
Absent this status, individuals would not be subject to confinement
without conviction of a criminal offense. Human rights norms, there-
fore, stress the importance of a careful and accurate diagnosis of
mental disability. 3
15
The ECHR requires a finding of unsoundness of mind to justify
confinement in a mental hospital, but does not define the term.316
The European Court has said that because of the fluidity of the term's
usage, it should not be given a definitive interpretation. 31 7 The Euro-
pean Court, however, also has stated that Article 5(1) (e) would not
308. Id. at 573.
309. Id. at 572-73.
310. App. No. 23807/94 (July 2, 1997) (Commission report), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/Hudocldoc/herep/sift/553.txt.
311. Id. para. 40.
312. Id. para. 39; see also Erkalo v. The Netherlands, App. No. 23807/94, 28 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 509, 529 (1998) (Court report) (finding that the State's failure to set a hearing date
to review continued detention constituted a violation of Article 5(1) (e)).
313. See Aerts v. Belgium, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939, 1962 (noting that the institution in
which petitioner was detained was not appropriate because it did not provide regular medi-
cal treatment or a therapeutic environment).
314. See id.
315. See MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, Principle 4, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 621
(providing guidelines for making a determination of mental illness).
316. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1)(e).
317. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1979).
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permit the detention of a person simply because "his views or behav-
iour deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular society. '318
The lawful detention of persons of unsound mind under the
ECHR, except in emergency cases, requires the observance of three
minimal conditions." 9 First, the state must establish through "objective
medical expertise' that the individual is of unsound mind.2 The proce-
dural requirement of objective medical evidence is important because
it adds legitimacy to the state's claim that detention is truly necessary
for treatment of a person with a mental illness. The medical evidence,
according to the European Commission, may come from a general
practitioner rather than a psychiatrist," 1 although psychiatrists are
more likely to meet the MI Principle of an "internationally accepted
318. Id. In the former Soviet Union and China, the incarceration of political and relig-
ious dissidents in maximum security psychiatric hospitals without medical justification has
been well documented. E.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Political Abuse of Psychiaty in the Soviet
Union and in China: Complexities and Controversies, 30J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 136, 137
(2002); Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN
L. 1, 4 (2000). Using over-inclusive definitions of mental disorders, the governments of
the former Soviet Union and China were able to hyper-diagnose nonimputable cases of
mental illness. Bonnie, supra, at 139 (noting hyperdiagnosis of schizophrenia in the Soviet
Union); Munro, supra, at 82-86 (noting that dangerousness is defined in China to include
certain types of dissidents). Determinants of diagnosis included signs that the patient ex-
hibited a "high level of commitment to a single cause" (political reform) and failed to
adapt to societal norms (dissidence). Bonnie, supra, at 139. During detainment, medicine
was routinely used for punitive purposes. Bonnie, supra, at 138 (noting that the Soviet
Union induced insulin comas and utilized atropine injections and high doses of anti-
psychotic drugs for punitive purposes); Munro, supra, at 24 (noting that China induced
insulin comas and used electroconvulsive shock therapy as methods of punishment). This
'misuse of psychiatry for politically repressive purposes" demonstrates the risks associated
with unchecked psychiatric power, and the importance of erecting institutional safeguards
in the context of involuntary hospitalization and treatment. Munro, supra, at 6.
319. See, e.g., Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18.
In the Court's opinion, except in emergency cases, the individual concerned
should not be deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown to be of
"unsound mind." The very nature of what has to be established before the com-
petent national authority-that is, a true mental disorder-calls for objective
medical expertise. Further, the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree war-
ranting compulsory confinement. What is more, the validity of continued con-
finement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder.
Id.
320. X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1981) (emphasis added). See
Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-19 (finding that the petitioner's actions justified
an "emergency" confinement and that objective and reliable medical evidence also sup-
ported his detention); Luberti v. Italy, 75 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1984) (finding that
the appellant was of unsound mind based on two psychiatric reports).
321. Schuurs v. The Netherlands, App. No. 10518/83, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 186, 188-89 (1985).
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medical standard [ ].1"322 The European Court has found deprivation
of liberty without first consulting a medical expert to be unlawful.3 93
The second criterion for lawful detention is that the mental ill-
ness "must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. ''1 21
Since the ECHR does not define unsoundness of mind, persons with
relatively minor mental health problems conceivably could be subject
to detention. The European Court has made clear, however, that the
mental disability must be of sufficient seriousness to justify deprivation
of liberty.32
5
Furthermore, the phrase "mental disorder.., of a kind or degree
warranting compulsory confinement" does not require that the pa-
tient's condition be treatable.3 26 Arguably, a mental hospital should
not confine a patient with an untreatable condition, such as a psycho-
pathic disorder. Yet, the European Court has rejected this argument,
reasoning that public protection may justify confinement, even if the
mental illness is untreatable.32 7
The third criterion is that "the validity of continued confinement de-
pends upon the persistence of such a disorder.'3 28 Accordingly, even if the
322. MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, Principle 4, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 621.
323. See Varbanov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 31365/96, para. 48 (Oct. 5, 2000) (Court re-
port), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (finding that the detention of a patient for 25 days
based on an order issued without consulting a medical expert was unlawful because the
case did not involve an emergency); Nowicka v. Poland, App. No. 30218/96, paras. 64-65
(Dec. 3, 2002) (Court report), at http://hudoc/echr.coe.int (holding that two court-or-
dered detentions totaling 83 days violated Article 5(1) since the detentions were to con-
duct psychiatric examinations that normally took only a few hours and were based on a
private dispute).
324. Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (emphasis added).
325. Varbanov, App. No. 31365/96, para. 46 (noting that a detention is warranted only if
other less restrictive measures would be ineffective).
326. See Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18; see also Hutchison Reid v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 50272/99, paras. 52-55 (Feb. 20, 2003) (Court report), at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int (holding that detention was appropriate although patient suffered
from a psychopathic personality disorder because of the finding that he had a high risk of
re-offending).
327. See Hutchison Reid, App. No. 50272/99, para. 52 (holding that the decision not to
release an applicant with an untreatable psychopathic disorder because of the high risk to
the community did not violate Article 5(1) (e)). Courts in the United Kingdom have simi-
larly interpreted ECHR case law. See A v. Scottish Ministers, 2002 S.L.T. 1331, 1338 (ex-
plaining the legitimacy of detaining an individual because of public health concerns); see
also Regina (H) v. London N. & E. Region Mental Health Review Tribunal, 3 W.L.R. 512,
521 (2001) (holding that the ECHR requires a mental disorder as a precondition for
confinement).
328. Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (emphasis added); Ashingdane v. United
Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1985); X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 18 (1981); see also Larry Gostin, Human Rights, Judicial Review and the Mentally
Disordered Offender, 1982 CRIM. L. REv. 779, 782 (listing the three conditions necessary to
lawfully confine a person of unsound mind).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
person had a sufficiently serious form of mental disability at the time
of admission, the hospital must discharge her when she achieves a
state of mental health that no longer warrants confinement. 329 Logi-
cally, the government must have in place a mechanism for ongoing
review of a person's mental status to ensure that all confined individu-
als continue to have a mental disability sufficient to necessitate
confinement.
Notably, the European Court found that, simply because an ex-
pert authority determines that the applicant is no longer suffering
from mental disorder, the law does not require his immediate and
unconditional release into the community.33 ° Such a rigid approach
would constrain the exercise of judgment as to whether "the interests
of the patient and the community into which he is to be released
would in fact be best served" by an immediate and unconditional dis-
charge.33' The European Court acknowledged that a responsible au-
thority should be able to "retain some measure of supervision over the
progress of the person once he is released into the community and to
... make his discharge subject to conditions. '332 However, safeguards
must be in place to assure that the hospital does not unreasonably
329. See X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18.
330. Johnson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22520/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 296, 322-23
(1997) (Court report) (finding that although the applicant no longer suffered from a
mental illness, a phased conditional discharge was appropriate).
331. Id. at 322.
332. Id. at 323. In the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal in Regina (K) v. Camden and
Islington Health Authority further considered the applicability of Article 5 to a Tribunal's
decision to discharge a patient subject to conditions. 2002 Q.B. 198. The Court of Appeal
distinguished between two kinds of cases. Id. at 228. The first is a case, like Johnson, where
the tribunal finds the patient is no longer suffering from a mental disorder, but needs to
be discharged into a controlled environment as part of a structured period of rehabilita-
tion. Id. In such a case, Article 5(1)(e) requires that the conditions, as well as the period
of time needed to comply with the conditions, must be proportionate to the objectives and
cannot become indefinite. Id. at 229. For example, if the tribunal imposes a condition
which proves inordinately difficult and time-consuming to perform, there may be a viola-
tion of the Convention. Id.
The second is a case, like in Camden and Islington Health Authority, where the tribunal con-
cludes that the patient is mentally ill, but could be treated appropriately in the community.
Id. at 228. Lord Phillips MR said:
If a health authority is unable, despite the exercise of all reasonable endeavours,
to procure for a patient the level of care and treatment in the community that a
tribunal considers to be a prerequisite to the discharge of the patient from hospi-
tal, I do not consider that the continued detention of the patient in hospital will
violate the right to liberty conferred by article 5.
Id. at 229. He also explained that:
Whether or not it is necessary to detain a patient in hospital for treatment may
well depend upon the level of facilities available for treatment within the commu-
nity. Neither article 5 nor European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence lays
down any criteria as to the extent to which member states must provide facilities
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delay discharge.333 In Johnson, a Mental Health Review Tribunal
found that Johnson no longer suffered from a mental illness, but de-
ferred his conditional discharge until arrangements could be made
for suitable hostel accommodation.3 3 4 However, the appointed social
worker could not find a suitable hostel, and Johnson remained in the
hospital for an additional four years. 335 The European Court held
that, although a deferral of conditional discharge was justified in prin-
ciple, Article 5 (1) (e) did not permit Johnson's detention because the
hospital did not use the necessary safeguards to ensure that it did not
unreasonably delay Johnson's release. 36
It is important to note that the three standards for compliance
under Article 5(1) (e) (i.e., reliable evidence of mental disorder, the
disorder warrants detention in hospital, and continued confinement
depends upon the persistence of the disorder) may not apply in emer-
gency situations. The European Court has stated that an emergency
case might not require objective medical expertise in advance of de-
tention.337 If domestic law authorizes emergency admission to a hos-
pital, the ECHR does not always require a thorough medical
examination prior to arrest or detention if it is impracticable.338 In
the European Court's view, "[a] wide discretion must in the nature of
things be enjoyed by the national authority empowered to order such
emergency confinements.3 39 Where a risk exists that a patient will
pose a public threat or will suffer a serious deterioration of his mental
health, the expert evaluation may take place after admission. 40 In
such circumstances, the public's safety or the patient's best interests
may prevail over the individual's right to liberty and may justify emer-
gency confinement without employment of Article 5(1) (e)'s implied
safeguards. 341 Nevertheless, a thorough medical examination must, in
all cases, occur promptly after emergency admission. 4 9
for the care of those of unsound mind in the community, thereby avoiding the
necessity for them to be detained for treatment in hospital.
Id. at 228-29.
333. See Johnson, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 297.
334. Id. at 302-03.
335. Id. at 302-06.
336. Id. at 314.
337. See Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1979).
338. X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1981).
339. Id.
340. See id. (rejecting the inference that "objective medical expertise" must always be
obtained before a hospital confines a person on the grounds of mental disability).
341. Id. at 21.
342. See id. (explaining that, after a patient's emergency confinement, his further deten-
tion must satisfy the minimum conditions in Article 5(1) (e)).
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c. Summary of Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR.-In summary, Arti-
cle 5(1) (e) of the ECHR places the following limitations on involun-
tary detention of persons on grounds of mental illness. First,
government must comply with domestic law by following all democrat-
ically imposed criteria and procedures.34 3 Second, government must
act consistently with the purpose of confinement, which is to provide
care and treatment in the person's best interests.3 4 4 This means that
authorities may not act arbitrarily and that the circumstances and con-
ditions of confinement must be compatible with treatment rather
than punishment.3 45 Finally, the person must be suffering from a
mental illness sufficient to justify confinement and must continue to
suffer from such a mental illness. 346 Government, moreover, must
produce independent evidence that reliably diagnoses the person as
mentally ill within internationally accepted medical standards..3 47 Gov-
ernment may not detain persons for an unreasonable period when
they are subject to conditional release into the community. 41
3. The Right to a Review of Detention by a Court in the European Sys-
tem. -Article 5(4) of the ECHR states that "Everyone who is deprived
of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceed-
ings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 349
Article 5(4) affords an individual fundamental rights to: (1) a review
of the lawfulness of her detention, (2) by a court, (3) in a reasonably
prompt manner, and (4) with the power to release her if she is being
unlawfully detained.33 °
a. Review of the "Lawfulness of Detention. "--Persons who have
been deprived of their liberty on grounds of mental disability must
have the right "to take proceedings at reasonable intervals before a
court to put in issue the 'lawfulness' of his detention, whether that
detention was ordered by a civil or criminal court or by some other
343. I at 19.
344. See Aerts v. Belgium, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939, 1961-62 (noting that the primary
goal of Article 5 is to protect the patient).
345. Id.
346. X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18.
347. See id at 19 (explaining that a deprivation of liberty that is in accordance with
domestic law may not be lawful under Article 5(1) (e) if the patient is not "shown to be of
unsound mind by objective medical evidence").
348. Johnson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22520/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 296, 314
(1997) (Court report).
349. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(4).
350. See id,
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authority." '' The European Court has expansively construed the
phrase "proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be
decided.315 2 The independent review of detention must achieve two
clear purposes."5 ' First, the review must examine whether authorities
have acted in accordance with the applicable procedures and criteria
set forth under domestic law.354 Second, the review must examine
whether authorities have complied fully with the ECHR."5' The au-
thorities must have followed all of the standards in Article 5(1) (e) in-
cluding the proscription against arbitrary detention and the
requirement of independent medical evidence demonstrating that
the person is, and continues to be, of unsound mind.5 6 The Euro-
pean Court, therefore, has insisted that the independent review of de-
tention must not be a mere formality, but must provide a serious
examination of the merits of the case. 57 While the review body need
not substitute its decision for that of the decision-making authority, it
must nevertheless assure that the person is, in fact, mentally disabled
to the extent necessary to justify involuntary confinement.35 8
b. Review by a "Court. "--The ECHR requires that the review
of detention be conducted by a "court.'"59 The word "court" in Arti-
cle 5(4) does not signify a court of law of the classic kind, integrated
within the judicial machinery of the country. Rather, it requires a
body with a judicial character and which affords procedural guaran-
tees to the parties.3 60 The most important characteristic of a court is
351. X 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23; see also De Wilde v. Belgium, I Eur. H.R. Rep. 373,
407 (1970) (Court report) ("Where the decision depriving a person of his liberty is one
taken by an administrative body, there is no doubt that Article 5 (4) obliges the Contracting
States to make available to the person detained a right of recourse to a court.").
352. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(4); see X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25 ("The review should,
however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which, according to the Convention,
are essential for the 'lawful' detention of a person on the ground of unsoundness of mind,
especially as the reasons capable of initially justifying such a detention may cease to
exist.").
353. Under United Kingdom law, courts can review the first purpose (conformity with
domestic law) by means ofjudicial review and habeas corpus while a Mental Health Review
Tribunal can review the second purpose (the merits of the case). SeeX, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
25 (explaining that domestic law procedures to determine "lawfulness," such as that used
by the United Kingdom, may not be adequate to decide lawfulness under the ECHR).
354. Id at 24-25 (finding that the government adhered to the United Kingdom's habeas
corpus procedures).
355. Id. at 25.
356. Id.
357. See id. (noting that the scope of judicial review must be sufficient to enable the
court to determine whether the illness that initially justified the detention persists).
358. Id
359. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(4).
360. X 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23.
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independence from the executive and the parties to the case. 36' This
is a critically important safeguard since it assures that the review body
does not have a conflict of interest. Since the detaining authority
technically rests within the executive branch of government, the Euro-
pean Court insists that the court reside within a different branch.3 6 2
Thus, the review body could reside within the judicial branch as a for-
mal court of law or be independent of the executive and judicial
branches. 63
A "court" must also follow a procedure of a judicial character,
giving the individual fundamental guarantees of natural justice.3 6 4
The guarantees required under Article 6 of the ECHR do not have to
be present in Article 5(4) judicial proceedings.36 5 However, the per-
son must have the opportunity to present her own case, either in per-
son or through a representative, and to challenge the medical and
social evidence adduced in support of the detention.3 6 6 In addition,
the government bears the burden of proving that the person meets
the criteria for detention. 6 7
Mental disability may entail restricting or modifying the manner
of exercise of natural justice, but it cannot justify impairing the very
essence of the right. Indeed, it may be necessary to institute special
procedural safeguards to protect the interests of mentally disabled
persons who are not fully capable of acting independently.3 68 The
fact that an individual's personal liberty is at stake combined with the
nature of the person's diminished mental capacity requires the gov-
361. Varbanov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 31365/96, para. 58 (2000) (Court report), at http:/
/hudoc.echr.coe.int.
362. See id. para. 60 (invalidating a procedure where a prosecutor's order was appealable
only to other higher-ranking prosecutors).
363. See X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26 (referring to both judicial and administrative review
procedures as appropriate independent review procedures, and explaining that a special-
ized tribunal may act as a court for purposes of 5(4) (1) provided that it "enjoys the neces-
sary independence"). But see Thorold, supra note 206, at 625 (arguing that since patients
have the burden of proof, Mental Health Review Tribunals do not have to find patients to
be suffering from mental disability to justify detention); id. at 629 (reasoning that the crite-
ria for discharge by Mental Health Review Tribunals may, in the future, be subject to exam-
ination under Article 5).
364. De Wilde v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 407 (1970) (Court report).
365. Article 6 of the ECHR guarantees a right to fair trial. ECHR, supra note 35. See
discussion of Article 6 infra notes 522-537 and accompanying text.
366. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1979); see also
Kawka v. Poland, App. No. 25874/94, paras. 60-61 (Jan. 9, 2001) (Court report), at http://
hudoc/echr.coe.int (finding a violation of Article 5(4) because the applicant did not have
an opportunity to contest the arguments supporting his detention).
367. Hutchison Reid v. United Kingdom, App. No. 50272/99, para. 70 (Feb. 20, 2003)
(Court report), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
368. Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24.
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ernment to provide legal representation. 69 The United Kingdom, for
example, instituted public financing of MHRT representation in re-
sponse to a case brought by MIND (the National Association of
Mental Health) in the early 1980s.37°
c. Review in a "Speedy" Manner. -Article 5(4), in guarantee-
ing a right to institute proceedings, also affords a right to a "speedy"
determination to terminate detention if it proves to be unlawful."'
The relevant time period for calculating a delay in judicial review runs
from when the patient filed an application for release. 372 The Euro-
pean Court has found that delays of four3 73 or five 3 74 months violated
the ECHR. The European Court, however, went considerably further
in E v. Norway,3 7 5 holding that a delay of eight weeks violated the man-
date for a speedy review.376 The European Court has acknowledged
that the government may, in exceptional cases, assert a sufficient justi-
fication for delays.377 However, primary responsibility for delay rests
on the government. Moreover, the complexity of a medical case does
not absolve national authorities from their fundamental obligation to
afford a prompt review of detention.378 Although isolated delays in
369. Megyeri v. Germany, App. No. 13770/88, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 584, 593 (1992).
370. Gostin, supra note 46, at 361 (discussing the case of Collins v. United Kingdom and
the resulting changes made to the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules of Procedure and
a regulatory amendment that provided public financing for legal representation).
371. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(4).
372. Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, App. No. 11509/85, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 575
(1990) (Court report).
373. Koendjbiharie v. The Netherlands, App. No. 11497/85, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 820, 827
(1990) (Court report).
374. Van der Leer, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 575.
375. 181 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1990).
376. Id. at 27; see also Rutten v. The Netherlands, App. No. 32605/96, para. 54 (2001)
(Court report), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (finding a violation where the first instance
court took two months and seventeen days to issue its decision and the appellate court
took a further three months to reach itsjudgment).
377. SeeE, 181 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27-28 (noting that the court should consider the
circumstances of the case to decide whether it was dealt with speedily).
378. Musial v. Poland, App. No. 24557/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 720, 733 (1999) (Court
report). Courts in the United Kingdom have followed the European Court's jurisprudence
in this area. For example, in Queen (on the application of C) v. Mental Health Review Tribunal,
No. C/01/0022, 2001 WL 676817 (C.A. July 3, 2001), the Court of Appeal held that the
denial of a request for an early hearing date by a solicitor experienced in mental health
matters was incompatible with the Convention. See id. paras. 58, 66; see also Mental Health
Review Tibunals: Time Limits and the ECHR, 10 MED. L. REv. 89, 90 (2002) (observing that
the Court of Appeal considered the practice of routinely listing hearings eight weeks after
an application to be arbitrary and unlawful and that the authorities made no attempt to
ensure that individual applications were heard as soon as reasonably practicable). The
High Court in R (on the application of KB, MK, R GM, LB, PD, and TB) v. Mental Health
Review Tribunal, 2002 WL 498854 (Q.B. Admin. Ct. Apr. 23, 2002), similarly held that pa-
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holding hearings do not necessarily violate ECHR rights, systematic
delays do. In the words of the European Court: "[T]he Convention
places a duty on the Contracting States to organise their legal systems
so as to allow the courts to comply with the requirements of [a speedy
hearing] ."7 Delays in detention reviews not only extend the dura-
tion of the detention, they may also lead to the use of inaccurate psy-
chiatric evaluations that no longer depict the current mental state of
380the person.
d. The Power to Release Unlawfully Detained Patients.-Article
5(4) provides that a court must have the power to order the patient's
release if the detention is not lawful.381 Consequently, the court must
be vested with the ultimate power to discharge the patient, and may
not act merely as an advisory body. 2
e. Incorporated and Periodic Review: Mentally Disordered Offend-
ers.-Hospitals detain mentally disordered offenders not only on the
basis of Article 5(1) (e), but also under Article 5(1) (a), which allows
"the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court. '383 Presumably, the justification for detention under sub-para-
graph (a) ceases once the person has been confined for a period of
time that is proportional to the gravity of the offense.384
tients detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 were entitled to a Tribunal
hearing within eight weeks of the date of their application. See id. para. 37. Where, in the
absence of any reasoned justification, a hearing did not take place within that timeframe
the court found there would be a breach of the Mental Health Act 1983. Id. para. 47. This
case is particularly interesting because the High Court took into account the resource limi-
tations and administrative problems in the Tribunal system, particularly the large workload
and the shortage of medical members. Id. paras. 87-92, 112-13. By holding that lack of
resources provides an insufficient justification for Tribunal delays, the Court implicitly re-
quired additional government expenditures to assure competent and speedy hearings for
persons detained under the Act. See id. para. 113.
379. Zimmermann v. Switzerland, App. No. 8737/79, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 24 (1983)
(Court report).
380. See Magalhdes Pereira v. Portugal, App. No. 44872/98, para. 49 (2002) (Court re-
port), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (finding that the use of a 20-month old psychiatric
evaluation to determine whether an individual's detention should continue violated Article
5(4)).
381. ECHR, supra note 35.
382. X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1981); see also Curley v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 32340/96, 31 Eur. H.R Rep. 401, 408 (2000) (Court report)
(finding that because the UK Parole Board did not have the power to order the release of
the prisoner the review done by the Parole Board violated Article 5(4)).
383. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(1) (a).
384. See , 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 ("The particular circumstances of this case,
and notably the fact that X was conditionally released and enjoyed a lengthy period of
liberty before being re-detained, may give rise to some doubts as to . . . the continued
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Mentally disordered offenders are admitted to a hospital by order
of a court, while other patients are admitted under civil powers. Pro-
vided the court finds, on the facts, that the person has a mental disa-
bility warranting hospital admission, the Article 5(4) judicial review
requirement will be deemed satisfied.385 The European Court has re-
peatedly found that where a court initially orders detention, the judi-
cial review required by the ECHR is incorporated in that decision.
The initial court order, however, may last only for a period of
time that is proportional to the gravity of the offense.3 87 For example,
in Silva Rocha v. Portugal, the European Court held that the state could
detain a person found not guilty by reason of insanity under sub-para-
graph (a) for three years given the seriousness of the offense and the
risk to the public; for reviews during that time, the sentencing court
incorporated the review required by Article 5(4) into its decision. 88
However, once this "tariff' of three years expired, the applicant had
the right to further judicial review.389
In the case of confinement of mentally disabled persons, the Eu-
ropean Court requires a periodic review of the lawfulness of deten-
tion.3 9 ° Since mental illness is subject to amelioration and cure,
subsequent reviews at reasonable intervals are necessary to ensure
that the person's mental state continues to require detention in a
mental hospital.391 Moreover, the review body must have the auth-
applicability of sub-paragraph (a)".). Authorities, however, cannot rely on sub-paragraph
(a) alone to justify detention in a mental hospital; the Court retains the power to verify, at
all times, that the person is of unsound mind under sub-paragraph (e). For a discussion of
X v. United Kingdom, see infra notes 393-411 and accompanying text.
385. See De Wilde v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 407 (1970) (Court report) (stating
that when a court makes the detention decision, Article 5(4) is not offended).
386. Id.; Luberti v. Italy, 75 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1984).
387. Silva Rocha v. Portugal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1913, 1921.
388. Id. at 1921-22.
389. Id. at 1922.
390. X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1981).
391. Luberti, 75 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15; Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1979). The Court has also required periodic review in certain circum-
stances "after conviction by a competent court" under Article 5(1)(a). Thynne v. United
Kingdom, 190 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Weeks v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9787/82, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 314-15 (1987)
(Court report) (holding that applicant was entitled to periodic review when the grounds
for his detention were subject to change based on his indeterminate life sentence); Hutchi-
son Reid v. United Kingdom, App. No. 50272/99, para. 65 (2003) (Court report), at http:/
/hudoc.echr.coe.int ("An entitlement to a review arises both at the time of the initial dep-
rivation of liberty and where new issues of lawfulness are capable of arising, periodically
thereafter.").
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ority to order a release if it finds continued detention unwarran-
ted. 3 9
2
f X v. United Kingdom: A Landmark in Mental Health Law
Reform.-X v. United Kingdom,393 one of several test cases brought by
MIND394 in the mid-1970s, is one of the most pivotal mental health
decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights. 3 95 The case
involved section 66 of the United Kingdom's Mental Health Act 1959,
which gave the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the
Home Secretary) the exclusive authority to discharge patients de-
tained under a hospital order with restrictions on discharge. 96 A re-
stricted patient was conditionally discharged from Broadmoor
Hospital (a maximum security psychiatric hospital), but the Home
Secretary subsequently recalled the patient to that hospital after the
patient's wife told a police officer her concerns about her husband's
mental state. 97 The applicant had at all times complied with the con-
ditions of discharge; there was no medical recommendation sought
and no investigation of the facts giving rise to the recall.39" The Euro-
pean Court held that section 66 of the 1959 Act violated Article 5 of
the ECHR in several respects.399
First, because mental illness is subject to amelioration and cure,
any person detained on grounds of "unsoundness of mind" under Ar-
ticle 5(1) (e) must have a right to periodic judicial review.4° ° As ex-
plained above, this review must examine not merely whether the
detention is in conformity with the domestic law, but whether it is
justified on its merits.4 ' The applicant did have a habeas corpus fo-
392. Benjamin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28212/95, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 9 (2002)
(Court report).
393. 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1981).
394. MIND, also known as the National Association for Mental Health, is an advocacy
group based in the United Kingdom that supports human rights for persons with mental
disability. About Mind, at http://www.mind.org.uk/About+Mind/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2003). One of the authors (Gostin) served as the Legal Director of MIND during the late
1970s. MIND brought several successful and historic cases in front of the European Com-
mission and Court of Human Rights and was instrumental in efforts to reform mental
health law in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe.
395. See Nigel Walker, Note, X v. United Kingdom, 22 BoT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 315, 317
(1982) (discussing the changes in the powers of the Mental Health Review Tribunals
caused by the Court's decision). See generally Gostin, supra note 328 (discussing the impli-
cations of X v. United Kingdom).
396. X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7-8.
397. Id. at 11-12.
398. Id. at 12.
399. Id. at 25-27.
400. Id. at 23.
401. Id.
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rum in which to challenge the domestic lawfulness of his detention.40 2
In habeas corpus proceedings, the domestic courts only examine the
facial lawfulness of the detention.4 °3 However, with this type of judi-
cial review, patients could not demonstrate that the Home Secretary
had acted contrary to law, in bad faith, or in an arbitrary manner,
because the remedies available to the patient only went to the legal
validity of the detention, not to its merits.4 °4 The European Court,
therefore, found that habeas corpus did not provide a form ofjudicial
review sufficiently wide in scope to examine substantively the justifica-
tion of the detention.40 5
Second, neither of the two bodies charged with the duty to review
the merits of the case-the Home Secretary and the Mental Health
Review Tribunal (MHRT)-were "courts" with the power to order dis-
charge.40 6 The Home Secretary, who made the ultimate decision, was
not a court within the meaning of the term because he was not inde-
pendent of the executive or the parties to the case and did not act
judicially.40 7 Indeed, the Home Secretary was both a party to the case
(because he was the detaining authority) and a member of the execu-
tive branch.40 8 The MHRT, on the other hand, was a court in the
sense that it was independent and acted judicially, but it did not have
the power to discharge.40 9 The MHRT under the 1959 Act advised
the Home Secretary as to the exercise of his powers.410 Nevertheless,
between 1970 and 1975 the Home Secretary rejected in excess of forty
percent of all positive recommendations made by the tribunal.4"'
4. The Right to be Informed of the Reasons for Arrest. -Article 5(2) of
the ECHR states that "[e]veryone who is arrested shall be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his
arrest and of any charge against him."412 This provision extends be-
yond the realm of criminal law, to any detention under mental health
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 24.
405. Id. at 25-26.
406. Id. at 26.
407. See id. at 7-8 (discussing both the Home Secretary's role in detention and deferral
of cases to the MHRT).
408. See id.
409. Id. at 26.
410. Id. at 8.
411. LARRY GOSTIN, 2 A HUMAN CONDITION 167-74 (1977). The United Kingdom com-
plied with the European Court's decision in X v. United Kingdom by enacting the Mental
Health (Amendment) Act 1982 to give restricted patients the right to a binding MHRT
review. Mental Health (Amendment) Act, 1982, c. 51 (Eng.).
412. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(2).
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law.413 The circumstances in which the Home Secretary exercised his
power to recall a restricted patient in X v. United Kingdom led the Eu-
ropean Commission to note a potential violation of Article 5(2), be-
cause the authorities had not promptly informed the applicant of the
reasons for his recall.414
There is a relationship between Article 5(2) and Article 5(4). Ar-
ticle 5(4) provides a right "to take proceedings by which the lawful-
ness of [a person's] detention [can] be decided speedily by a
court. '415 A person subject to detention in a mental hospital could
not make effective use of the right to a hearing unless someone
promptly and adequately informed her of the reasons for the depriva-
tion of her liberty.416
B. The Conditions of Confinement
Human rights found in regional systems that apply to persons
with mental disabilities focus primarily on liberty and security, e.g.,
assuring adequate standards and procedures for involuntary admis-
sion to a hospital and the opportunity for meaningful periodic review
by a court or tribunal. But, human rights do not stop at the hospital
door. Rather, they set minimal standards for a therapeutic environ-
ment and prevention of neglect and abuse of patients.417 The Euro-
pean System derives these minimal standards from several sources of
human rights law: (1) Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits inhu-
man and degrading treatment; (2) Article 5(1) of the ECHR, which
prohibits arbitrary detention; and (3) the European Torture Conven-
tion, which provides a mechanism for monitoring the conditions of
confinement. In the American System, Article 5 of the American Con-
vention establishes a right to humane treatment 418 that those gov-
413. See Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, App. No. 11509/85, 12 Eur. H.R. 567, 574
(1990) (Court report) (noting that Article 5(4) makes no distinction between individuals
who are arrested and those who are detained and that both are entitled to know the rea-
sons for the deprivation of their liberty).
414. X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27-28. The Court did not specifically find a violation
of Article 5(2), because it thought the Article 5(2) claim was adequately considered under
its discussion of the Article 5(1) violations. Id. at 29.
415. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(4).
416. See Van der Leer, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 574. The government introduced a detailed
procedure for informing restricted patients of the reasons for their recall. For a detailed
description of this procedure, see LARRY GOSTIN, MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 11.13-11.14,
15.10-15.20 (1986).
417. See Gostin, supra note 46, at 353-54 (1987) (noting that although the international
approach to mental health cannot guarantee improved human rights standards or related
policies, it does heighten the "expectation of humane and dignified treatment and respect
for rights").
418. American Convention, supra note 68, 9 I.L.M. at 676-77.
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erned by it have similarly invoked to argue for improved conditions of
confinement. 419 The African Commission has not yet had occasion to
address these issues in its Communications. The part that follows dis-
cusses the use of regional human rights standards to protect detained
persons from exposure to conditions that may demean them and re-
sult in a deterioration of their mental health.
1. Torture or Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.-
Article 3 of the ECHR states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to tor-
ture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."'42 Un-
like most human rights, "there can be no derogation [from Article 3]
even" if it is necessary for the public's health or safety or national se-
curity.421' The European Commission4 2 2 and Court423 both have
found that torture must involve an unlawful or invidious purpose, a
point reiterated in the United Nations Torture Declaration.4 24 As a
result, the torture prohibition is unlikely to apply to mental health
cases unless there is some anti-therapeutic or unethical motive such as
political oppression.425
Inhuman and degrading treatment, unlike torture, does not re-
quire a malevolent intent. The United Nations Detention Principles ex-
plain that "inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment should
be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against
abuses, whether physical or mental. '42 6 Mental health professionals
who seclude or restrain patients may violate Article 3 of the ECHR
419. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting Article 5 as
an accepted international standard prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment).
420. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 3.
421. Ribitsch v. Austria, App. No. 18896/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 573, 601 (1995) (Court
report).
422. The Greek Case, 1969Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 186 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (urging
the government of Greece to abolish its use of torture).
423. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978) (noting that
torture has "a special stigma [attached] to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very seri-
otis and cruel suffering").
424. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 3d
Comm., Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/10408, reprinted in [1975] 29 U.N.Y.B. 624, 624, U.N.
Sales No. E.77.I.1 (providing a detailed definition of torture with a discussion of the intent
requirement).
425. Unfortunately, there is a sad tradition in some parts of the world of using psychiat-
ric detention to subvert political opposition. See generally Bonnie, supra note 318 (discuss-
ing political abuses in the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, as well as the
possibility of ending such abuses through human rights and medical ethics).
426. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprison-
ment, G.A. Res. 173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 76th mtg., Annex, Principle 6, n.a., reprinted in
[1988] 42 U.N.Y.B. 510, 511 n.a. U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.100.
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even if their purpose is to provide therapy for the patient or security
for the institution.4 27  Article 3, therefore, applies to patients in
mental hospitals who claim their caretakers neglected, abused, or
placed them in conditions that are unsanitary or unsafe. Since pa-
tients are vulnerable by virtue of their mental state and their depen-
dence on the government to meet their needs, special scrutiny of
their conditions of confinement is required:
The position of inferiority and powerlessness which is typical
of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for in-
creased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has
been complied with. While it was for medical authorities to
decide, ... patients nevertheless remain under the protec-
tion of Article 3 ....428
In Ireland v. United Kingdom,4 29 the European Court set the stan-
dard for inhuman and degrading treatment: Treatment will be inhu-
man only if it reaches a level of gravity involving considerable mental
or physical suffering, and degrading if the person has undergone hu-
miliation or debasement involving a minimum level of severity.43 ° In-
human and degrading treatment "depends on all the circumstances of
the case," including the nature and context of the treatment, the man-
ner and method of its execution, its duration, "its physical or mental
effects and, in some cases, the [victim's] sex, age, and state of
health."44 '
In theory, courts can use Article 3 to scrutinize both the condi-
tions of the patients' confinement and treatment (including compul-
sory medical treatment).432 Nevertheless, the European Court's
427. See, e.g., McFeeley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8317/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161, 199
(1980) (Commission report) (noting that a denial of facilities for exercise may violate Arti-
cle 3).
428. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 244 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26 (1992).
429. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 63 (1978).
430. Id. at 65; see Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 29 (1992)
(Court report) (finding a violation of Article 3 when a prisoner sustained blows of such
intensity to meet the Ireland standard). But see Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 198,
225 (finding no violation of Article 3 because ill-treatment failed to reach a minimum level
of severity).
431. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65; see Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1978) (noting the case-by-case nature of determining whether a pun-
ishment is degrading); see also Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 59 (1993) (reiterating that Tyrer established such a case-by-case determination for
evaluating whether a punishment is degrading).
432. The European Commission has found in one case that unpleasant side effects of
psychiatric treatment with medication were not sufficiently serious to constitute inhuman
and degrading treatment under Article 3. Grare v. France, App. No. 18835/91, 15 Eur.
H.R. Rep. Comm'n Supp. 100, 100 (1993). Several countries have also examined this issue
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Article 3 jurisprudence has been highly deferential to mental health
authorities. The European Court reflected this deference in
Herczegfalvy v. Austria, finding that while the Court would make the
ultimate determination under Article 3, "it is for the medical authori-
ties to decide, on the basis of the recognised rules of medical science,
on the therapeutic methods to be used, if necessary by force, to pre-
serve the physical and mental health of patients. '43 3 In this case, a
psychiatric hospital had admitted the applicant in a weakened state
following a hunger strike.4 34 Against his will, he was force-fed and
given strong doses of sedatives.43 5 As a result of his aggressive behav-
ior, the hospital workers sometimes attached him to a security bed by
a net and straps and restrained him with handcuffs and a belt around
his ankles.43 6 Although the European Court found the prolonged use
of handcuffs and the security bed disturbing, it determined that the
restraint was medically justified.43 7
The European Court, therefore, has traditionally embraced a
medically oriented standard that requires the government to demon-
strate that the conditions or treatment at issue fall within internation-
ally recognized mental health standards. The European Commission
and Court, in applying this medically based standard, have typically
deferred to the judgments of mental health professionals-in one
case finding no violation4 38 even though a mentally disturbed pris-
oner came to feel that he was being treated like an animal.4 3 9 Con-
under their domestic law. In R (on the application of Wilkinson) v. Responsible Medical Officer, I
W.L.R. 419 (Eng. C.A. 2002), the United Kingdom Court of Appeal applied Article 3 of the
Convention to section 63 of the Mental Health Act, which permits treatment without con-
sent in certain circumstances. Id. para. 83. The European Court of Human Rights has also
held that "a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or
degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been
convincingly shown to exist." Herczegfalvy, 244 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26. The United
States Supreme Court has also validated treatment without consent to compel persons to
be competent to attend trial if there is concern about the person being dangerous. Sell v.
United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2187 (2003).
433. Herczegfalvy, 244 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26.
434. Id. at 25.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 26.
437. Id.
438. Hilton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5613/72, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 104, 128 (1978)
(Commission Report).
439. Id. at 120 (noting that an inmate in Liverpool prison felt "like an animal to ... such
an extent that he would roll in his own excrement"). But see Keenan v United Kingdom,
App. No. 27229/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 913, 964-65 (2001) (Court report) (finding a viola-
ion of Article 3 where a mentally unstable prisoner committed suicide after being placed
in segregation for seven days and having his prison sentence extended by twenty-eight
days); see infra notes 465-470 and accompanying text for further discussion of Keenan.
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sider the permissive view taken in B. v. United Kingdom,44 ° Dhoest v.
Belgium,4" 1 and Aerts v. Belgium.4 42
B. v. United Kingdom was another test case brought by MIND in
the mid-1970s. 44 In that case, a patient at Broadmoor Hospital com-
plained that the State was detaining him in grossly overcrowded con-
ditions, characterized by "inadequate sanitary [(e.g., toilet and
washing)] facilities," and a "constant [atmosphere] of violence. ' '4 4 4
He alleged that dormitory beds were only eight to fifteen inches apart,
that there was no privacy, and that he received little fresh air or exer-
cise.445 The applicant claimed he had received no treatment whatso-
ever and almost never saw his doctor.446 The European Commission
determined his complaint to be admissible for the following reasons:
The physical conditions in Broadmoor Hospital are admit-
tedly unsatisfactory and have been criticised by different offi-
cial bodies over a number of years. Whilst the hospital staff
may .. . do their best to cope with these inadequacies, this
does not itself exclude the possibility that the physical condi-
tions of detention could in themselves give rise to a question
under Art[icle] 3. The [European] Commission considers
that the applicant's different allegations concerning the con-
ditions of his detention and the question of his medical treat-
ment must be looked at together and, if so examined, raise
issues under Art[icle] 3 which require investigation and ex-
amination on the merits.447
The European Commission subsequently ruled against the applicant
on the merits because of the absence of a single incident sufficiently
grave on its own to warrant a finding of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment.44 The European Commission's decision leaves in doubt
whether Article 3 would take cognizance of the totality of conditions
in the absence of a single factor so gross as to shock the conscience.
The European Commission's position, however, is not consistent with
the European Court's Article 3 jurisprudence, which stresses that in-
human and degrading treatment depends on all the circumstances of
440. App. No. 6870/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Rep. (1981).
441. App. No. 10448/83, 55 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5, 23 (1987).
442. 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939.
443. B., App. No. 6870/75, para. 15.
444. Id. para. 5.
445. Id. para. 132.
446. Id. paras. 187, 199.
447. Id. Annex II, para. 2.
448. Id. paras. 177-181.
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the case.449 Indeed, many forms of torture and inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment do not involve merely one horrific act, but rather a re-
gime that is unconscionably cruel in its totality.
In Dhoest v. Belgium, the European Commission found no viola-
tion of Article 3 when caretakers tied down a patient to his bed over-
night and forcibly administered tranquilizers to him.45°  The
European Commission said that, although a person's revolt or non-
cooperation does not excuse inhuman and degrading treatment,
"[h]aving regard to all the circumstances ... and in particular to his
hostility towards ... treatment... the... conditions of detention did
not attain the seriousness of [inhuman and degrading] treatment en-
visaged by Article 3 of the Convention." '451
In Aerts v. Belgium, the European Court again found no violation
of Article 3 despite the fact that the psychiatric wing of Lantin Prison
was detaining a mentally ill person.452 The European Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
had harshly criticized the detention on the grounds that it did not
meet "minimum acceptable . . . ethical and humanitarian" stan-
dards.453 Yet, the European Court held that "[t]he living conditions
... do not seem to have had such serious effects on his mental health
as would bring them within the scope of Article 3... [and] it has not
been conclusively established that the applicant suffered treatment
that could be classified as inhuman or degrading." '454
In another Article 3 case brought by MIND during the mid-1970s,
A. v. United Kingdom,455 the European Commission secured a friendly
settlement that implicitly recognized that certain forms of seclusion,
even if ordered by medical authority, can be inhumane. 456 A patient
at Broadmoor Hospital complained under Article 3 that the hospital
had subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment during a pe-
riod of seclusion that lasted five weeks following his suspected involve-
ment in the arson of one of the hospital wards.45 7 The hospital gave
the patient only very limited opportunities for exercise or association,
deprived him of adequate furnishings and clothing, and placed him
449. Dhoest v. Belgium, App. No. 10448/83, 55 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 23
(1987).
450. Id. at 22-23.
451. Id. at 23.
452. Aerts v. Belgium, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1940, 1966.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. App. No. 6840/74, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 131 (1980) (Commission report).
456. The friendly settlement was adopted in July 1980. Id.
457. Id. at 131-32.
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in a room that was unsanitary and without adequate light and ventila-
tion.458 A. v. United Kingdom demonstrates that, although the Euro-
pean Commission and Court have not been highly sympathetic to
claims of inhuman and degrading treatment, Article 3 can still be an
important source of law to improve the most deplorable conditions in
mental hospitals.
The European Court has addressed the issue of whether the
ECHR prohibits removal or deportation of a person with mental ill-
ness to countries that do not offer adequate care. In Bensaid v. United
Kingdom,4 59 the European Court upheld a decision by the Home Of-
fice in the United Kingdom to remove a person with schizophrenia to
his home country of Algeria on grounds that his marriage in England
was "one of convenience."4 6 0 There was no violation of Article 3 even
though treatment for his mental illness would be more difficult in Al-
geria."' Article 3, the Court said, includes situations where the
source of the treatment complained of is beyond the State's control,
but a "high threshold" is needed where the State is not "direct[ly]
responsib[le] ... for the... harm." '4 6 2 The patient could obtain treat-
ment in Algeria at a hospital seventy-five kilometers from his home.4 63
The fact that treatment would be harder for him to obtain in Algeria
than in the UK was not conclusive for purposes of Article 3.464
458. Id. at 132. Further details of the parties' submissions are set out in the decision on
admissibility in 10 Dec. & Rep. 5 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1978). The friendly settlement in-
cluded an ex gratia payment to the applicant and a requirement that new working guide-
lines for the seclusion of patients at Broadmoor Hospital be introduced. A., 3 Eur. H.R.
Rep. at 132. Rooms used for seclusion must now be at least 4.7 square meters and have
natural lighting; an individual program of care must be drawn up; patients must have suita-
ble clothing and footwear, mattresses and bedding, and reading matter. Id. at 133-34. Un-
less a patient's condition precludes it, the hospital must let him out of his room to use the
toilet, give him at least 30 minutes exercise each morning and afternoon, and allow him to
have visitors. Id. at 134. Hospital caretakers will observe patients in seclusion at irregular
intervals that do not exceed 15 minutes. Id. The caretakers should keep a special record
book that tracks the beginning and ending time of seclusion, the grounds for the seclu-
sion, the details of what clothing and bedding the caretakers give the patient, and any
observations and reviews that they make. Id.
459. 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 305.
460. Id. at 311.
461. Id. at 321.
462. Id. at 306-07.
463. Id. at 313.
464. But seeD. v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 778, 793 (finding that it would
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment to deport an immigrant with AIDS to his
home country where his health would likely deteriorate quickly). The United Kingdom
courts have quashed deportation orders by the Secretary of State, finding that, if the re-
moval of an individual to a country with inadequate mental health services would severely
affect his health, then the deportation order contravenes Article 3 of the ECHR. See R v.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Kebbeh, Case No. CO-1269-98 (Q.B. 1999)
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The cases above demonstrate the high threshold set by the Euro-
pean Court for triggering an Article 3 violation. The European Com-
mission and Court have been so deferential in their Article 3 decisions
that they have never found that conditions in a mental hospital were
sufficiently inhuman and degrading to breach Article 3. In two im-
portant cases, however, the European Court recently has revisited its
Article 3 jurisprudence and applied protections against inhuman and
degrading treatment to persons with disabilities in prison settings.
The first case, Keenan v. United Kingdom,46 involved the suicide of
a mentally ill man confined to a prison segregation cell after he as-
saulted two prison officers.466 The deputy Governor extended the
prisoner's sentence by twenty-eight days and placed the prisoner in
segregation for seven days.467 The court found that a lack of effective
monitoring and informed psychiatric input by prison officials demon-
strated "significant defects in the medical care provided to a mentally-
ill person."46 Taking into account the prisoner's vulnerability and
the authorities' obligation to protect his health, the court determined
that the serious disciplinary punishment "threatened his physical and
moral resistance" and adversely affected his personality.469 The Euro-
pean Court found these actions violated Article 3 because they "consti-
tute [d] inhuman and degrading treatment. "470
A few months later, the European Court again applied Article 3
to the treatment of a person with disabilities in a prison setting. In
Price v. United Kingdom,47' a court sentenced a woman with significant
physical disabilities to jail for seven days for contempt of court.4 72
During this period, the prison officials confined her to a regular cell
(finding that an individual with an amputated leg should not be sent back to Gambia
because of the inappropriate health care he would receive there); see also R v. Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't, ex parte B, Case No. CO-1818-98 (Q.B. 1999) (determining that the
Secretary's decision to send an individual back to Germany was unreasonable). But see R v
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Kilic, Case No. CO-2112-99 (Q.B. 1999) (up-
holding a deportation order because the deportation would not result in serious psycho-
logical harm to the person).
465. App. No. 27229/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 913 (2001) (Court report).
466. Id. at 923-24.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 964. The prisoner had been taking anti-psychotic medication and was a
known suicide risk, but medical personnel in the prison did not keep adequate daily
records of his condition. Id. Furthermore, a prison physician who was not a psychiatrist
changed the prisoner's medication. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 154.
472. Id. at 158.
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that did not have appropriate facilities for a person with disabilities.47 3
Thus, the applicant had no choice but to sleep in her wheelchair.474
She was unable to use the toilet facilities or access the light switches
and emergency buttons because they were all out of her reach.475 She
experienced serious medical problems as a result of the conditions of
her detention.476 The court articulated that in determining whether
treatment is degrading it will consider whether the person's intent was
to humiliate the person concerned.477 The court noted that even if it
did not find a humiliating purpose, it would not automatically decide
that there was no violation of Article 3.478 Here the court did not find
that the prison officials meant to embarrass the woman, but it never-
theless held that "detain[ing] a severely disabled person" under these
circumstances violated the ECHR's prohibition against degrading
treatment.
479
The European Court's use of Article 3 represents a new approach
toward protecting the human rights of persons with disabilities.
These recent decisions, however, do not present a clear standard or
definitive trend. The facts of the cases play a large role in determin-
ing whether the court will find that a facility violated the prohibition
against inhuman and degrading treatment.48 Therefore, it is difficult
to predict whether the regional courts will expand this right in future
decisions to apply to individuals with mental disabilities in the hospital
setting.
Severe maltreatment, neglect or humiliation of patients, or place-
ment of patients in punitive or unsafe environments should give rise
to Article 3 claims. While therapeutic intent is important, the Euro-
pean Court has a responsibility to protect patients from serious forms
of maltreatment even if administered ostensibly under the guise of
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 163.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 165. Judge Greve, in a separate opinion for the European Court, extended
this argument even further, stating:
In this the applicant is different from other people to the extent that treating her
like others is not only discrimination but brings about a violation of Article 3 ....
It is obvious that restraining any non-disabled person to the applicant's level of ability
to move and assist herself for even a limited period of time, would amount to inhu-
man and degrading treatment-possibly torture.
Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
480. See, e.g., Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59
(1993) (emphasizing the need to consider the facts of each case in human rights violation
cases).
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medical expertise. It remains unclear whether the European Court
will apply the precedents set in Keenan and Price to analogous situa-
tions affecting persons with mental disabilities; however, the increas-
ing attention given to Article 3 claims under the ECHR suggests that
in the future the European Court might return to Article 3 as an im-
portant source of ECHR law in matters of mental health.
2. An Anti-Therapeutic Environment as "Arbitrary" Detention. -Arti-
cle 5(1) (e) of the ECHR provides another possible route for finding
that the conditions of confinement are so anti-therapeutic that they
violate the ECHR. As explained above, the European Court has held
that the term "lawfulness" under Article 5(1) requires conformity with
the domestic law and with the purposes of deprivation of liberty per-
mitted by Article 5(1).48 In theory, there must be a reasonable rela-
tionship between the reasons for confining the person and the means
used to achieve these goals.48 2 Under this theory, since the purposes
of detention on the grounds of unsoundness of mind are therapeutic,
such detention can take place only in a facility equipped to provide
minimally adequate care and treatment.4"3
Initially, in Ashingdane and Dhoest, European institutions dis-
claimed a connection between the actual detention (which was natu-
rally a matter for consideration under Article 5) and the conditions of
confinement (which was naturally a matter for consideration under
Article 3)484 Still, the European Court has hinted that Article 5 (1) (e)
is relevant for reviewing a patient's conditions of confinement. The
first sign of this was in the Ashingdane case when the European Court
found that detention of a person was "lawful" for the purposes of Arti-
cle 5(1) (e) only if effected in a hospital, clinic, or other appropriate
institution.48 5
The European Court appeared to go further in Aerts v. Belgium by
suggesting that persons with mental illness must be confined in a min-
imally therapeutic environment:
[T]here must be some relationship between the ground of
permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and
481. See Aerts v. Belgium, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939, 1962.
482. Id.
483. See id. (holding unlawful the detention of an unsound patient in a facility when
"the aim of the detention and the conditions in which it took place" lacked the appropri-
ate balance, given that the patient received no medical care and did not have a therapeutic
environment).
484. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37-38 (1985); Dhoest v.
Belgium, App. No. 10448/83, 55 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 25 (1987).
485. Ashingdane, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21.
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conditions of detention. In principle, the "detention" of a
person as a mental health patient will only be "lawful" for the
purposes of sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1 if effected in a
hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution.48 6
The European Court did not think that the psychiatric wing of a
prison was an appropriate place to detain mentally ill persons because
it was not a therapeutic environment and did not provide the patient
with the medical attention he needed. 4 ' The Court found that the
connection "between the aim of the detention and the conditions in
which it took place was ... deficient. 4 8
The European Court's jurisprudence is still too undeveloped to
predict whether it will formulate robust criteria for ensuring that
mental health facilities provide minimum standards of treatment,
care, and protection from abuse. It is not difficult to form a theory
supporting a "right to therapeutic conditions" under Article 5. Mini-
mally adequate care and treatment should be a necessary pre-condi-
tion to detention on grounds of unsoundness of mind; otherwise, it
would be difficult to justify detention on those grounds alone. Put
another way, if the government is depriving a person of her liberty
because she needs therapy, then the government should have a duty
to provide minimally adequate treatment. Minimally adequate stan-
dards of treatment would help assure that a person's mental health
does not deteriorate, but actually improves, during confinement.489
3. Monitoring of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment in the European System.-The Council of Europe designed
the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to strengthen "the pro-
tection of persons deprived of their liberty" by "nonjudicial
means."49 The Convention does not establish international human
rights standards for torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.
Rather, it provides a mechanism for monitoring and enforcement
486. Aerts, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1962.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has found that a State cannot de-
tain persons with mental illness who are not dangerous and can exist outside of a hospital
either by themselves or with the help of their family or friends. O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
490. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Europ. T.S. No. 126 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1989), available
at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/euro/z34eurotort.html.
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through the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 491
The European Committee examines the treatment of persons de-
prived of their liberty by making visits to places, such as prisons and
hospitals, where a public authority has deprived persons of their lib-
erty.49 2 The Committee, in cooperation with member states, or-
ganizes its own visits, carried out by at least two members with the
assistance of experts and interpreters.4 9 3 In addition to periodic visits,
the Committee can schedule other visits as they become necessary.
4 94
Before it can visit facilities, the Committee must inform the govern-
ment concerned that it intends to visit. 495 After it notifies the govern-
ment, it can visit facilities whenever if wants. 49 6 The government must
provide the Committee with "unlimited access" to the place of deten-
tion and all the information necessary for the Committee to success-
fully complete its task.497 This information includes the right to
interview detained persons in private and the right to "communicate
freely" with any relevant person.498
The Government "may make representations to the Committee
against a visit."' 49 9 This procedure is only allowed in exceptional cir-
cumstances, e.g., if there are concerns about national security or pub-
lic safety. 500
After each visit, the Committee must draft a report describing its
conclusions and send this report to the Government with any recom-
mendations it has for improvement.51  If the Government does not
make efforts to improve the facility, then the Committee, if two-thirds
of its members agree, can publicly speak about the issue.50 2
The Committee's report is confidential, but it must publish it
whenever the Government requests. 50 ' However, the Committee can-
not publish any personal information unless it gets "the express con-
sent of the person concerned." 50 4 Subject to these confidentiality
491. Id. art. 1.
492. Id. art. 2.
493. Id. art. 7(2).
494. Id. art. 7(1).
495. Id. art. 8(1).
496. Id.
497. Id. art. 8(2).
498. Id. art. 8(4).
499. Id. art. 9 (1).
500. Id.
501. Id. art. 10(1).
502. Id. art. 10(2).
503. Id. arts. 11(1)-(2).
504. Id. art. 11 (3).
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requirements, the Committee must submit a public report of its activi-
ties annually to the Committee of Ministers.5 °5
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in many respects,
works outside of the conventional human rights framework. Human
rights law, by its nature, is publicly visible and binding on govern-
ments. The Convention, however, often operates without public scru-
tiny, uses the power of moral persuasion, and relies on government
cooperation. Still, its systematic monitoring of places of detention
helps assure compliance with standards set in Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights. Additionally, as in Aerts v. Belgium,
the European Court can use a finding of fact by the European Com-
mittee to help adjudicate a human rights case.5°6
4. Inhuman and Degrading Treatment in the American System.--The
American Commission has adopted a more direct stance than the Eu-
ropean Court in requiring governments to protect persons with
mental disabilities from inhuman and degrading treatment. In Victor
Rosario Congo v. Ecuador,5°7 the American Commission found Ecuador
in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention, which guaran-
tees humane treatment.5 8 A person with mental disabilities taken
into custody was not cooperating with interrogators.50 9 Two days
later, guards struck him on the head.5 0 The Rehabilitation Center
employees did not give him any medical treatment for the resulting
injury, and they left him in the cell for forty days.511 Eventually, au-
thorities took him to a hospital to treat his severe dehydration, but Mr.
Congo ended up dying in that hospital 2.5 1  The American Commis-
sion acknowledged that special standards apply when analyzing Ameri-
can Convention rights with respect to persons with mental
disabilities.51 3 Specifically, the MI Principles should act as guidance
505. Id. art. 12.
506. 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939, 1954-59.
507. Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99, para. 66 (1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/98eng/Merits/Ecuador%2011427.htm.
508. Id. The American Commission also found a violation of Article 4(1) of the Ameri-
can Convention, the right to life. See also Hernandez Lima v. Guatemala, Case 11.297,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 28/96, paras. 58-61 (Oct. 16, 1996), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annu-
alrep/96eng/Guatemala 1297.htm (finding a violation of Articles 4 and 5 where the state
did not prevent a detained individual from getting cholera in prison).
509. Victor Rosario Congo, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99, paras. 6-7.
510. Id. para. 9.
511. Id. paras. 10-17.
512. Id. paras. 18-20.
513. Id. para. 53.
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for determining whether the person received humane treatment.
514
The Commission found that keeping a person in isolation itself can
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment, but when the person in
isolation has a mental disability "this could involve an even more seri-
ous violation of the State's obligation to protect the physical, mental
and moral integrity of persons held under its custody. ' 515 The Com-
mission cited poor conditions and lack of medical treatment as factors
in determining where inhuman and degrading treatment has oc-
curred. 516 The Commission concluded that "a violation of the right to
physical integrity is even more serious in the case of a person held in
preventive detention, suffering a mental disease, and therefore in the
custody of the State in a particularly vulnerable position. "517
The Congo case is important and noteworthy for several reasons.
First, it was the first time that the Inter-American Commission ad-
dressed the rights of persons with mental disabilities. Second, the
case set a strong precedent for the protection of these rights under
the American Convention, firmly establishing Article 5 as a powerful
tool to help prevent deleterious detention and treatment conditions
in mental hospitals and related facilities.5 " The holding of the Amer-
ican Commission presented a compelling connection between the
right to humane treatment and the protection of persons with mental
disabilities under confinement. Third, the American Commission
based its conclusions, in the absence of precedent within its own sys-
tem, on prior holdings by the European Commission and Court, as
well as on the MI Principles. 519 This recognition and acceptance of
other related sources of international law augurs well for the future
development of the American System. Rights and protections of per-
sons with mental disabilities will develop more rapidly if the American
514. Id. para. 54.
515. Id. para. 58.
516. Id. para. 66. The American Commission cites precedent from the European Com-
mission, for the proposition that "the incarceration of a mentally disabled person under
deplorable conditions and without medical treatment may be considered inhuman or de-
grading treatment." Id.; see also Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
37-38 (1985) (holding that the lawfulness of a patient's detention would be questionable if
he were "incarcerated in appalling conditions with no consideration being given to his
treatment").
517. Victor Rosario Congo, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99, para. 67.
518. See id. para. 68 (determining that "the State is responsible for not taking the neces-
sary measures to protect the physical, mental and moral integrity of the victim").
519. Id. paras. 57-68.
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Commission continues to build on the jurisprudence of the more es-
tablished European System.
5 20
C. Civil Rights
Human rights norms extend to the exercise of a wide array of
civil rights both within and outside of institutions. Simply because a
person has a mental disability, or is subject to confinement, does not
mean she is incapable of exercising rights of citizenship. The regional
human rights instruments contain many provisions that can be help-
ful in securing civil rights for persons with mental disabilities, includ-
ing the rights of access to the courts, privacy, marriage, and
521procreation.
1. The Right to a Fair and Public Hearing When Determining Some-
one's Civil Rights.-Article 6(1) of the ECHR states: "In the determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."'5 22 The European Court in
Golder v. United Kingdom held that Article 6 gives everyone the right to
bring any claim regarding her civil rights in front of a judicial review
body.5 23 The Article, therefore, embodies the right of access to a
court. The court, moreover, must follow a procedure that is funda-
mentally fair, including affording litigants a right to representation so
that they can present their case "properly and satisfactorily. 524
Article 6 rights may be subject to limitations, but the limitations
must be based on a legitimate aim, be proportionate to that aim, and
cannot restrict judicial access "to such an extent that the very essence
520. The OAS has also promulgated a distinct torture convention applicable to states in
the Inter-American system. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Treaties/a-51.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). However, this convention does not
provide for a separate enforcement mechanism similar to the European convention. See id.
art. 8 (leaving the state to investigate any alleged acts of torture). Countries are required
to inform the American Commission of any actions that they have taken to apply the Con-
vention. Id. art. 17.
521. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 35, art. 8(1) (securing to everyone a "right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence").
522. Id. art. 6(1).
523. 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, 536 (1975) (Court report).
524. Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, 315 (1979) (Court report). In the United
Kingdom, for example, in R. (on the application of Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Hospital, Hale, L.J.
ruled that a mental patient had the right to cross-examine medical witnesses relating to his
claim that forcible treatment violated his Convention rights. 1 W.L.R. 419 (Eng. C.A.
2002), paras. 63, 82.
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of the right is impaired."5 25 In Winterwerp, the European Court held
that "[w] hile . . .mental illness may render legitimate certain limita-
tions upon the exercise of the 'right to a court,' it cannot warrant the
total absence of that right as embodied in Article 6(1).
' '526
Persons with mental disability, therefore, have rights guaranteed
under the European Convention to judicial determinations to secure
their full entitlement to civil rights.5 27 The European Court has
found violations of Article 6 in a number of cases in which persons
with mental disabilities either were refused adequate access to a court
or experienced unreasonable delays in having their cases heard. The
subject matter of these cases varied greatly and included denial of a
detained patient's right to control property,5 28 a finding of mental in-
capacity to acquire rights and undertake obligations,5 2 9 placement of
a person into guardianship,5 3 ° and denial of a mentally ill parent's
right of access to her child.5 3 1
However, in a remarkable case, the European Commission and
Court held that the ECHR did not prevent the United Kingdom from
requiring persons to obtain permission of the court before instituting
judicial proceedings in securing their rights under mental health leg-
islation. 2 While the United Kingdom government asserted that per-
sons with mental disabilities are prone to pursuing vexatious
litigation, it did not have evidence to support its assumption.5 3 3 The
European Court restricted its analysis to the United Kingdom law's
effect on the applicant and found that the law hindered his recourse
to the national courts.5 3 4 Nevertheless, the Court was of the opinion
that the applicant was unlikely to prevail on the merits.5 3 5 Therefore,
based on the circumstances as a whole, the European Court found
that the law did not violate Article 6 as it applied to Ashingdane.5 3 6
The European Court's decision implies that a state can bar a person
525. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124, 3169.
526. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1979).
527. Id.
528. Id. at 15.
529. Matter v. Slovakia, App. No. 31534/96, at 3 (July 5, 1999) (Court report), at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int.
530. Bock v. Germany, 150 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1989).
531. B v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9840/82, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 87 (1987) (Court re-
port); H v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9580/81, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 95 (1987) (Court re-
port); P., C. and S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 56547/00 (July 16, 2002) (Court report),
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
532. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26 (1985).
533. Id. at 25.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 25-26.
536. Id.
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from access to a court to determine the merits of her case merely be-
cause the claim may fail. The very essence of Article 6, however, is
that citizens have rights of access to the judicial system to pursue their
claims. 37 If the claims are without merit, the domestic courts are free
to dismiss them after hearing the evidence.
2. The Right to a Private and Family Life and the Right to Marry and
Found a Family.-Article 8 of the ECHR prohibits public authorities
from interfering with a person's right "to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence."5 38 This right is broad
enough to encompass an entitlement "to establish and to develop rela-
tionships with other human beings, especially in the emotional field
for the development and fulfillment of one's own personality."5 39 The
primary objective is to protect the individual against arbitrary interfer-
ence by public authorities, but Article 8 also imposes a positive obliga-
tion on government to respect private and family life.54 ° The state, for
example, may have to adopt policies affirmatively "designed to secure"
a "private life even in the sphere of the relations" among private
citizens.54 t
Governments can place limitations on Article 8 rights only "in
accordance with the law" and where "necessary in a democratic society
in the interests," inter alia, of public safety or the protection of health,
morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.542 Government limita-
tions, moreover, must be proportionate to one of these legitimate gov-
ernmental interests. 543
The European Court has found a violation of Article 8 in a case
involving the freedom of correspondence of a detained patient.544
The hospital and the patient's guardian had screened all outgoing
post and determined which pieces of mail it would forward to the ad-
dressees, including letters of complaint about his medical treat-
537. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 6.
538. Id. art. 8(1).
539. X. v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86, 87 (1976).
540. Several of the major cases involving Article 8 concern the custody and care of mi-
nors. See, e.g., T.P. v. United Kingdom, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 120, 142 (holding that the
State had a responsibility to disclose information to the mother regarding the reasons why
the State took her child into protective care); K. v. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 192, 235
(finding that the government's reasons for taking a child away from his mother were suffi-
cient under Article 8).
541. X. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, 238-39 (1985).
542. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 8(2).
543. Nasri v. France, App. No. 19465/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458, 477 (1995).
544. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 244 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50-51 (1992).
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ment.545 Similarly, the European Court accepted a settlement of a
case involving the possible violation of the right of a patient to infor-
mational privacy.546 In the latter case, the detained patient had a
troubled relationship with her mother, and her adoptive father had
sexually abused her.547 Given that the mother was the nearest relative
under the Act, she and the stepfather had access to highly confiden-
tial information regarding the patient, and the Act did not afford the
patient a procedure by which she could re-designate the identification
of her nearest relative.548
The right to a private life under Article 8 applies to sexual life,
suggesting that a court would proscribe unreasonable interference
with sexual relationships of persons in institutions. 549 Yet, it is likely
that a court would uphold reasonable rules restricting sexual activi-
ties. For example, the European Commission found that a prison did
not violate Article 8 when it denied a prisoner unsupervised visits with
his spouse.55 °
The European Court has also interpreted Article 8 to protect the
rights of parents to have a continuing relationship with their children,
even if the parents have mental disabilities. 55 1 The court has demon-
545. Id. However, a court in the United Kingdom has upheld a special hospital policy of
random recording and monitoring ten percent of patient phone calls. R (on the applica-
tion of N) v. Ashworth Special Hosp. Auth., CO/4416/2000, at para. 22 (Q.B. May 11,
2001) (upholding Safety and Security in Ashworth, Broadmoor, and Rampton Hospitals
Directions 2000). The court regarded the policy as a justified infringement of Article 8
because it was a proportionate measure necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of main-
taining high security for potentially dangerous persons. Id.
546. J.T. v. United Kingdom, [2000] 1 FLR 909 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2000). For more
information about the admissibility decision of the European Commission of Human
Rights see [1997] EHRLR 436.
547. Id para. 7.
548. Id. paras. 8-10. The parties agreed to a settlement based on a proposed change in
the Mental Health Act that would allow detained patients to apply to the court to replace
the nearest relative when a patient reasonably objected to having that person named. Id.
para. 12. The amendment would also allow patients to exclude particular people from
acting as a "nearest relative." Id. The settlement also included a small amount of monetary
compensation. Id.
549. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 160, 168 (1981) (Court
report) (finding a violation of Article 8 where laws making homosexual conduct criminal
caused the applicant psychological stress and fear and interfered in his right to a private
life).
550. See Council of Europe, Human Rights Files No. 5, Conditions of Detention and the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1981). The Euro-
pean Commission declined an application by a Swiss married couple claiming a violation
of Article 8 when they were detained in the same prison for two months without being able
to see each other unsupervised. Id. at 18. The European Commission and the prison
authority justified their actions on the grounds of prevention of disorder in the prison. Id.
at 19.
551. K. v. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 192, 228.
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strated a clear aversion to complete separation between parents and
their children. 52 While recognizing that state authorities "enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child
into care [,]" the court has determined that restrictions on interaction
between parents and their children deserve "stricter scrutiny. '55 3 A
critical component of this analysis is whether the government's ac-
tions are "necessary in a democratic society[,]" with a preference that
the state take actions to allow as much interaction between parents
and children as is possible under the circumstances, even if it places
additional burdens on the state.554 Also, the Court found a violation
of family life when local authorities did not allow the parents to have
legal representation at their newborn child's adoption hearing.55 5
Article 12 guarantees a particular aspect of the right to a private
life-the entitlement of adults to marry and to found a family.556 Gov-
ernment may be considered to have violated the right to marry and
found a family if it prohibits or unreasonably delays the marriage of a
competent adult.557 The European Commission held that the right to
marry was, in essence, a right to forge a legally binding association
between a man and a woman. 558 The government should not be able
to deny this right solely because one of the partners is in prison and
the couple will not be able to live together.559 This principle un-
doubtedly also applies to persons with mental disabilities detained for
substantial periods of time.
Apart from these instances, surprisingly few mental health cases
under Articles 8 and 12 have been litigated in the European system
despite the relevance of private and family life to persons with mental
disabilities. It is not difficult to think of other potential claims under
Articles 8 and 12, e.g., the right to privacy and confidentiality, to soli-
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. See Kutzner v. Germany, App. No. 46544/99, at 11, 15 (2002) (Court report), at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (rejecting government imposed restrictions on parents' visiting
rights with children because the government's aims, while "relevant," were "insufficient to
justify such a serious interference in the applicant's family life") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
555. P. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 56547/00, at 33-34 (July 16, 2002) (Court report),
at http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
556. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 12.
557. See Hamer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7114/75, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 5, 14-15 (1979).
558. Id. at 13.
559. Draper v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8186/78, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
72, 81 (1980).
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tude in one's home, and to relationships with children, parents, and
other family members.56 °
Consider a person's claim that certain compulsory powers that
restrict or force associations with family violates the right to family and
private life. If mental health authorities forbid visits with family or
deprive patients of their autonomy or liberty, in spite of family objec-
tions, genuine issues may arise under Article 8.
In summary, the ECHR has defended the civil rights of persons
with mental disabilities in a variety of contexts. The European Court
has afforded individuals the right of access to the national judicial sys-
tem, the right to a private and family life, including the freedom to
communicate, and the right to a sexual life and marriage.
3. The Right to Life.-The various human rights systems have
construed the right to life both positively and negatively. Clearly in
the civil and political sphere, the right to life, as conceived by the
United Nations and regional systems, enjoins the government from
taking away life without justification.56 ' Moreover, a more limited af-
firmative interpretation has emerged from regional right to life juris-
prudence, suggesting that in certain extreme circumstances the
failure of the government to take steps to guard against foreseeable
risk, or even to provide services needed to avert loss of life, violates
this right. Both the European Court562 and the Inter-American Com-
mission 563 have applied the right to life to situations affecting persons
with mental disabilities, and all three regional courts have found right
to life violations in other contexts.
564
560. See, e.g., Eur. Comm'n H.R., Stock-taking on the European Convention on Human
Rights, Supplement 1987, at 16 (1988) (noting that a parent's relationship with her child is
a fundamental element of family life). But see Re F [2000] 2 FCR 481, in which the High
Court found no violation of Article 8 in a case involving termination of parental rights.
561. Edwards v. United Kingdom, App. No. 46477/99, at 15 (Mar. 14, 2002) (Court
report), at http://www.echr.coe.int.
562. See id. at 16, 18 (finding a right to life violation where a prisoner murdered his cell
mate and the government was aware of the prisoner's "extreme dangerousness" before the
murder but did not inform prison authorities).
563. SeeVictor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99, para. 82
(1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Ecuador% 2 011427.htm
(holding that a State violated an inmate's right to life by failing to provide him with ade-
quate nutrition and hydration, which caused the inmate's death).
564. Hern~indez Lima v. Guatemala, Case 11.297, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 28/96, paras. 58-61
(Oct. 16, 1996), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/96eng/Guatemalal1 2 9 7 .htm (find-
ing a violation of the right to life where the state did not take adequate steps to prevent a
detained individual from getting cholera in prison); Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers'
Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de L'Homme, Les T~moins
deJehovah v. Zaire, African Comm'n Human & Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 25/89, 47/90,
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The European Court of Human Rights examined the right to life
under Article 6 (the right to a fair trial) in the context of mental
health. In Edwards v. United Kingdom, the court held that the British
government breached its duty under Article 2 to protect the life of a
prisoner named Christopher Edwards.565 Richard Linford, a cellmate
who was known to be a dangerous person diagnosed with schizophre-
nia, murdered Mr. Edwards.566 The court declared:
[T]he failure of the agencies involved in this case (medical
profession, police, prosecution and court) to pass on infor-
mation about Richard Linford to the prison authorities and
the inadequate nature of the screening process on Richard
Linford's arrival in prison disclose a breach of the State's ob-
ligation to protect the life of Christopher Edwards. 67
In the Congo case, the Inter-American Commission also found vio-
lations of the right to life under Article 4(1) of the American Conven-
tion.56 8 The Commission issued a strong indictment of the treatment
of Mr. Congo by the government of Ecuador, finding that the govern-
ment "failed to take the measures in its power to ensure the right to
life of a person who, partly because of his state of health and in part
owing to injuries inflicted on him by a State agent, was defenseless,
isolated and under its control."56 According to the Inter-American
Commission, this failure to act violated Mr. Congo's right to life.5 70
As these decisions demonstrate, the regional human rights sys-
tems have been willing to find violations of the right to life where
governments have grossly neglected the treatment needs of persons
with mental disabilities in the custody of the state, or have placed
these persons in situations that expose them to a serious risk of harm
or mental and physical deterioration.
V. THE RIGHT TO MENTAL HEALTH
The task of defining and enforcing civil and political rights re-
quired vast scholarship and litigation in international fora.5 7 ' This Ar-
ticle has tracked the continuing evolution of civil and political rights
56/91, 100/93, para. 43 (finding that extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrest, arbitrary
detentions, and torture violated the right to life).
565. App. No. 46477/99, at 18.
566. Id. at 16.
567. Id. at 18.
568. Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99, para. 84
(1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Ecuador%2011427.htm.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. GoSTIN & LAZZARJNI, supra note 1, at 30.
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in the United Nations human rights infrastructure. It has also demon-
strated the systematic development of civil and political rights by the
European Court of Human Rights and to a lesser extent by the other
regional human rights systems. The international and regional
human rights communities, on the other hand, have largely neglected
economic, social, and cultural rights. However, governments should
give economic, social, and cultural rights, notably the right to mental
health, the same rigorous and sustained consideration that they have
given to civil and political rights.57 2
The relative importance of civil and political rights versus eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights undergirds one of the most impor-
tant and controversial disputes in the human rights community. Many
countries, particularly democracies in the Northern and Western
Hemispheres, feel that civil and political rights should take prece-
dence.57 From this perspective, human rights law constrains the state
from imposing on autonomy or liberty rights, but does not likewise
give rise to affirmative obligations to provide services.
A persuasive argument may be made, however, that governments
should consider economic, social, and cultural rights as being equally
important as civil and political rights. The text of the major human
rights instruments provides the principal support for this position.
The United Nations Charter, in its preamble, articulates a determina-
tion to "promote social progress and better standards of life" and to
"employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples."574 Various other interna-
tional instruments have built upon this idea in the decades since the
Charter was established. Article 22 of the UDHR characterizes social
and economic rights as "indispensable for [a person's] dignity and the
free development of his personality." '575 The ICESCR comprises the
foundation for economic, social, and cultural rights under the United
Nations treaty structure.5 7 6 The provisions of the ICESCR oblige gov-
ernments to adhere to affirmative duties to promote social and eco-
nomic development.5 77 The ICESCR recognizes in its Preamble that
572. Id
573. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Beyond Moral Claims: A Human Rights Approach in Mental Health,
10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHIcs 264, 270 (2001).
574. U.N. Charter, supra note 69, pmbl.
575. UDHR, supra note 74, art. 22.
576. See ICESCR, supra note 87, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 ("All peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
577. See generally ICESCR, supra note 87, 993 U.N.T.S. at 3 (setting out the duties re-
quired by all states that are parties to the ICESCR).
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both economic, social, and cultural rights and civil and political rights
are necessary to achieve the goals and freedoms envisioned by human
rights law.5"' Governments can limit economic, social, and cultural
rights under the ICESCR only as "compatible with the nature of these
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a
democratic society." '579 The Vienna Declaration supports the view that
"[a] 11 human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated."8 °
Economic, social, and cultural rights also warrant respect because
they are in some ways more foundational than civil and political
rights. Minimal levels of social and economic status, including suffi-
cient conditions of health, are a prerequisite to the exercise of civil
and political rights. Without a fundamental government obligation to
satisfy basic health needs, including mental health, other rights would
become less meaningful and unattainable for portions of the popula-
tion. Indeed, the modern human rights community has increasingly
recognized the importance of economic, social, and cultural rights. 51
Nevertheless, economic, social, and cultural rights often suffer in na-
tional public policy discourse because they can be costly to secure and
may only address concerns salient to small-and politically power-
less-groups within a society.582
A. Development of the Right to Mental Health Under International
Human Rights Systems
The right to health, including mental health, is rooted in the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights found in numerous international
documents. The UDHR acknowledges the right to health as a compo-
nent of "a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
[a person and that person's] family, including . . . medical care and
578. The Preamble of the ICESCR states that the "ideal of free human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby every-
one may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political
rights." Id. pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
579. Id. art. 4, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
580. Vienna Declaration, supra note 144, para. 5.
581. See Audrey R. Chapman, Monitoring Women's Right to Health Under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1157, 1159 (1995) (dis-
cussing the need for more monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights); see also
Goldberg, supra note 57, at 280-81 (describing health as an economic, social, and cultural
right that receives inadequate recognition and protection).
582. See generally Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Eco-
nomic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 363 (2002) (describing the
conflict between utility-maximization and human rights protection in the context of the
'right to work").
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necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of...
sickness." '5 8 3 The ICESCR adopts a broad concept of health as a
human right, declaring "the right of everyone to the . . . highest at-
tainable standard of physical and mental health." '8 4 States must make
efforts to fully realize this right, including "the creation of conditions
which . . . assure to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness."58 5 The MI Principles also afford a right to the "best
available mental health care." ' 6
Other international and regional instruments have incorporated
variations of the right to health into their respective texts. The Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (ICERD) includes "[t]he right to public health, medical
care, social security and social services. "587 The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
recognizes a "right to protection of health and to safety in working
conditions" and calls for the elimination of "discrimination against
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, access to health care services."5 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) asserts that "the right of
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of
health." '5 8 9
Regional instruments provide more detailed fight to health provi-
sions that more specifically outline State obligations. The European
Social Charter conceives of a right to health that encompasses public
health and health care.590 The European Social Charter also provides
for job training, rehabilitation, and social resettlement of people with
mental or physical disabilities. 91 The descriptive and expansive con-
ception of the right to health advanced by the European Social Char-
ter is mirrored in the Inter-American System's Protocol of San
Salvador, which in addition to calling for "enjoyment of the highest
583. UDHR, supra note 74, art. 25.
584. ICESCR, supra note 87, art. 12(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
585. Id. art. 12(2)(d), 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
586. MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, Principle 1, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B. at 621.
587. ICERD, supra note 100, art. 5(e) (iv), 660 U.N.T.S. at 222.
588. CEDAW, supra note 98, arts. 11(1)(f), 12(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18-19.
589. CRC, supra note 99, art. 24(1), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 52.
590. European Social Charter, signed Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35, art. 11, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htm/035.htm [hereinafter ESC] (de-
scribing the right to health as including an obligation by the contracting states to decrease
the causes of illness and encourage through education and advice that every individual
should take responsibility for her own health).
591. Id. art. 15.
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level of physical, mental and social well-being" includes six specific
areas within the right to health, including "[s] atisfaction of the health
needs of the highest risk groups. 592 The African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights contains "the right to enjoy the best attainable
state of physical and mental health" requiring the State to "take the
necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to en-
sure that they receive medical attention when they are sick."593
Despite the widespread recognition of the right to health across
these multiple sources, the scope and definition of the right to health
has remained vague and variable until recently.594 The existence of a
right to health is confirmed by numerous references in international
human rights instruments, but the varying terminology and lack of
specific elaboration have left the extent of the right unclear. Unlike
many issues related to civil and political rights, the regional human
rights systems did not provide significant jurisprudential development
to illuminate the contours of the right to health.595 An ongoing de-
bate persists in the human rights community over the meaning and
content of the right to health.596
592. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), adopted Nov. 17, 1988,
art. 10(2)(f), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic5.htm [hereinafter San
Salvador Protocol]. There are five other areas within the right to health that states must
make efforts to ensure:
a. Primary health care, that is, essential health care made available to all individu-
als and families in the community; b. Extension of the benefits of health services
to all individuals subject to the State's jurisdiction; c. Universal immunization
against the principal infectious diseases; d. prevention and treatment of endemic,
occupational and other diseases; [and] e. education of the population on the
prevention and treatment of health problems.
Id art. 10(2)(a)-(e).
593. African Charter, supra note 68, art. 16, 21 I.L.M. at 61.
594. For an extensive account of the development of the right to health, see TOEBES,
supra note 36, at 3-26.
595. Regional human rights litigation invoking the right to health has occurred infre-
quently and usually within a broader complaint asserting violations of multiple rights. The
Inter-American Commission, in particular, has recognized at least one explicit violation of
the right to health under Article XI of the American Declaration. See Annual Report of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 12/85, Case No. 7615 (Bra-
zil) (March 5, 1985), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm
(finding that building projects undertaken by Brazil that forced the Yanomani Indian
Tribe to abandon its homes violated the tribe members' right to health and well-being
under Article XI of the American Declaration of Human Rights). The jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Commission includes only violations of the tight to education and rights of
trade unions. TOEBES, supra note 36, at 186-87. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador will not
allow individuals to complain about a violation of their right to health. Id.
596. See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 27-30 (examining the disagreement over
the meaning of the right to health); Mann et al., supra note 41, at 11-18 (discussing three
relationships between health and human rights); TOEBES, supra note 36, at 245-59 (explor-
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Earlier scholarly analysis has explored an "ideology of entitle-
ment"-the idea that international human rights law affords a right to
mental health. 9 v The conceptualization of mental health as a human
right, and not simply a moral claim, suggests that states possess bind-
ing obligations to respect, defend, and promote that entitlement.
Considerable disagreement exists, however, as to whether "mental
health" is a meaningful, identifiable, operational, and enforceable
right, or whether it is merely aspirational or rhetorical.598 A right to
mental health that is too broadly defined lacks clear content and is
less likely to have a meaningful effect.599 For example, if health is, in
the World Health Organization's words, truly "a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being," then no one can ever achieve
it.6"' Even if this definition were construed as a reasonable, as op-
posed to an absolute standard, it remains difficult to implement, and
is unlikely to be justiciable.6'
Therefore, it is vital to delineate an unambiguous definition for
the right to health that helps clarify state obligations, identify viola-
tions, and establish criteria and procedures for enforcement.60 2 To
clarify the issue, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
ing the scope of the right to health); Kinney, supra note 39, at 1474-75 (discussing the
difference in the meaning of the right to health in the United States and the rest of the
world); David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 40-
48 (1999) (analyzing the right to health under various frameworks such as a government's
failure to give the public access to general health services); see atsoJamar, supra note 39, at
8-17 (exploring broad and narrow definitions of the right to health); Rosalia Rodriguez-
Garcia & Mohammad N. Akhter, Human Rights: The Foundation of Public Health Practice, 90
Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 693, 694 (2000) (describing how health professionals protect the
human rights of HIV/AIDS patients by preserving their right to privacy, providing them
with "equal access to medical care," and helping them retain employment).
597. Larry 0. Gostin, The Ideology of Entitlement: The Application of Contemporary Legal Ap-
proaches to Psychiatry, in MENTAL ILLNESS: CHANGES AND TRENDS 27, 27-54 (Philip Bean ed.,
1983); see Larry Gostin, The Mentally Ill and the Power of the State, in LIBERTY AND LEGISLATION,
supra note 47, at 76, 83-84 (proposing human rights principles that should guide a state's
relationship with the mentally ill); see also Larry Gostin, Human Rights in Mental Health, in
PSYCHIATRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAw 148, 148-49 (Martin Roth & Robert Bluglass eds.,
1985) (discussing the definition of human rights in the context of mental health).
598. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Human Right to Health: A Right to the "Highest Attainable
Standard of Health," 31 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 29, 29.
599. Id.
600. Id. WHO's Declaration of Alma Ata in 1978 reaffirms that: "[H]ealth, which is a
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity, is a fundamental human right and that the attainment of the highest
possible level of health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realization re-
quires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health
sector." WHO's Declaration of Alma-Ata, decl. I, adapted September 6-12, 1978, available at
http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration-almaata.pdf.
601. Gostin, supra note 598, at 29.
602. Id.
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and Cultural Rights, which oversees the implementation and monitor-
ing of the ICESCR, issued General Comment 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health.6 °3 The General Comment ex-
plicates the right to health under the ICESCR, representing the most
authoritative existing statement on the scope and meaning of the
right to health.6 °4
General Comment 14 conceives of a right to health that is exten-
sive, fundamental, and "indispensable for the exercise of other
human rights."60 5 Thus, the right to health encompasses public
health and health care, as well as other conditions that are necessary
determinants for people to live healthy lives, including adequate nu-
trition, housing, uncontaminated drinking water, sanitation, safe
workplaces, and a healthy environment.60 6 The right to health also
contains both "freedoms and entitlements."60 7 The freedoms are pro-
tections essentially drawn from the context of civil and political rights:
the right to have control over one's health and body, the right to sex-
ual and reproductive freedom, and freedom from interference, which
includes the right to be free from torture and medical treatment or
experimentation without consent.60 8 The entitlements, by compari-
son, include an affirmative "right to a system of health protection
which provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest
attainable level of health."60 9 The General Comment considers the
right to health in terms of broad norms, state obligations, violations,
and implementation standards.
The General Comment explores the normative context of the
right to health, citing the importance of availability, accessibility, ac-
ceptability, and quality within facilities, goods, and services.6 10 The
notion of "availability" requires the existence of the "underlying deter-
minants of health, such as safe and potable drinking water" and sani-
tation, as well as functional health services, including trained health
care professionals, adequate health treatment facilities, and access to
essential medicines. 61 1 The norm of "accessibility" ensures that health
facilities, goods, and services are available to all, and prohibits discrim-
ination and economic, geographic, physical, or informational barriers
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. General Comment 14, supra note 37, 1.
606. Id. 11.
607. Id. 8.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id. 12.
611. Id. 12(a).
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to access.61 2 Health services must be acceptable under medical ethics
standards and from the perspective of cultural traditions. 613 Further-
more, health services must adhere to high quality standards that are
scientifically and medically appropriate.614
The state is faced with three obligations: to respect, protect, and
fulfill the right to health.6" Under the duty to respect, a state may
not interfere "directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to
health."6 6 This duty mandates that a state refrain from limiting equal
access to preventive, curative, and palliative health services, from im-
peding traditional preventive care and medical practices, and from
engaging in deleterious environmental practices."' The state is fur-
ther generally constrained from marketing unsafe drugs, with excep-
tions for treatment of mental illness and infectious diseases under
certain conditions.6" 8 The obligation to protect requires the state to
take affirmative measures to guarantee that traditional practices, pri-
vate parties, and businesses do not interfere with the right to
health.619 The responsibility to fulfill obligates the state to facilitate
and promote the right to health through positive measures that af-
firmatively enable and assist individuals and communities to fully en-
joy the right to health.6 2' Appropriate measures to achieve this goal
include legislative, budgetary, and promotional actions. 62 General
Comment 14 cites a number of core obligations as vital to ensuring a
minimal level of services: nondiscriminatory access to services, safe
and adequate food, potable water, basic shelter and sanitation, essen-
tial drugs, reproductive and maternal services, immunization, infec-
tious disease control, access to health information, and training of
health personnel.6 22
Violations of the right to health may occur through either action
or omission.623 For example, certain state policies actively deny access
to health services, propagate policies that result in harm to the health
612. Id 12(b).
613. Id. 12(c).
614. Id. 12(d).
615. Id. 33.
616. Id.
617. Id. 34.
618. Id. The Comment states that exceptions to marketing unproven drugs for mental
illness should only be undertaken under limited conditions, in consultation with interna-
tional standards such as the MI Principles. Id.
619. Id. 35.
620. Id. 36.
621. Id. 33.
622. Id. 9 43-44.
623. Id. 47.
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of the public, or otherwise contravene the standards set in the Gen-
eral Comment; others, however, just fail to take sufficient steps toward
the progressive realization of the right to health.6 24 A violation of the
second type will not occur if the state merely has insufficient resources
to comply but is willing to do so.
Finally, the General Comment outlines detailed implementation
standards that require states to develop framework legislation that sets
a national strategy, to devote resources to this strategy, to set goals and
benchmarks to evaluate progress, and to establish appropriate proce-
dures and remedies to hold violators accountable for their actions.6 25
The expansive and ambitious definition of the right to health de-
veloped by General Comment 14 could have a substantially beneficial
impact on the lives of persons with mental disabilities. 626 The estab-
lishment of a broad right to health increases the likelihood that na-
tional and local governments will augment the health services,
including mental health services, available to the public. A broad
right to health would likewise require governments to assure that
mental health services and the determinants of good mental health
were accessible, acceptable, and of appropriate quality, pursuant to
the norms established in the General Comment.
Persons with mental disabilities and their advocates could utilize
the General Comment 14 standards to insist that governments deliver
on their obligations related to the right to health. As an illustration of
how governments could use the right to health to achieve better con-
ditions for persons with mental disabilities, consider the creation of
community integration and treatment initiatives for persons with
mental disabilities. The government's "duty to respect" the right to
health mandates that it refrain from limiting equal access to mental
health services, including treatment facilities and preventive mental
health services.6 2 7 The "duty to protect" requires that the government
take action to prevent private parties from interfering with the right to
mental health. 62 8 Thus, individuals could hold the government ac-
countable pursuant to the right to health for failing to impose or en-
force sufficient standards and regulations on community mental
health care facilities or special residences for persons with mental dis-
624. Id. 48-52.
625. Id. 53-62.
626. Peter Mittler, Meeting the Needs of People with an Intellectual Disability: International
Perspectives, in DIFTERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 2, at 25, 26-31 (arguing that terminology
and definitions, in order to be effective, must reflect human rights values).
627. See General Comment 14, supra note 37, 34.
628. See id 35.
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abilities.6 29 Finally, the "duty to fulfill" supports affirmative govern-
ment efforts to ensure, for example, that they adequately provide
mental health services in the community setting, make efforts to edu-
cate the public about mental disability, and undertake preventive and
populational mental health initiatives.63 °
General Comment 14 highlights the linkages between the right to
health and other human rights. From a normative perspective, this
correlation of rights elevates the right to health so it has equal stand-
ing with other rights. From a practical perspective, it provides an ad-
ditional tool to promote mental health through human rights. Many
of the activities that violate the right to health may also transgress
other human rights. An example of this can be seen in the interac-
tion between the right to health and the right not to be subjected to
inhuman and degrading treatment.63 Regional courts in the Ameri-
cas and Europe have found violations of the prohibition on inhuman
and degrading treatment where a mentally ill person is detained in
squalid, inhumane conditions and does not receive appropriate treat-
ment.632 However, the same actions that give rise to an inhuman and
degrading treatment violation under these circumstances could also
be seen as violating the right to health.633 Subjecting persons with
mental disabilities to poor conditions while in confinement and fail-
ing to provide them with adequate medical and psychiatric treatment
may result in significant physical and mental deterioration or even
death; consequently, these conditions do not comport with the gov-
ernment's obligations under the right to health. Thus, the incorpora-
tion of right to health claims along with other, more established,
human rights claims in regional jurisprudence can help legitimize
629. See id.
630. See id. 36.
631. The Inter-American Convention actually combines its prohibition on inhuman and
degrading treatment and its civil and political protection of health within Article 5 of the
American Convention. American Convention, supra note 68, art. 5, 9 I.L.M. at 2-3. This
provision establishes a right to "humane" treatment, a concept that encompasses protec-
tion against inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to physical and mental
health. Id. However, the right to health found in this section has not been interpreted as
broadly as in General Comment 14. General Comment 14, supra note 37, 4. The Proto-
col of San Salvador contains a much more detailed (and substantial) right to health that is
more analogous to the scope of the right in General Comment 14. San Salvador Protocol,
supra note 592, art. 10.
632. See Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 913, 964
(2001) (Court report) (finding inhuman and degrading treatment where a prisoner with
known mental health problems was segregated for seven days without adequate medical
care and subsequently committed suicide).
633. See TOEBES, supra note 36, at 264-66 (noting that the right to health covers inhuman
and degrading treatment).
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and solidify the right to health in these regional systems. More fre-
quent utilization of the right to health will allow it to become part of a
robust framework of rights protecting mental health, securing mental
health services for those in need of them, and improving the related
social determinants that affect mental health.
In 2002, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights ap-
pointed a Special Rapporteur with a mandate to focus on the right to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.634 The Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, identified
three primary objectives in his preliminary report in 2003: to pro-
mote, and encourage others to promote, "the right to health as a fun-
damental human right; to clarify the contours and content of the
right to health; and to identify good practices for the operationaliza-
tion of the right to health at the community, national, and interna-
tional levels." '635 The Rapporteur will explore these objectives
through two interrelated themes: the intersection of the right to
health and poverty and of the right to health and prejudicial
actions."'
Persons with mental disabilities stand to benefit greatly from the
activities of the Special Rapporteur. Efforts to promote health as a
fundamental human right, to the extent they are successful, will help
establish an international baseline for acceptable compliance with the
right to health. This will simultaneously create a floor of mental
health services necessary to maintain a mentally healthy population.
The identification of good practices for implementation of the right
to health at all jurisdictional levels could have a far-reaching effect on
the availability of health services for persons with mental disabilities.
As the affirmative aspects of the right to health become more ac-
cepted internationally, national and local jurisdictions are more likely
to provide and fund community mental health services. The Special
Rapporteur's designated focus areas will also necessarily address issues
important to persons with mental disabilities.
637
B. Problems with Definition, Standards, Implementation, and Enforcement
General Comment 14 is timely and relevant to persons with
mental disabilities. The Comment addresses the right to health more
634. Hunt, supra note 38. The Commission on Human Rights appointed Paul Hunt,
who is from New Zealand, in August 2002 for a three-year term. Id. at 2.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. See id. at 22 (noting that persons with mental disabilities are especially susceptible
to human rights violations).
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systematically and extensively than any prior discussion of the right to
health.638 Further, its provisions immediately apply to all states that
have ratified the ICESCR.6" 9 However, it is too soon to predict the
practical effect the Comment will have on the recognition of the right
to health worldwide.
If the right to health is to become tangible, rather than aspira-
tional, international institutions and governments must not only heed
the guidance of General Comment 14, but also must articulate achiev-
able methods of implementing and enforcing its provisions. 640 The
failure to impose sufficient implementation and enforcement obliga-
tions-such as outcome measurement indices and international re-
porting systems-on national governments may eviscerate the
practical importance of the right to health in international prac-
tice.6 4 ' Two obvious obstacles may hinder widespread implementa-
tion. First, General Comment 14 directly applies only to countries
that have ratified the ICESCR.6 42 Therefore, countries not party to
the ICESCR, such as the United States, are not legally bound to follow
the right to health as outlined by the General Comment. 643 While the
standard advanced by General Comment 14 may eventually become
customary international law, the universal acceptance of a broad right
to health may nonetheless not occur for an extended period of time.
Second, the level of implementation is partially contingent on the re-
sources of the particular state. 644 "The right to health" is not
equivalent to the "right to be healthy[,] 645 since the attainment of
good health depends on multiple determinants, including biological
preconditions.646 Under the "progressive realization" standard of the
ICESCR, governments with insufficient resources will not have to ful-
fill a robust right to health with any degree of immediacy or haste.6 4 7
Nevertheless, the drafting of General Comment 14 and the con-
tinuing mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Health hold promise
638. See General Comment 14, supra note 37, 1 4 (noting that the right to health incor-
porates a wide range of factors and determinants).
639. Id. 1 42.
640. See Kinney, supra note 39, at 1471 (describing the difficulties and importance of
implementing General Comment 14's guidance).
641. Id. at 1471-74.
642. General Comment 14, supra note 37, 1 42.
643. See Kinney, supra note 39, at 1471.
644. General Comment 14, supra note 37, 1 47.
645. Id. 1 8.
646. Id. 11 8-9.
647. General Comment 3: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. CESCR, 5th Sess., 1 9, U.N. Doc. E/
1991/23 (1990), available at http://www.cesr.org/ESCR/gencomment3.htm.
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for the future of the right to health and the application of this right to
mental health. The aforementioned developments signal an increas-
ing international interest in the right to health and have elucidated
the clearest explanation yet of how human rights can affirmatively im-
prove physical and mental health.
C. The Right to Health in a Mental Health Context
The right to health, to the extent that it exists in international
instruments, necessarily and clearly includes both physical and mental
health. Many of the international texts specifically mention "mental
health" in their right to health guarantees. Those that do not explic-
itly mention mental health contemplate an ideal of health that en-
compasses mental as well as physical well-being.64 Just as it is difficult
to address the right to health without contemplating other related
human rights, it is difficult to consider mental and physical health
separately in the context of human rights-a certain level of both
mental and physical health are necessary to ensure the ability to enjoy
and benefit from other human rights.
The right to health, together with other human rights, supports
modem trends in mental health policy and practice, including com-
munity integration initiatives for persons with mental disabilities and
the budding concept of public mental health.649 Community integra-
tion is based on the theory that persons with mental disabilities can
receive effective treatment in a community setting.650 Community
care does not involve as drastic a curtailment of civil and political
rights as does institutionalization. Consequently, detention in a psy-
chiatric facility should only occur under exceptional circumstances
where the person requires continual psychiatric and medical care and
poses a risk to himself or others.65 1
648. See Gostin, supra note 573, at 271 (explaining that the right to mental health is
noted both explicitly in international texts such as ICESCR and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights and implicitly in texts such as the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights).
649. See INST. OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HE.ALTH 111-12 (1988) (discussing
the need to continue developing the relationship between public health and mental
health).
650. Id.
651. SeeWinterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1979) (delineat-
ing the elements necessary to detain a person of unsound mind).
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D. Two Fundamental Aspects of the Right to Mental Health: Individual
Mental Health and Public Mental Health
The right to mental health contains two equally important com-
ponents-the right to individual mental health and the right to public
mental health. An individualized concept of mental health empha-
sizes the conditions most relevant to the mental health status of a par-
ticular individual.652 This individual concept predominates most of
the discourse related to human rights. Protecting the individual's in-
terest in autonomy or liberty is the basis for most civil and political
rights. Certain components of social and economic rights focus on
the individual as well; an affirmative right to health can be construed
to apply directly to the mental health care needs of a specific individ-
ual.653 If the government knowingly implements policies and prac-
tices that are harmful to the mental health of individuals, there may
be a violation of the right to individual mental health. Similarly, if the
state withholds services necessary to maintain the mental health of in-
dividuals, it may violate that same right.
By contrast, public mental health approaches issues of mental
health from a population-based perspective.6 54 The human rights
community has increasingly come to recognize the synergies between
human rights and populational health.655 Thus, it is interesting and
timely to conceive of human rights from the perspective of the needs
of populations as opposed to individuals.
It is helpful to view public mental health through the prism of
public health.656 The Institute of Medicine, in its seminal report The
Future of Public Health, proposed one of the most influential contempo-
rary definitions: "Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively
to assure the conditions for people to be healthy."6 57 The emphasis
on cooperative and mutually shared obligation ("we, as a society") re-
652. See, e.g., MI Principles, G.A. Res. 119, supra note 28, principle 9(2), [1991] 45
U.N.Y.B. at 622 (explaining that mental health practitioners should consult with the pa-
tient in formulating their course of treatment).
653. See HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 16 (commenting that identifica-
tion of health impacts and violations of rights will help uncover burdens on mental well-
being).
654. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 11-14
(2000) (explaining that public health research and actions benefit the "collective
population").
655. See HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 16 (noting the needs for in-
creased capacity to utilize public health methods to study and identify human rights
violations).
656. See generally GOSTIN, supra note 654, at 3-22 (explaining the public health system);
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A READER (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 2002).
657. INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 649, at 19.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
inforces that collective entities (i.e., governments) should take respon-
sibility for mentally healthy populations.658
Public mental health goes beyond merely providing care and re-
habilitation services. Rather, the state must assure the existence of
multiple conditions in which people can be mentally healthy.659
Many policies and practices affect mental health-including those
that give people a sense of belonging and purpose, and those that
reduce highly stressful conditions.
The more extensive descriptions of the right to health, such as
those found in General Comment 14 and in some of the regional
human rights instruments, directly mention population-based health
obligations that fit well within the traditional public health paradigm.
For example, General Comment 14 requires states to facilitate efforts
to improve health for both individuals and communities.66 ° These ef-
forts include public health functions such as immunization, infectious
disease control, and access to health information in its list of core
obligations.661
At the regional level, the Protocol of San Salvador in the Inter-
American System specifically includes public health requirements in
its right to health provision. 66 2 The Protocol requires states to make
efforts to ensure "[u]niversal immunization against the principal in-
fectious diseases; [p]revention and treatment of endemic, occupa-
tional and other diseases; [e]ducation of the population on the
prevention and treatment of health problems, and [s] atisfaction of
the health needs of the highest risk groups." "' The European Social
Charter's right to health similarly embraces components of public
health practice, charging states "to remove as far as possible the causes
of ill-health; to provide advisory and educational facilities for the pro-
motion of health ... ; to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic
and other diseases." '6 6 4 The rights and duties created by these instru-
ments compel states to take affirmative measures to buttress the foun-
dations of public health within society.
We offer the following concise definition of public mental health:
658. See id. at 32, 112 (discussing the need for governmental health obligations, support
of public health efforts, and the application of fundamental public health concepts to
mental health).
659. See id. at 112 (suggesting there is a public health need to develop effective means to
reduce the risks of mental illness).
660. General Comment 14, supra note 37, 1 36-37.
661. Id.
662. San Salvador Protocol, supra note 592, art. 10.
663. Id. (enumeration omitted).
664. ESC, supra note 590, art. 11 (enumeration omitted).
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The duty of the state, within the limits of its available re-
sources, to assure the conditions necessary for people to at-
tain and maintain mental health.665
This definition places explicit obligations on the state, and recognizes
that a claim to a right to mental health imposes a correlating duty.
666
By acknowledging that states possess varying capabilities, this defini-
tion also requires a state to act only within the limits of its resources to
secure the right to mental health.667 The definition does not impose
an absolute standard because mental health is affected by many fac-
tors outside of government's control (e.g., genetics, behavior, and
stressful conditions).668 However, it requires the state to ensure the
conditions under which the public can be mentally healthy.669 Gov-
ernments can do a great deal to improve the mental health of popula-
tions, including providing decent economic conditions, education
and health information, opportunities for meaningful employment,
social and welfare services, primary and secondary mental health care,
community mental health services, and hospital-based treatment and
670
services.
Governments can also positively affect mental health by improv-
ing the underlying societal conditions that would otherwise negatively
impact the mental health of populations. Governments can help or-
ganize social life to avoid stressful conditions and promote positive
mental health-for example by implementing policies that favor hu-
mane work conditions, time and space for recreation and relaxation,
and assistance with stress-causing circumstances such as child rearing
and debt. Government obligations, then, go beyond the provision of
individual psychiatric services. Governments should also assure a
broad array of services that are necessary for populations to maintain
mental health.67' The definition does not, however, guarantee a mini-
mal standard of mental health because, given widely disparate re-
source levels, a single international standard would be unworkable.6 7 2
The application of public health methods to mental health prac-
tice, within the boundaries and context of human rights, could yield
positive results for persons with mental disabilities and for the public's
mental health generally. For instance, government could attempt to
665. Gostin, supra note 573, at 271.
666. Id.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 271-72.
671. Id. at 272.
672. Id.
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raise public awareness about mental disability issues. The use of pub-
lic education campaigns-a staple of regular public health practice-
to reduce the stigma and fear surrounding mental disability, can re-
duce the estrangement of mentally disabled individuals from the com-
munity.6 73 Efforts to promote greater understanding and acceptance
of persons with mental disability by others in the community will bol-
ster community integration initiatives and provide persons with
mental disability with an opportunity to live richer, fuller, and more
interactive lives in the community. Education campaigns can also
serve preventive goals, informing the public about the availability of
mental health care services for themselves and others about whom
they care.6 74 Finally, public mental health education campaigns can
advance the public policy debate over the rights of persons with
mental disabilities, from both an individual and community
perspective.
The application of other disciplines, such as screening and epide-
miology, can also benefit mental health. Epidemiological investiga-
tions into the incidence and prevalence of mental health conditions
can help identify trends and concentrations of mental disability in the
community.675 Governments can then use this information to target
scarce resources to assist those in need of mental health care or re-
lated interventions.676 Initiatives to detect and rapidly identify per-
sons with mental disabilities will allow for the detection of mental
disabilities before they worsen, and permit timely intervention. This
will, in turn, improve the mental health of those at risk of developing
a mental disability and enhance the aggregate mental health of the
entire community.
Lastly, public mental health can improve mental health in the
population through its efforts related to other areas of health. Public
health practice excels at reducing the underlying determinants of dis-
ease and injury. 677 General Comment 14 recognizes the underlying
determinants of health as central to the state's duty under the right to
health. 678 This relationship applies equally well to mental health con-
ditions-maintaining good conditions in the environment, safe food
and water, and adequate shelter and sanitation will help preserve a
673. See GoSTIN, supra note 654, at 150-51 (discussing governments' use of public educa-
tion campaigns to raise awareness about public health concerns).
674. See id.
675. INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 649, at 111-12.
676. Id at 111.
677. Id. at 40-41.
678. General Comment 14, supra note 37, 4.
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higher level of mental health than would occur in the absence of
these conditions.679 Thus, efforts by public health agencies to im-
prove these conditions comprise an additional component of public
mental health practice. 680 The recognition of the importance of these
underlying determinants in human rights norms gives them extra
credence in public mental health practice.
Attention to mental health issues by public health agencies is in-
tegral to the realization of the right to mental health. Since most pub-
lic health activity takes place at the local level, the incorporation of
human rights norms into local policies and procedures may present a
promising approach to using human rights standards to support the
goals of public mental health. Law and policy instruction from na-
tional and international sources are necessary components of this en-
deavor, but concerted efforts at the local level to highlight the
importance of human rights norms to public mental health will help
to improve mental health conditions.
VI. THE FUTURE OF HuMAN RIGHTS FOR PERSONS
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
International human rights law can do much to promote good
mental health in the population generally and improve the lives of
persons with mental disabilities. This Article provides some insight
into the development of a remarkable, but still incomplete, human
rights structure that acts as a potent means to achieve these goals. An
intricate and dynamic human rights framework has been developed at
the international and regional levels. The components of this frame-
work-documents defining human rights, and institutions enforcing
and interpreting them-have created evolving human rights systems
that protect and guarantee fundamental rights to all, regardless of lo-
cation or situation.68 These international and regional mechanisms
have increasingly demonstrated concern over abuses of human rights
that affect persons with mental disabilities and awareness of the role
that human rights can serve in preventing these abuses and fostering
good mental health throughout the population.682
679. See id.
680. See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 649, at 112 (concluding that pubic health efforts
in the mental health area should be consistent with overall public health goals).
681. See HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 9-11 (stating that various docu-
ments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have set forth human rights
standards that are becoming a part of global life).
682. See generally Herr, supra note 22, at 115 (outlining the history of human rights
agreements and discussing how governments can use them to improve mental health).
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The various systems for the protection of human rights present
the opportunity to provide tangible human rights protection for per-
sons with mental disabilities at both the individual and populational
level. Reporting, investigatory, and adjudicatory mechanisms allow
for the detection and prevention of human rights violations in the
context of mental health."83 In some circumstances, particularly
under the regional institutions, individuals may bring their grievances
directly to human rights institutions to obtain specific relief from vio-
lations.684 Reports or decisions by human rights bodies, therefore,
have a potentially powerful effect on the lives of persons with mental
disabilities. Moreover, to the extent that these decisions interpret and
clarify the scope and application of human rights to persons with
mental disabilities, they provide generalizable principles applicable to
subsequent government activities and enforcement. 68 5 These general-
izable principles can promote mental health for individuals and popu-
lations. In the individual context, persons with mental disabilities
facing similar conditions will receive the protection of established
human rights norms.6" 6 In the public mental health context, govern-
ments will have an obligation to create conditions to protect and pro-
mote the mental health of the populace.
Persons with mental disabilities will benefit from the continual
development of human rights systems at the international and re-
gional levels. The respective systems play different but complemen-
tary roles in building and reinforcing a vibrant and enforceable
human rights structure for the protection and promotion of the rights
of persons with mental disabilities. The United Nations System con-
tinues to progressively enhance its human rights framework through
efforts to enact new instruments, both binding and nonbinding, to
protect mental health within the rubric of human rights.68 7 Initiatives
such as the proposed international convention on disability and the
ongoing mandate of the Special Rapporteurs on Health and Disability
683. See id. at 128-35 (discussing the implementation of human rights standards related
to intellectual disabilities through reports, resolutions, nongovernmental organizations,
and case law).
684. Id. at 126.
685. See id. at 132-33 (noting that Wyatt, a mental disability rights case, led to refinement
of standards in many subsequent disability rights cases).
686. See HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 10-11 (suggesting that increased
focus and implementation of human rights standards could lead to human rights norms
becoming global standards).
687. See Hunt, supra note 38, 90-94 (specifically recognizing the right to mental
health and the need for improved access to this right).
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Rights advance the development of stronger, more enforceable rights
for persons with mental disabilities.688
Regional human rights systems offer a substantial opportunity to
provide additional human rights protection for persons with mental
disabilities. The development of human rights jurisprudence at the
regional level, particularly in the European system, has refined inter-
national understanding of the applicability of human rights to mental
health and has extended the scope of this understanding.689 The
unique jurisdiction and mandate of the regional institutions has facili-
tated these efforts. The ability of individuals, and in some cases
NGOs, to directly access regional institutions has allowed the victims
of human rights abuses to take more proactive steps to shed light on
these abuses and prevent them from recurring.69 ° Individual access to
regional courts has provided an opportunity for victims of human
rights abuses to receive direct redress for the abuses, through com-
pensation or otherwise. 69 1 The collective jurisprudence of the re-
gional systems has established significant protections for persons with
mental disabilities. 692 Regional institutions have frequently forwarded
novel and innovative interpretations of how governments should ap-
ply human rights to mental health.693 Moreover, regional institutions
have shown a demonstrable and laudable tendency to adopt prece-
dents from international instruments, such as the MI Principles, and
from the jurisprudence of other regional systems.694 Pursuant to this
tradition, the regional systems may be the first venues to decipher,
interpret, and apply the right to health outlined in General Comment
14. The structure of the regional systems has yielded a focus and flexi-
bility not found in the United Nations System-therein lies their
688. See id.
689. See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that the European system has
produced the most extensive regional human rights jurisprudence).
690. Id. at 10-11.
691. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 35, art. 5(5) (providing victims of unlawful arrest or
detention a right to compensation).
692. See Fennell, supra note 247, at 110-15 (examining developments of the European
Court of Human Rights in mental health policy and rights); see also Harding, supra note
247, at 258-68 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of the ECHR's influence on mental
health policies).
693. Harding, supra note 247, at 260-62.
694. See, e.g., Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 63/99,
para. 54 (1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Ecua-
dor%2011427.htm (utilizing the MI principles as guidance).
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promise in playing a continuing prominent role in the area of mental
health and human rights.695
The enforcement of existing human rights instruments in the
United Nations System has not measured up well to its regional coun-
terparts. United Nations institutions have the authority under ex-
isting international law to engage more proactively in the protection
and promotion of the human rights of persons with mental disabili-
ties, regardless of the status of new conventions or other initiatives.696
When the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has strongly pursued
fact-finding investigations in the past, it has successfully pressured na-
tional governments to revise mental health laws that violate human
rights. For instance, in 1985, criticism of Japan's mental hygiene law
based upon the conclusions of a fact-finding mission spurred the Japa-
nese government to institute serious reforms to their mental health
system.697 The use of fact-finding expeditions and critical reports
from United Nations monitoring committees, special rapporteurs,
and human rights NGOs can exert pressure on governments which
fail to respect human rights. These efforts are vital to the continued
evolution of human rights protections for persons with mental
disabilities.
The rise of the right to health as an important concept in interna-
tional human rights law is also crucial to the interests of persons with
mental disabilities. Development of an international consensus on
the right to health is ongoing and may prove difficult across the com-
plicated landscape of international human rights systems.698 Indeed,
it may take many years for the broad conception of the right to health
envisioned by the authors of General Comment 14 to become a practi-
695. Dinah Shelton, The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems, in THE FUTURE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 351, 352-53 (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds.,
1999).
696. See generally Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 3, 7-15 (providing an
overview of international human rights law and its enforcement).
697. See Gostin, supra note 46, at 362. At the time,Japan had over 30,000 persons in civil
confinement on consent given by third parties. The accompanying report accused Japan
of violating section 9 (4) of the ICCPR. Id. Japan agreed in the wake of the report to revise
its law. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN MENTAL HEALTH IN JAPAN (1987); Gos-
tin, supra note 46, at 353, 361-62. NGOs have had success using similar tactics. Mental
Disability Rights International's report on Mexican mental asylums prompted a negative
report from the Inter-American Commission and the subsequent revision of national
mental health policies. Mental Disability Rights International, Human Rights & Mental
Health: Mexico, at 58 (September 2000), available at http://www.mdri.org/publications/
index.htm.
698. Cf TOEBES, supra note 36, at 16-17 (describing controversy over use of the term
"right to health").
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cal reality. Nevertheless, substantial efforts to establish a strong right
to health continue at the international and regional levels.699 Interna-
tional institutions and NGOs have already begun to forge a strong in-
ternational precedent for a more dynamic right to health. 70 0 The
activities of the Special Rapporteur on Health have also bolstered ef-
forts in this direction.70 ' Regional systems, which have already recog-
nized a right to health in their foundational instruments and case
law,70 2 are poised to incorporate a broader interpretation of the right
to health into their jurisprudence. Additionally, the promulgation of
new human rights instruments and institutions related to disability
rights could provide yet another venue for the expansion of an affirm-
ative right to mental health. 7 3 These collective efforts represent a
burgeoning and multifaceted movement around the right to health
that could have enormous positive consequences for persons with
mental disabilities. It will be essential, however, to devote more fo-
cused attention to public mental health.
Finally, human rights norms that will protect and promote the
interests of persons with mental disabilities do not have to exist solely
at the international level. National governments may incorporate
these norms into their domestic legislative structure. Many countries
have undertaken serious efforts at mental health law reform, but many
699. Seegenerally id. at 27-84 (describing international and regional actions to implement
a right to health).
700. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been extremely active in the continu-
ing development and understanding of the right to health. WHO has undertaken several
initiatives to promote the right to health, including staff training in the right to health,
publication of explanatory materials for the public, and consultation with the Special Rap-
porteur on Health. See Written Submission by the World Health Organization, U.N. ESCOR,
Comm'n on Human Rights, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/122 (2003), at 7, available
at http://www.who.int/hhr/en/WHO-written-submission_59thsession.pdf. WHO is also
in the process of developing a global health and human rights resource database and an
annotated bibliography of health and human rights materials. Id. Moreover, the WHO
has implemented a mental health Global Action Programme (mhGAP), which includes
initiatives such as the WHO Mental Health Legislation Manual and an international forum
on mental health and human rights that occurred in November 2003. WHO Project, supra
note 31. For additional resources related to these WHO initiatives, see World Health Or-
ganization, Health and Human Rights, http://www.who.int/hhr/en/ (last visited Nov. 11,
2003).
701. See Hunt, supra note 38, 90-94 (outlining the Special Rapporteur's approach to
promoting the right to mental health).
702. See GoSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 1, at 11.
703. In addition to the proposed U.N. convention, the Inter-American Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities created a
new committee to monitor and report on the progress of disability rights by states in the
Inter-American System. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, adopted June 7, 1999, art. VI, at http://
www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/disability.htm.
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others continue to have antiquated and obsolete laws that do not con-
form to human rights standards or provide adequate authority to im-
plement these standards within a national system. 0 Countries that
wish to proceed may either modify their national legal systems to con-
form to human rights obligations, or incorporate international
human rights jurisprudence as precedent in their national mental
health schemes. Some countries, particularly those in the Council of
Europe, have adopted both approaches. 705 The existence of human
rights standards at the national level ensures that individuals have the
right to redress their grievances in a national forum and reduces the
urgency of international oversight, assuming that the government is
complying with the standards set out in the legislation.7" 6 The WHO
Mental Health Legislation Manual will provide a useful guide for na-
tional governments attempting to accomplish law reform.70 7
The human rights of persons with mental disabilities can be effec-
tively protected and promoted through international human rights
law. Regional systems have extensively developed civil and political
rights that protect mentally disabled individuals.70 8 By contrast, eco-
nomic and social rights, including the right to mental health, remain
underutilized in all of the international systems, despite an emerging
consensus on the existence and viability of these rights. 7 9 New initia-
tives within the United Nations and regional systems hold significant
promise for advancing the right to mental health under international
law.7 l0 Similarly, the continued development of jurisprudence at the
regional level will complement other efforts to improve the human
rights protections and the lives of persons with mental disabilities.
Human rights are not a panacea for persons with mental disabili-
ties. Nevertheless, focused attention on the civil and political, as well
704. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 269-82 (discussing international ef-
forts to implement the MI Principles).
705. The United Kingdom, for instance, has passed mental health legislation that incor-
porates many of the human rights norms addressed in this Article and has additionally
passed legislation incorporating the case law of the European Court into its domestic law.
Mental Health Act, 1983, c. 20 (Eng.); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
706. See Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 287-88 (discussing the importance of
domestic enforcement of international standards).
707. World Health Organization, Mental Health and Human Rights Project, available at
http://www.who.int/mental_health/polity/legislation/humanrights/en (last visited Sept.
24, 2003).
708. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 35 (delineating civil and political rights that European
member states should respect).
709. See Gosin, supra note 573, at 270 (describing the view of most countries that civil
and political rights are more important than economic and social rights).
710. See Hunt, supra note 38, 90-94 (setting forth the goals and methods for advanc-
ing the right to mental health).
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as social and economic rights of this group is vitally important. Coun-
tries have treated persons with mental disabilities horribly throughout
history and into the present."' Governments have failed to serve
their needs for treatment, care, and support, and have failed to pro-
tect their rights and dignity.7 12 This historical neglect and animus
may end if the movement for human rights succeeds in lifting persons
with mental disabilities from their historically inferior status.
711. See id. 93 (noting reports of human rights violations, such as torture and sexual
exploitation, at institutions designated for treatment).
712. See id. 1 91 (asserting that mental health is a low priority for many governments).
